

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION**

In Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. § Case No. **19-34054-SGJ-11**

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

Appellant §

vs. §

Highland Capital Management, L.P, et al § **3:23-CV-2071-E**

Appellee §

**[3904] Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders"
Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary
Proceeding. Entered on 8/25/2023.**

Volume 38

APPELLANT RECORD

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

In re:

HIGHLAND CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT, L.P.

Reorganized Debtor.

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Chapter 11

Case No. 19-34054-sgj11

INDEX

APPELLANT HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

COMES NOW Appellant/Movant Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, both in its individual capacity and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust,¹ (collectively, "Appellant" or "HMIT"), and files this Second Supplemental² Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009(a)(1):

I.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- A. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that the "colorable" claim analysis allowed the court to consider evidence and other non-pleading materials including, but not limited to, the court's reasoning that:
1. the colorability analysis is stricter than a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis;
 2. the colorability analysis is "akin to the standards applied under the ... *Barton* doctrine";
 3. the colorability analysis requires a "hybrid" of the *Barton* doctrine and "what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place"; and/or,

¹ And in all capacities and alternative derivative capacities asserted in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, and 3816] ("Emergency Motion"), the supplement to the Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 3760], and the draft Complaint attached to the same [Dkt. No. 3760-1].

² Appellant files this Second Supplement pursuant to the Clerk's request at Docket #3949 and correspondence on 10/23/2023.

4. “[t]here may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave”?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3781, 3790, 3903-04].

- B. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant lacked constitutional or prudential standing to bring its claims in its individual and derivative capacities?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- C. Did the bankruptcy court err in alternatively determining that, even under a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, Appellant did not assert colorable claims including, but not limited to, determining that:

1. Appellant’s allegations are conclusory, speculative, or constitute “legal conclusions”;
2. Appellant’s claims or allegations are not “plausible”;
3. Appellant’s allegations pertaining to a *quid pro quo* are “pure speculation”;
4. Proposed Defendant James P. Seery (“Seery”) owed no duty to Appellant in any capacity as a matter of law;
5. Appellant failed “to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty”;
6. Appellant’s allegations pertaining to its aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims are speculative and not plausible;
7. The remedies of equitable disallowance and equitable subordination are not remedies “available” to Appellant as a matter of law;
8. Appellant’s unjust enrichment claim is invalid as a matter of law because “Seery’s compensation is governed by express agreements”;
9. Appellant is not entitled to declaratory relief because it has no colorable claims; and/or
10. Appellant cannot recover punitive damages for its breach of fiduciary duty claim?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- D. Alternatively, even if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its “hybrid” *Barton* analysis controls, did the court violate Appellant’s due process rights by denying Appellant its requested discovery?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3800, 3853, 3903-04, June 8, 2023 Hearing].

- E. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant’s requested discovery including, but not limited to:

1. ordering that Appellant could not request or obtain any discovery other than a deposition of Seery and James D. Dondero; and/or
2. determining that state court “Rule 202” proceedings supported the denial of discovery?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3800 & June 8, 2023 Hearing; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- F. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant’s alternative request for a continuance to obtain the requested discovery?

- G. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant’s evidence, or admitting the same for only limited purposes, offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

- H. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by overruling Appellant’s objections to Appellees’ evidence offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?

- I. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant’s experts’ testimony?

[See Dkt. No. 3853; *see also* Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- J. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by striking Appellant’s proffer of its excluded experts’ testimony from the record?

[See Dkt. No. 3869].

- K. Alternatively, if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its “hybrid” *Barton* analysis controls, did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant had not asserted colorable claims under that “hybrid” analysis including, but not limited to, its findings that:

1. there is no evidence to support that Seery shared material non-public information with the Claims Purchasers;
2. there is no evidence to support the alleged quid pro quo;
3. the material shared was *public* information; and/or
4. the Claims Purchasers had sufficient and lawful reasons to pay the amounts paid

for the purchased claims.

[See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- L. Did the bankruptcy court err in finding that Appellant is controlled by Dondero, and, as such, Appellant “cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose”?
- M. Alternatively, does sufficient evidence support the bankruptcy court’s evidentiary findings made pursuant to its “hybrid” *Barton* analysis?
- N. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying an expedited hearing on Appellant’s Motion for Leave? [See Dkt. 3713].
- O. Does the bankruptcy court’s use of a new “colorability” standard to determine if claims by non-debtors against other non-debtors may proceed violate *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny?
- P. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying Appellant’s Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or Alternatively, for New Trial under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 including, but not limited to by:
 - 1. declining to consider disclosures that demonstrated that Appellant is “in the money”—an issue pertinent to the court’s erroneous standing decisions; and
 - 2. concluding that the disclosures failed to reinforce Appellant’s standing to pursue the claims presented?

[Dkt. 3936].

II.
DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION
IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

Vol. 1
1. Notice of Appeal

- a. Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3906];
- b. Amended Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3908]; and
- c. Second Amended Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3945]

2. The judgment, order, or decree appealed from:

- a. Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan “Gatekeeper Provision” and Pre-Confirmation “Gatekeeper Orders”: Denying Hunter Mountain Investment

000835
000940

Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceedings [Dkts. 3903 & 3904]; and

001045

- b. Order Denying Motion of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Seeking Relief Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 [Dkt. 3936].

3. Docket sheet.

001049

- a. Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054

4. Other Items to be included:

- a. HMIT hereby designates the following items in the record on appeal from Cause No. 19-34054-sgj11:

Vol. 2	FILE DATE	DOCKET NO. (INCLUDING ALL ATTACHMENTS AND APPENDICES)	DESCRIPTION
001594	01/22/2021	1808	Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)
001660	02/22/2021	1943	Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief
001821	09/09/2022	3503	Motion to Conform Plan filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
001830	02/27/203	3671	Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reorganized Debtor's Motion to Conform Plan
Vol. 3	03/28/2023	3699 (3699-1 — 3699-5)	HMIT Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
001849	03/28/2023	3700 (3700-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
Vol. 4	03/30/2023	3704	Farallon, Stonehill, Jessup and Muck Objection to Motion for Expedited Hearing
002236	03/30/2023	3705	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
002243			
002248			

Vol. 5 002251	03/30/2023	3706	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
002254	03/30/2023	3707	Highland's Response in Opposition to Emergency Motion for Leave
002262	03/30/2023	3708 (3708-1 — 3708-8)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of the Highland Parties' Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Opposed Application for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
002348	03/31/2023	3712	HMIT Reply in Support of Application for Expedited Hearing
002355	03/31/2023	3713	Order Denying Motion for Expedited Hearing
002358	04/04/2023	3718 (3718-1 — 3718-4)	HMIT Motion for Leave to File Appeal
002391	04/04/2023	3719 (3719-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Appeal
002398	04/05/2023	3720	Order Denying HMIT's Opposed Motion for Expedited Hearing
002400	04/05/2023	3721 (3721-1 — 3721-2) Thru Vol. 7	HMIT Notice of Appeal
Vol. 8 002826	04/06/2023	3726 (3726-1) Thru Vol. 9	Certificate of Mailing regarding HMIT Notice of Appeal
Vol. 9 003257	04/07/2023	3731	Notice of Docketing Transmittal of Notice of Appeal
003260	04/13/2023	3738 (3738-1)	Highland's Opposed Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix a Briefing Schedule and Set a Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
003270	04/13/2023	3739	Highland's Motion for Expedited Hearing
003278	04/13/2023	3740	Joinder to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date With Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon

		Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC	
7	04/13/2023	3741	Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
6	04/13/2023	3742	Amended Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
11	04/13/2023	3745	Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice by Omar Jesus Alaniz filed by James P. Seery Jr.
94	04/15/2023	3747	Joinder by James P. Seery Jr. to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
6	04/17/2023	3748	HMIT's Response and Reservation of Rights
9	04/19/2023	3751	Notice of Status Conference
02	04/21/2023	3758	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"
1	04/21/2023	3759	HMIT's Notice of Rescheduling Hearing
14	04/21/2023	3761	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability" ³
23	04/23/2023	3760 (3760-1)	HMIT's Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
8	04/25/2023	3765	Transcript of Hearing held on 04/24/2023
30	05/11/2023	3780	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's (i) Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding; and (ii) Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck

³ A duplicate of Doc 3758.

Vol. 10			Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
003458	05/11/2023	3781	Order Fixing Briefing Scheduling and Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding as Supplemented
003463	05/11/2023	3783	Highland and Seery's Joint Response to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
Vol. 11	05/11/2023	3784 (3784-1 — 3784-46)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Response
003537 Thru Vol. 16	05/18/2023	3785	HMIT's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding
Vol. 17	05/22/2023	3787	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
004665	05/24/2023	3788 (3788-1 — 3788-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
004712	05/24/2023	3789	HMIT's Application for Expedited Hearing
004714	05/24/2023	3790	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
004808	05/25/2023	3791 (3791-1 — 3791-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
004813	05/25/2023	3792	Order Setting Expedited Hearing
004836	05/25/2023	3795	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
Vol. 18			
004930			
004931			

05/25/2023	3798 (3798-1)	Highland Parties' Joint Response in Opposition to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery
05/26/2023	3800	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
05/28/2023	3801	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
06/05/2023	3815 (3815-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3816 (3816-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
06/05/2023	3817 (3817-1 — 3817-5)	Highland Parties' Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Evidentiary Hearing on June 8, 2023
06/05/2023	3818 (3818-1 — 3818-9)	HMIT's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement
06/07/2023	3820	Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3821 (3821-1 — 3821-3)	Declaration in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/07/2023	3822 (3822-1)	HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal [WITHDRAWN]
06/07/2023	3823	Joinder to Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

06/07/2023	3824	HMIT's Objections to the Highland Parties' Exhibit and Witness List
06/08/2023	3828	HMIT's Response to Highland Claimant Trust and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Experts Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/09/2023	3837	Request for transcript regarding hearing held on 06/08/2023
06/12/2023	3838	Court admitted exhibits on hearing June 8, 2023 (See Docket Entry Nos. 3817 & 3818)
06/12/2023	3841	Highland Parties' Reply in Further Support of their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/12/2023	3842 (3842-1)	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery Jr.'s Reply in Further Support of Their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
06/13/2023	3843	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 06/08/2023
06/13/2023	3844	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 05/26/2023
06/13/2023	3845	HMIT's Request for Oral Hearing or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer
06/13/2023	3846	Response in Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Request for Oral Argument or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Creditor James P. Seery Jr.
06/13/2023	3847	HMIT's Reply to the Highland Parties' Response to Request for Oral Hearing
06/16/2023	3853	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence

Vol. 42 009928	06/16/2023	3854	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence
009944	06/19/2023	3858 (3858-1 — 3858-2)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) ⁴
010013	06/23/2023	3860	The Highland Parties' Objections to and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
010023	06/23/2023	3861	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to the Highland Parties' Objections and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
010025	07/05/2023	3869	Order Striking HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) and Limiting Briefing
010029	07/06/2023	3872	Notice of Filing of the Current Balance Sheet of the Highland Claimant Trust filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust
010035	07/21/2023	3888	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
010047	07/21/2023	3889	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by the Highland Claimant Trust
010059	08/17/2023	3901	Withdrawal of HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
Vol. 43 010062	09/08/2023	3905 (3905-1 — 3905-6)	Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or, Alternatively, for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 and Incorporated Relief Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

⁴ HMIT understands that the Court struck this proffer in docket entry 3869. Because the proffer appears to remain on the record and to avoid any argument that HMIT has failed its burden to designate the record, HMIT designates this docket entry out of an abundance of caution.

Vol. 43
010135
010136

09/11/2023	3907	Clerk's Correspondence regarding HMIT's Notice of Appeal
09/22/2023	3928	Notice Regarding Appeal and Pending Post-Judgment Motion filed by HMIT

B. Exhibits.

Further, the Parties submitted hearing exhibits. HMIT designates for inclusion in the record for appeal all the hearing exhibits submitted to the Court, which were all electronically filed and are in the Court's record and are a part of this Appellate Record. (Docs. 3817 and 3818). The following exhibits are submitted and included in the Court's record:

<u>HMIT Exhibits</u> (Dkts. 3818, 3818-1, 3818-2, 3818-3, 3818-4, 3818-5, 3818-6, 3818-7, 3818-8, and 3818-9)
HMIT Exhibits 1-4, 6-80
<u>HCM Exhibits</u> (Dkts. 3817, 3817-1, 3817-2, 3817-3, 3817-4, 3817-5)
HCM Exhibits 2-15, 25-34, 36, 38-42, 45-46, 51, 59-60, 100

Dated: October 23, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

**PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY
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*Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via ECF notification on October 23, 2023, on all parties receiving electronic notification.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with \$125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over \$416 million, building a cash war chest of over \$541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over \$688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was \$365 million, those claims were sold for about \$150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶ Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero, et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, **Docket No. 1** (as amended by **Docket No. 158**).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from \$460 an hour for associates to \$1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from \$830 an hour for first year associate to over \$2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.⁶

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

- (i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and
- (ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and
- (iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

⁶ To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

EXHIBIT A-1

009014

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October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“Creditors’ Committee”) in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland” or “Debtor”). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors’ Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee’s Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over \$550 million in assets and net \$110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland’s decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net \$110 million arbitration award in favor of the “Redeemer Committee.”¹ After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor’s counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland’s best interest.

¹ The “Redeemer Committee” was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the “Crusader Fund” that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the “Redeemer Committee” and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

October 5, 2021

Page 2

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.² It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise" *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

² See Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

October 5, 2021

Page 3

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires.” See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that “the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest.” This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.³ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors’ committee to share information it receives with those who “hold claims of the kind represented by the committee” but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors’ committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland’s structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee’s Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor’s failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee’s Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task “fell through the cracks.”⁴ This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor’s counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show “cause” to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor’s failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors’ Committee often refer to the Debtor’s structure as a “byzantine empire,” the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.⁵ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

³ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement “for cause,” including that “the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available.” Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

⁴ See Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 49:5-21).

⁵ During a deposition, the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor’s assets “[o]ff the top of [his] head” and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

October 5, 2021

Page 4

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").⁶ The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

⁶ Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

October 5, 2021

Page 5

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at \$22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of \$40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.⁷ Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),⁸ nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.⁹ That representation is untrue;

and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating \$300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be \$0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to \$80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

⁷ Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

⁸ See [Doc. 1894](#) (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

⁹ See [Doc. 2389](#) (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

October 5, 2021

Page 6

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.¹⁰ If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.¹¹ It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.¹² This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹³ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims¹⁴:

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

¹⁰ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

¹¹ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), [Doc. 3778 at 17-25](#).

¹² See *id.* at 22.

¹³ See Appendix, p. A-25.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

October 5, 2021

Page 7

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.¹⁵ In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor’s estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors’ claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ¹⁶
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0 ¹⁷

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a \$200 million dissipation in the estate’s asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of \$556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021.¹⁸

¹⁵ A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

¹⁶ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included “the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds,” the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

¹⁷ Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid \$50 million for claims worth only \$46.4 million. See Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between \$472-600 million as opposed to \$364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

¹⁸ Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor’s settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest’s interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

October 5, 2021

Page 8

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by \$236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by \$100 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.¹⁹

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.²⁰ Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.
- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

¹⁹ See Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

²⁰ See Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

October 5, 2021

Page 9

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²¹ We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

²¹ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

October 5, 2021

Page 10

In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;
- d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement²²;
- e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

October 5, 2021

Page 11

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2



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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

009027

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 2

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of \$189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of \$110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.¹

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

¹ *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozłowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).² At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.³

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.⁴

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

² Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

³ See *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

⁴ See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 4

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.⁵ Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.⁶

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").⁷ There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.⁸ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

⁵ See Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

⁶ See Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

⁷ See Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

⁸ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 5

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."⁹ Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.¹⁰ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

⁹ See Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

¹⁰ During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. See Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

Ms. Nan R. Eitel

November 3, 2021

Page 6

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty \$750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a “settlement” to obtain Mr. Daugherty’s withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor’s plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor’s confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor’s failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court’s order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.¹¹

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors’ Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor’s failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor’s affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate’s asset value decreased by approximately \$200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the \$200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately \$75 billion under management. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (“HCLOF”). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (“DAF”) held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining 2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

¹¹ See “Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11” (the “Periodic Reporting Requirements”). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST’s commitment to maintaining “uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor’s financial condition and business activities” and “to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor’s financial affairs.” 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately \$15 million in legal fees and costs.¹²

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over \$300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at \$0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.¹³ Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to \$45 million in Class 8 claims and \$35 million in Class 9 claims.¹⁴ At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total \$80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a \$31.5 million return.¹⁵

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was \$22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least \$44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.¹⁶ This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

¹² Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than \$7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the \$15 million in legal fees).

¹³ See Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

¹⁵ We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately \$28 million.

¹⁶ Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." See Ex. B.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel

November 3, 2021

Page 8

- The Debtor sold approximately \$25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over \$70 million; the Debtor likewise sold \$6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for \$18 million.
- The Debtor divested interests worth \$145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for \$35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);
- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;
- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth \$50 million) and Targa (worth \$37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 9

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"¹⁷ Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "actual and necessary cost" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."¹⁸ It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹⁹ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims:

¹⁷ See Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

¹⁸ *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).

¹⁹ See Ex. C.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 10

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly \$600 million,²⁰ which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating \$50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ²¹
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0

²⁰ See Ex. D.

²¹ See Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 11

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by \$200 million, from \$556 million on October 16, 2019, to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021).²²
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of \$236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.²³

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than \$100 million in claims on those trades.

²² Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

²³ See Ex. F.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 12

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The aggregate \$150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²⁴ In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

²⁴ See Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of \$60,000 per month for the first three months, \$50,000 per month for the following three months, and \$30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.²⁵ When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of \$150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."²⁶ Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

- (1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to \$1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

²⁵ See Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.

²⁶ See Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 14

"Case Resolution Plan," \$500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and \$750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

- (2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to \$500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, \$250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of \$150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.²⁷ Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly \$600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate \$50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between \$472-\$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between \$150 and \$232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least \$460 million, including \$105 million in cash and a \$50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

²⁷ See Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.²⁸
- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.²⁹ The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.³⁰

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

²⁸ Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.

²⁹ Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.

³⁰ Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 16

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.³¹

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.³² Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.³³ In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.³⁴ Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.³⁵ This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

³¹ 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).

³² The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.

³³ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

³⁴ *Id.* at 26-28.

³⁵ See *id.* at 22.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel

November 3, 2021

Page 17

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a \$6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.³⁶ In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.³⁷ If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. See 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

³⁶ See Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

³⁷ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;
- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay \$18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and
- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By: 

Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:pdm


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Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor’s CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers.....	2
Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]	3
Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony.....	15
Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities.....	24
20 Largest Unsecured Creditors.....	25
Timeline of Relevant Events	26
Debtor’s October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1].....	27
Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021).....	28
Summary of Debtor’s January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report.....	29
Value of HarbourVest Claim.....	30
Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)	31
HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625].....	32
UBS Settlement [Doc. 2200-1]	45
Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management	62
Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020	63
Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman	65
Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley	66
Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor’s G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates.....	67
Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.....	70

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers



*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

009046

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. **Definitions**

- A. “Court” means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.
- B. “NAV” means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity’s assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO’s gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.
- C. “Non-Discretionary Account” means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.
- D. “Related Entity” means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any “non-statutory” insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the “Related Entities Listing”); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor’s cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).
- E. “Stage 1” means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the (“Term Sheet”) by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.
- F. “Stage 2” means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.
- G. “Stage 3” means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.
- H. “Transaction” means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

- I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
- J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.
- K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities:** N/A (See entities above).

B. Operating Requirements

- 1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
- 2. Related Entity Transactions
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

- a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.
- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

- A. **Covered Entities:** See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).¹
- B. **Operating Requirements**
 - 1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
 - 2. Related Entity Transactions

¹ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

- a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
3. **Third Party Transactions (All Stages)**
- a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.
- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities:** See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.²

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
2. Related Entity Transactions
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):
 - a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) \$3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

² The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
- c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.³
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

³ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.⁴
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.⁵
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

- A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.
- B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

- A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.
- B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

⁴ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

⁵ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

- A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.
- B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.
- C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A⁶

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
 - a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
 - b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
 - c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
 - d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
 - e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
 - f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
 - g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
 - h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
 - i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
 - j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
 - k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
 - l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
 - m) Red River CLO Ltd.
 - n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
 - o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
 - p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
 - q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
 - r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
 - s) Pam Capital
 - t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

⁶ NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund ("Korean Fund")
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

Page 1

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
3 DALLAS DIVISION

4 -----)

5 In Re: Chapter 11
6 HIGHLAND CAPITAL Case No.
7 MANAGEMENT, LP, 19-34054-SGJ 11

8

9 Debtor

10 -----

11

12

13 REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

14 January 29, 2021

15 10:11 a.m. EST

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22

23

Reported by:
24 Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

25

<p>Page 2</p> <p>1 January 29, 2021</p> <p>2 9:00 a.m. EST</p> <p>3</p> <p>4 Remote Deposition of JAMES P.</p> <p>5 SEERY, JR., held via Zoom</p> <p>6 conference, before Debra Stevens,</p> <p>7 RPR/CRR and a Notary Public of the</p> <p>8 State of New York.</p> <p>9</p> <p>10</p> <p>11</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p>	<p>Page 3</p> <p>1 REMOTE APPEARANCES:</p> <p>2</p> <p>3 Heller, Draper, Hayden, Patrick, & Horn</p> <p>4 Attorneys for The Dugaboy Investment</p> <p>5 Trust and The Get Good Trust</p> <p>6 650 Poydras Street</p> <p>7 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130</p> <p>8</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 BY: DOUGLAS DRAPER, ESQ</p> <p>11</p> <p>12</p> <p>13 PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES</p> <p>14 For the Debtor and the Witness Herein</p> <p>15 780 Third Avenue</p> <p>16 New York, New York 10017</p> <p>17 BY: JOHN MORRIS, ESQ.</p> <p>18 JEFFREY POMERANTZ, ESQ.</p> <p>19 GREGORY DEMO, ESQ.</p> <p>20 IRA KHARASCH, ESQ.</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24 (Continued)</p> <p>25</p>
<p>Page 4</p> <p>1 REMOTE APPEARANCES: (Continued)</p> <p>2</p> <p>3 LATHAM & WATKINS</p> <p>4 Attorneys for UBS</p> <p>5 885 Third Avenue</p> <p>6 New York, New York 10022</p> <p>7 BY: SHANNON McLAUGHLIN, ESQ.</p> <p>8</p> <p>9 JENNER & BLOCK</p> <p>10 Attorneys for Redeemer Committee of</p> <p>11 Highland Crusader Fund</p> <p>12 919 Third Avenue</p> <p>13 New York, New York 10022</p> <p>14 BY: MARC B. HANKIN, ESQ.</p> <p>15</p> <p>16 SIDLEY AUSTIN</p> <p>17 Attorneys for Creditors' Committee</p> <p>18 2021 McKinney Avenue</p> <p>19 Dallas, Texas 75201</p> <p>20 BY: PENNY REID, ESQ.</p> <p>21 MATTHEW CLEMENTE, ESQ.</p> <p>22 PAIGE MONTGOMERY, ESQ.</p> <p>23</p> <p>24 (Continued)</p> <p>25</p>	<p>Page 5</p> <p>1 REMOTE APPEARANCES: (Continued)</p> <p>2 KING & SPALDING</p> <p>3 Attorneys for Highland CLO Funding, Ltd.</p> <p>4 500 West 2nd Street</p> <p>5 Austin, Texas 78701</p> <p>6 BY: REBECCA MATSUMURA, ESQ.</p> <p>7</p> <p>8 K&L GATES</p> <p>9 Attorneys for Highland Capital Management</p> <p>10 Fund Advisors, L.P., et al.:</p> <p>11 4350 Lassiter at North Hills</p> <p>12 Avenue</p> <p>13 Raleigh, North Carolina 27609</p> <p>14 BY: EMILY MATHER, ESQ.</p> <p>15</p> <p>16 MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR</p> <p>17 Attorneys for Defendants Highland Capital</p> <p>18 Management Fund Advisors, LP; NexPoint</p> <p>19 Advisors, LP; Highland Income Fund;</p> <p>20 NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund and</p> <p>21 NexPoint Capital, Inc.:</p> <p>22 500 N. Akard Street</p> <p>23 Dallas, Texas 75201-6659</p> <p>24 BY: DAVOR RUKAVINA, ESQ.</p> <p>25 (Continued)</p>

<p>Page 6</p> <p>1 REMOTE APPEARANCES (Continued)</p> <p>2</p> <p>3 BONDS ELLIS EPPICH SCHAFER JONES</p> <p>4 Attorneys for James Dondero,</p> <p>5 Party-in-Interest</p> <p>6 420 Throckmorton Street</p> <p>7</p> <p>8 Fort Worth, Texas 76102</p> <p>9 BY: CLAY TAYLOR, ESQ.</p> <p>10 JOHN BONDS, ESQ.</p> <p>11 BRYAN ASSINK, ESQ.</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14 BAKER MCKENZIE</p> <p>15 Attorneys for Senior Employees</p> <p>16 1900 North Pearl Street</p> <p>17</p> <p>18 Dallas, Texas 75201</p> <p>19 BY: MICHELLE HARTMANN, ESQ.</p> <p>20 DEBRA DANDEREAU, ESQ.</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24 (Continued)</p> <p>25</p>	<p>Page 7</p> <p>1 REMOTE APPEARANCES: (Continued)</p> <p>2</p> <p>3 WICK PHILLIPS</p> <p>4 Attorneys for NexPoint Real Estate</p> <p>5 Partners, NexPoint Real Estate Entities</p> <p>6 and NexBank</p> <p>7 100 Throckmorton Street</p> <p>8 Fort Worth, Texas 76102</p> <p>9 BY: LAUREN DRAWHORN, ESQ.</p> <p>10</p> <p>11 ROSS & SMITH</p> <p>12 Attorneys for Senior Employees, Scott</p> <p>13 Ellington, Isaac Leventon, Thomas Surgent,</p> <p>14 Frank Waterhouse</p> <p>15 700 N. Pearl Street</p> <p>16 Dallas, Texas 75201</p> <p>17 BY: FRANCES SMITH, ESQ.</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p>
<p>Page 8</p> <p>1</p> <p>2 E X A M I N A T I O N S</p> <p>3 WITNESS PAGE</p> <p>4 JAMES SEERY</p> <p>5 By Mr. Draper 9</p> <p>6 By Mr. Taylor 75</p> <p>7 By Mr. Rukavina 165</p> <p>8 By Mr. Draper 217</p> <p>9</p> <p>10 E X H I B I T S</p> <p>11 SEERY DYD</p> <p>12 EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION PAGE</p> <p>13 Exhibit 1 January 2021 Material 11</p> <p>14 Exhibit 2 Disclosure Statement 14</p> <p>15 Exhibit 3 Notice of Deposition 74</p> <p>16</p> <p>17 INFORMATION/PRODUCTION REQUESTS</p> <p>18 DESCRIPTION PAGE</p> <p>19 Subsidiary ledger showing note component versus hard asset component 22</p> <p>20 Amount of D&O coverage for trustees 131</p> <p>21 Line item for D&O insurance 133</p> <p>22</p> <p>23 MARKED FOR RULING</p> <p>24 PAGE LINE</p> <p>25 85 20</p>	<p>Page 9</p> <p>1 COURT REPORTER: My name is</p> <p>2 Debra Stevens, court reporter for TSG</p> <p>3 Reporting and notary public of the</p> <p>4 State of New York. Due to the</p> <p>5 severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and</p> <p>6 following the practice of social</p> <p>7 distancing, I will not be in the same</p> <p>8 room with the witness but will report</p> <p>9 this deposition remotely and will</p> <p>10 swear the witness in remotely. If any</p> <p>11 party has any objection, please so</p> <p>12 state before we proceed.</p> <p>13</p> <p>14 Whereupon,</p> <p>15 J A M E S S E E R Y,</p> <p>16 having been first duly sworn/affirmed,</p> <p>17 was examined and testified as follows:</p> <p>18 EXAMINATION BY</p> <p>19 MR. DRAPER:</p> <p>20 Q. Mr. Seery, my name is Douglas</p> <p>21 Draper, representing the Dugaboy Trust. I</p> <p>22 have series of questions today in</p> <p>23 connection with the 30(b) Notice that we</p> <p>24 filed. The first question I have for you,</p> <p>25 have you seen the Notice of Deposition</p>

Page 14

1 J. SEERY
2 the screen, please?
3 A. Page what?
4 Q. I think it is page 174.
5 A. Of the PDF or of the document?
6 Q. Of the disclosure statement that
7 was filed. It is up on the screen right
8 now.
9 COURT REPORTER: Do you intend
10 this as another exhibit for today's
11 deposition?
12 MR. DRAPER: We'll mark this
13 Exhibit 2.
14 (So marked for identification as
15 Seery Exhibit 2.)
16 Q. If you look to the recovery to
17 Class 8 creditors in the November 2020
18 disclosure statement was a recovery of
19 87.44 percent?
20 A. That actually says the percent
21 distribution to general unsecured
22 creditors was 87.44 percent. Yes.
23 Q. And in the new document that was
24 filed, given to us yesterday, the recovery
25 is 62.5 percent?

Page 16

1 J. SEERY
2 anybody else?
3 A. I said Mr. Doherty.
4 Q. In looking at the two elements,
5 and what I have asked you to look at is
6 the claims pool. If you look at the
7 November disclosure statement, if you look
8 down Class 8, unsecured claims?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You have 176,000 roughly?
11 A. Million.
12 Q. 176 million. I am sorry. And
13 the number in the new document is 313
14 million?
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. What accounts for the
17 difference?
18 A. An increase in claims.
19 Q. When did those increases occur?
20 Were they yesterday? A month ago? Two
21 months ago?
22 A. Over the last couple months.
23 Q. So in fact over the last couple
24 months you knew in fact that the recovery
25 in the November disclosure statement was

Page 15

1 J. SEERY
2 A. It says the percent distribution
3 to general unsecured creditors is
4 62.14 percent.
5 Q. Have you communicated the
6 reduced recovery to anybody prior to the
7 date -- to yesterday?
8 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
9 form of the question.
10 A. I believe generally, yes. I
11 don't know if we have a specific number,
12 but generally yes.
13 Q. And would that be members of the
14 Creditors' Committee who you gave that
15 information to?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did you give it to anybody other
18 than members of the Creditors' Committee?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Who?
21 A. HarbourVest.
22 Q. And when was that?
23 A. Within the last two months.
24 Q. You did not feel the need to
25 communicate the change in recovery to

Page 17

1 J. SEERY
2 not accurate?
3 A. Yes. We secretly disclosed it
4 to the Bankruptcy Court in open court
5 hearings.
6 Q. But you never did bother to
7 calculate the reduced recovery; you just
8 increased --
9 (Reporter interruption.)
10 Q. You just advised as to the
11 increased claims pool. Correct?
12 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
13 form of the question.
14 A. I don't understand your
15 question.
16 Q. What I am trying to get at is,
17 as you increase the claims pool, the
18 recovery reduces. Correct?
19 A. No. That is not how a fraction
20 works.
21 Q. Well, if the denominator
22 increases, doesn't the recovery ultimately
23 decrease if --
24 A. No.
25 Q. -- if the numerator stays the

Page 26

1 J. SEERY

2 were amended without consideration a few

3 years ago. So, for our purposes we didn't

4 make the assumption, which I am sure will

5 happen, a fraudulent conveyance claim on

6 those notes, that a fraudulent conveyance

7 action would be brought. We just assumed

8 that we'd have to discount the notes

9 heavily to sell them because nobody would

10 respect the ability of the counterparties

11 to fairly pay.

12 Q. And the same discount was

13 applied in the liquidation analysis to

14 those notes?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now --

17 A. The difference -- there would be

18 a difference, though, because they would

19 pay for a while because they wouldn't want

20 to accelerate them. So there would be

21 some collections on the notes for P and I.

22 Q. But in fact as of January you

23 have accelerated those notes?

24 A. Just one of them, I believe.

25 Q. Which note was that?

Page 28

1 J. SEERY

2 you whether they are included in the asset

3 portion of your \$257 million number, all

4 right? Mr. Morris didn't want me to go

5 into specific asset value, and I don't

6 intend to do that.

7 The first question I have for

8 you is, the equity in Trustway Highland

9 Holdings, is that included in the

10 \$257 million number?

11 A. There is no such entity.

12 Q. Then I will do it in a different

13 way. In connection with the sale of the

14 hard assets, what assets are included in

15 there specifically?

16 A. Off the top of my head -- it is

17 all of the assets, but it includes

18 Trustway Holdings and all the value that

19 flows up from Trustway Holdings. It

20 includes Targa and all the value that

21 flows up from Targa. It includes CCS

22 Medical and all the value that would flow

23 to the Debtor from CCS Medical. It

24 includes Cornerstone and all the value

25 that would flow from Cornerstone. It

Page 27

1 J. SEERY

2 A. NexPoint, I said. They

3 defaulted on the note and we accelerated

4 it.

5 Q. So there is no need to file a

6 fraudulent conveyance suit with respect to

7 that note. Correct, Mr. Seery?

8 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the

9 form of the question.

10 A. Disagree. Since it was likely

11 intentional fraud, there may be other

12 recoveries on it. But to collect on the

13 note, no.

14 Q. My question was with respect to

15 that note. Since you have accelerated it,

16 you don't need to deal with the issue of

17 when it's due?

18 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the

19 form of the question.

20 A. That wasn't your question. But

21 to that question, yes, I don't need to

22 deal with when it's due.

23 Q. Let me go over certain assets.

24 I am not going to ask you for the

25 valuation of them but I am going to ask

Page 29

1 J. SEERY

2 includes any other securities and all the

3 value that would flow from Cornerstone.

4 It includes HCLOF and all the value that

5 would flow up from HCLOF. It includes

6 Korea and all the value that would flow up

7 from Korea.

8 There may be others off the top

9 of my head. I don't recall them. I don't

10 have a list in front of me.

11 Q. Now, with respect to those

12 assets, have you started the sale process

13 of those assets?

14 A. No. Well, each asset is

15 different. So, the answer is, with

16 respect to any securities, we do seek to

17 sell those regularly and we do seek to

18 monetize those assets where we can

19 depending on whether there is a

20 restriction or not and whether there is

21 liquidity in the market.

22 With respect to the PE assets or

23 the companies I described -- Targa, CCS,

24 Cornerstone, JHT -- we have not --

25 Trustway. We have not sought to sell

Page 38

1 J. SEERY

2 A. I don't recall the specific

3 limitation on the trust. But if there was

4 a reason to hold on to the asset, if there

5 is a limitation, we can seek an extension.

6 Q. Let me ask a question. With

7 respect to these businesses, the Debtor

8 merely owns an equity interest in them.

9 Correct?

10 A. Which business?

11 Q. The ones you have identified as

12 operating businesses earlier?

13 A. It depends on the business.

14 Q. Well, let me -- again, let's try

15 to be specific. With respect to SSP, it

16 was your position that you did not need to

17 get court approval for the sale. Correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Which one of the operating

20 businesses that are here, that you have

21 identified, do you need court authority

22 for a sale?

23 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the

24 form of the question.

25 A. Each of the businesses will be a

Page 40

1 J. SEERY

2 or determined the discount that has been

3 placed between the two, plan analysis

4 versus liquidation analysis?

5 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

6 of the question.

7 A. To which document are you

8 referring?

9 Q. Both the June -- the January and

10 the November analysis has a different

11 estimated proceeds for monetization for

12 the plan analysis versus the liquidation

13 analysis. Do you see that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And there is a note under there.

16 "Assumes Chapter 7 trustee will not be

17 able to achieve the same sales proceeds as

18 Claimant trustee."

19 A. I see that, yes.

20 Q. Do you see that note?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Who arrived at that discount?

23 A. I did.

24 Q. What percentage did you use?

25 A. Depended on the asset. Each one

Page 39

1 J. SEERY

2 different analysis that we'll undertake

3 with bankruptcy counsel to determine what

4 we would need depending on when it is

5 going to happen and what the restrictions

6 either under the code are or under the

7 plan.

8 Q. Is there anything that would

9 stop you from selling these businesses if

10 the Chapter 11 went on for a year or two

11 years?

12 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

13 of the question.

14 A. Is there anything that would

15 stop me? We'd have to follow the

16 strictures of the code and the protocols,

17 but there would be no prohibition -- let

18 me finish, please.

19 There would be no prohibition

20 that I am aware of.

21 Q. Now, in connection with your

22 differential between the liquidation of

23 what I will call the operating businesses

24 under the liquidation analysis and the

25 plan analysis, who arrived at the discount

Page 41

1 J. SEERY

2 is different.

3 Q. Is the discount a function of

4 capability of a trustee versus your

5 capability, or is the discount a function

6 of timing?

7 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

8 A. It could be a combination.

9 Q. So, let's -- let me walk through

10 this. Your plan analysis has an

11 assumption that everything is sold by

12 December 2022. Correct?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And the valuations that you have

15 used here for the monetization assume a

16 sale between -- a sale prior to December

17 of 2022. Correct?

18 A. Sorry. I don't quite understand

19 your question.

20 Q. The 257 number, and then let's

21 take out the notes. Let's use the 210

22 number.

23 MR. MORRIS: Can we put the

24 document back on the screen, please?

25 Sorry, Douglas, to interrupt, but it

Page 42

1 J. SEERY
2 would be helpful.
3 MR. DRAPER: That is fine, John.
4 (Pause.)
5 MR. MORRIS: Thank you very
6 much.
7 Q. Mr. Seery, do you see the 257?
8 A. In the one from yesterday?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. Second line, 257,941. Yes.
11 Q. That assumes a monetization of
12 all assets by December of 2022?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. And so everything has been sold
15 by that time; correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. So, what I am trying to get at
18 is, there is both the capability between
19 you and a trustee, and then the second
20 issue is timing. So, what discount was
21 put on for timing, Mr. Seery, between when
22 a trustee would sell it versus when you
23 would sell it?
24 MR. MORRIS: Objection.
25 Q. What is the percentage you

Page 44

1 J. SEERY
2 as capable as you are?
3 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
4 form of the question.
5 A. I don't know.
6 Q. Is there anybody as capable as
7 you are?
8 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
9 form of the question.
10 A. Certainly.
11 Q. And they could be hired.
12 Correct?
13 A. Perhaps. I don't know.
14 Q. And if you go back to the
15 November 2020 liquidation analysis versus
16 plan analysis, it is also the same note
17 about that a trustee would bring less, and
18 there is the same sort of discount between
19 the estimated proceeds under the plan and
20 under the liquidation analysis.
21 MR. MORRIS: If that is a
22 question, I object.
23 Q. Is that correct, Mr. Seery,
24 looking at the document?
25 A. There are discounts, yes.

Page 43

1 J. SEERY
2 applied?
3 A. Each of the assets is different.
4 Q. Is there a general discount that
5 you used?
6 A. Not a general discount, no. We
7 looked at each individual asset and went
8 through and made an assessment.
9 Q. Did you apply a discount for
10 your capability versus the capability of a
11 trustee?
12 A. No.
13 Q. So a trustee would be as capable
14 as you are in monetizing these assets?
15 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
16 form of the question.
17 Q. Excuse me? The answer is?
18 A. The answer is maybe.
19 Q. Couldn't a trustee hire somebody
20 as capable as you are?
21 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the
22 form of the question.
23 A. Perhaps.
24 Q. Sir, that is a yes or no
25 question. Could the trustee hire somebody

Page 45

1 J. SEERY
2 Q. Again, the discounts are applied
3 for timing and capability?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, in looking at the November
6 plan analysis number of \$190 million and
7 the January number of \$257 million, what
8 accounts for the increase between the two
9 dates? What assets specifically?
10 A. There are a number of assets.
11 Firstly, the HCLOF assets are added.
12 Q. How much are those?
13 A. Approximately 22 and a half
14 million dollars.
15 Q. Okay.
16 A. Secondly, there is a significant
17 increase in the value of certain of the
18 assets over this time period.
19 Q. Which assets, Mr. Seery?
20 A. There are a number. They
21 include MGM stock, they include Trustway,
22 they include Targa.
23 Q. And what is the percentage
24 increase from November to January,
25 November of 2020 to January of 2021?

Page 46

1 J. SEERY

2 A. Do you mean what is the

3 percentage increase from 190 to 257?

4 Q. No. You just identified three

5 assets. MGM stock, we can go look at the

6 exchange and figure out what the price

7 increase is; correct?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Why not? Is the MGM stock

10 publicly traded?

11 A. Yes. It doesn't trade on --

12 Q. Excuse me?

13 A. It doesn't trade on an exchange.

14 Q. Is there a public market for the

15 MGM stock that we could calculate the

16 increase?

17 A. There is a semipublic market;

18 yes.

19 Q. So it is a number that is

20 readily available between the two dates?

21 A. It's available.

22 Q. Now, you identified Targa and

23 Trustway. Correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Those are not readily available

Page 48

1 J. SEERY

2 Q. And if I understand what you

3 just said, it is that the Houlihan Lokey

4 valuation for those two businesses showed

5 a significant increase between November of

6 2020 and January of 2021?

7 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

8 of the question.

9 A. I didn't say that.

10 Q. I am trying to account for the

11 increase between the two dates, and you

12 identified three assets. You identified

13 MGM stock, which has, I can guess, as you

14 have said, a readily ascertainable value.

15 Then you identified two others that the

16 valuation is based upon something Houlihan

17 Lokey provided you. Correct?

18 A. I gave you three examples. I

19 never said "readily." That is your word,

20 not mine. And I didn't say that Houlihan

21 had a significant change in their

22 valuation.

23 Q. So let's now go back to the

24 question. There is an increase in value

25 from November 24th of 2020 to January 28th

Page 47

1 J. SEERY

2 markets; correct?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Those are operating businesses?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Who provided the valuation for

7 the November 2020 liquidation analysis?

8 A. We use a combination of the

9 value that we get from Houlihan Lokey for

10 mark purposes and then we adjust it for

11 plan purposes.

12 Q. And the adjustment was up or

13 down?

14 A. When?

15 Q. For both November and January.

16 You got a number from Houlihan Lokey. You

17 adjusted it. Did you adjust it up or did

18 you adjust it down?

19 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

20 of the question.

21 A. I believe that for November we

22 adjusted it down, and for January we

23 adjusted it down. I don't recall off the

24 top of my head but I believe both of them

25 were adjusted down.

Page 49

1 J. SEERY

2 of 2021, the magnitude being roughly 60

3 some odd million dollars. Correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. We can account for \$22 million

6 of it easily, right?

7 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form.

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. That is the HarbourVest

10 settlement, so that leaves roughly

11 \$40 million unaccounted for?

12 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the

13 form of the question if that is a

14 question. It is accounted for.

15 Q. What makes up that difference,

16 Mr. Seery?

17 A. A change in the plan value of

18 the assets.

19 Q. Okay. Which assets? Let's sort

20 of go back to where we were.

21 A. There are numerous assets in the

22 plan formulation. I gave you three

23 examples of the operating businesses. The

24 securities, I believe, have increased in

25 value since the plan, so those would go up

Page 50

1 J. SEERY
2 for one. On the operating businesses, we
3 looked at each of them and made an
4 assessment based upon where the market is
5 and what we believe the values are, and we
6 have moved those valuations.
7 Q. Let me look at some numbers
8 again. In the liquidation analysis in
9 November of 2020, the liquidation value is
10 \$149 million. Correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And in the liquidation analysis
13 in January of 2021, you have \$191 million?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You see that number. So there
16 is \$51 million there, right?
17 A. No.
18 Q. What is the difference between
19 191 and -- sorry. My math may be a little
20 off. What is the difference between the
21 two numbers, Mr. Seery?
22 A. Your math is off.
23 Q. Sorry. It is 41 million?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. \$22 million of that is the

Page 52

1 J. SEERY
2 of the question.
3 Q. Mr. Seery, yes or no?
4 A. I said no.
5 Q. What is that based on, then?
6 A. The person's ability to assess
7 the market and timing.
8 Q. Okay. And again, couldn't a
9 trustee hire somebody as capable as you to
10 both, A, assess the market and, B, make a
11 determination as to when to sell?
12 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form
13 of the question.
14 A. I suppose a trustee could.
15 Q. And there are better people or
16 people equally or better than you at
17 assessing a market. Correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form
20 of the question.
21 Q. So, again, let's go back to
22 that. We have accounted for, out of
23 \$41 million where the liquidation analysis
24 increases between the two dates,
25 \$22 million of it. That leaves

Page 51

1 J. SEERY
2 HarbourVest settlement, right?
3 A. I believe that's correct.
4 Q. Is that fair, Mr. Seery?
5 A. I believe that is correct, yes.
6 Q. And part of that differential
7 are publicly traded or ascertainable
8 securities. Correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And basically you can get, or
11 under the plan analysis or trustee
12 analysis, if it is a marketable security
13 or where there is a market, the
14 liquidation number should be the same for
15 both. Is that fair?
16 A. No.
17 Q. And why not?
18 A. We might have a different price
19 target for a particular security than the
20 current trading value.
21 Q. I understand that, but I mean
22 that is based upon the capability of the
23 person making the decision as to when to
24 sell. Correct?
25 MR. MORRIS: Objection to form

Page 53

1 J. SEERY
2 \$18 million. How much of that is publicly
3 traded or ascertainable assets versus
4 operating businesses?
5 A. I don't know off the top of my
6 head the percentages.
7 Q. All right. The same question
8 for the plan analysis where you have the
9 differential between the November number
10 and the January number. How much of it is
11 marketable securities versus an operating
12 business?
13 A. I don't recall off the top of my
14 head.
15 MR. DRAPER: Let me take a
16 few-minute break. Can we take a
17 ten-minute break here?
18 THE WITNESS: Sure.
19 (Recess.)
20 BY MR. DRAPER:
21 Q. Mr. Seery, what I am going to
22 show you and what I would ask you to look
23 at is in the note E, in the statement of
24 assumptions for the November 2020
25 disclosure statement. It discusses fixed

Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities

Asset	Sales Price
Structural Steel Products	\$50 million
Life Settlements	\$35 million
OmniMax	\$50 million
Targa	\$37 million

- These assets were sold over the contemporaneous objections of James Dondero, who was the Portfolio Manager and key-man on the funds.
- Mr. Seery admitted¹ that he must comply with the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and the Protocols for the sale of major assets of the estate. We believe that a competitive bid process and court approval should have been required for the sale of each of these assets (as was done for the sale of the building at 2817 Maple Ave. [a \$9 million asset] and the sale of the interest in PetroCap [a \$3 million asset]).

¹ See Mr. Seery's Jan. 29, 2021 deposition testimony, Appendix p. A-20.

20 Largest Unsecured Creditors

Name of Claimant	Allowed Class 8	Allowed Class 9
Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund	\$136,696,610.00	
UBS AG, London Branch and UBS Securities LLC	\$65,000,000.00	\$60,000,000
HarbourVest entities	\$45,000,000.00	\$35,000,000
Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC	\$23,000,000.00	
CLO Holdco Ltd	\$11,340,751.26	
Patrick Daugherty	\$8,250,000.00	\$2,750,000 (+\$750,000 cash payment on Effective Date of Plan)
Todd Travers (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$2,618,480.48	
McKool Smith PC	\$2,163,976.00	
Davis Deadman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$1,749,836.44	
Jack Yang (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$1,731,813.00	
Paul Kauffman (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$1,715,369.73	
Kurtis Plumer (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$1,470,219.80	
Foley Gardere	\$1,446,136.66	
DLA Piper	\$1,318,730.36	
Brad Borud (Claim based on unpaid bonus due for Feb 2009)	\$1,252,250.00	
Stinson LLP (successor to Lackey Hershman LLP)	\$895,714.90	
Meta-E Discovery LLC	\$779,969.87	
Andrews Kurth LLP	\$677,075.65	
Markit WSO Corp	\$572,874.53	
Duff & Phelps, LLC	\$449,285.00	
Lynn Pinker Cox Hurst	\$436,538.06	
Joshua and Jennifer Terry	\$425,000.00	
Joshua Terry	\$355,000.00	
CPCM LLC (bought claims of certain former HCMLP employees)	Several million	
TOTAL:	\$309,345,631.74	\$95,000,000

Timeline of Relevant Events

Date	Description
10/29/2019	UCC appointed; members agree to fiduciary duties and not sell claims.
9/23/2020	Acis 9019 filed
9/23/2020	Redeemer 9019 filed
10/28/2020	Redeemer settlement approved
10/28/2020	Acis settlement approved
12/24/2020	HarbourVest 9019 filed
1/14/2021	Motion to appoint examiner filed
1/21/2021	HarbourVest settlement approved; transferred its interest in HCLOF to HCMLP assignee, valued at \$22 million per Seery
1/28/2021	Debtor discloses that it has reached an agreement in principle with UBS
2/3/2021	Failure to comply with Rule 2015.3 raised
2/24/2021	Plan confirmed
3/9/2021	Farallon Cap. Mgmt. forms "Muck Holdings LLC" in Delaware
3/15/2021	Debtor files Jan. '21 monthly operating report indicating assets of \$364 million, liabilities of \$335 million (inclusive of \$267,607,000 in Class 8 claims, but exclusive of any Class 9 claims), the last publicly filed summary of the Debtor's assets. The MOR states that no Class 9 distributions are anticipated at this time and Class 9 recoveries are not expected.
3/31/2021	UBS files friendly suit against HCMLP under seal
4/8/2021	Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. forms "Jessup Holdings LLC" in Delaware
4/15/2021	UBS 9019 filed
4/16/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Acis to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/29/2021	Motion to Compel Compliance with Rule 2015.3 Filed
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - Redeemer to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
4/30/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - HarbourVest to Muck (Farallon Capital)
4/30/2021	Sale of Redeemer claim to Jessup (Stonehill Capital) "consummated"
5/27/2021	UBS settlement approved; included \$18.5 million in cash from Multi-Strat
6/14/2021	UBS dismisses appeal of Redeemer award
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Jessup (Stonehill Capital)
8/9/2021	Notice of Transfer of Claim - UBS to Muck (Farallon Capital)

Critical unknown dates and information:

- The date on which Muck entered into agreements with HarbourVest and Acis to acquire their claims and what negative and affirmative covenants those agreements contained.
- The date on which Jessup entered into an agreement with the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Fund to acquire their claim and what negative and affirmative covenants the agreement contained.
- The date on which the sales actually closed versus the date on which notice of the transfer was filed (i.e., did UCC members continue to serve on the committee after they had sold their claims).

Debtor's October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1]

	Plan Analysis	Liquidation Analysis
Estimated cash on hand at 12/31/2020	\$26,496	\$26,496
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	198,662	154,618
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(29,864)	(33,804)
Total estimated \$ available for distribution	195,294	147,309
Less: Claims paid in full		
Administrative claims [4]	(10,533)	(10,533)
Priority Tax/Settled Amount [10]	(1,237)	(1,237)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-	-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [5]	(5,560)	(5,560)
Class 3 – Priority non-tax claims [10]	(16)	(16)
Class 4 – Retained employee claims	-	-
Class 5 – Convenience claims [6][10]	(13,455)	-
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims [7]	(2,955)	-
Subtotal	(33,756)	(17,346)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	161,538	129,962
Class 5 – Convenience claims [8]	-	17,940
Class 6 – Unpaid employee claims	-	3,940
Class 7 – General unsecured claims [9]	174,609	174,609
Subtotal	174,609	196,489
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	92.51%	66.14%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-	-
Class 8 – Subordinated claims	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>
Class 9 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>
Class 10 – Class A limited partnership interests	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>

Notable notations/disclosures in the Oct. 15, 2020 liquidation analysis include:

- Note [9]: General unsecured claims estimated using \$0 allowed claims for HarbourVest and UBS. Ultimately, those two creditors were awarded \$105 million of general unsecured claims and \$95 million of subordinated claims.

Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021)²

	Plan Analysis	Liquidation Analysis
Estimated cash on hand at 1/31/2020 [sic]	\$24,290	\$24,290
Estimated proceeds from monetization of assets [1][2]	257,941	191,946
Estimated expenses through final distribution [1][3]	(59,573)	(41,488)
Total estimated \$ available for distribution	222,658	174,178
Less: Claims paid in full		
Unclassified [4]	(1,080)	(1,080)
Administrative claims [5]	(10,574)	(10,574)
Class 1 – Jefferies Secured Claim	-	-
Class 2 – Frontier Secured Claim [6]	(5,781)	(5,781)
Class 3 – Other Secured Claims	(62)	(62)
Class 4 – Priority non-tax claims	(16)	(16)
Class 5 – Retained employee claims	-	-
Class 6 – PTO Claims [5]	-	-
Class 7 – Convenience claims [7][8]	(10,280)	-
Subtotal	(27,793)	(17,514)
Estimated amount remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims	194,865	157,235
% Distribution to Class 7 (Class 7 claims including in Class 8 in Liquidation scenario)	85.00%	0.00%
Class 8 – General unsecured claims [8] [10]	273,219	286,100
Subtotal	273,219	286,100
% Distribution to general unsecured claims	71.32%	54.96%
Estimated amount remaining for distribution	-	-
Class 9 – Subordinated claims	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>
Class 10 – Class B/C limited partnership interests	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>
Class 11 – Class A limited partnership interests	<i>no distribution</i>	<i>no distribution</i>

Notable notations/disclosures in the Feb. 1, 2021 liquidation analysis include:

- claim amounts in Class 8 assume \$0 for IFA and HM, \$50.0 million for UBS and \$45 million HV.
- Assumes RCP claims will offset against HCMLP's interest in fund and will not be paid from Debtor assets

² Doc. 1895.

Summary of Debtor's January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report³



	10/15/2019	12/31/2020	1/31/2021
Assets			
Cash and cash equivalents	\$2,529,000	\$12,651,000	\$10,651,000
Investments, at fair value	\$232,620,000	\$109,211,000	\$142,976,000
Equity method investees	\$161,819,000	\$103,174,000	\$105,293,000
mgmt and incentive fee receivable	\$2,579,000	\$2,461,000	\$2,857,000
fixed assets, net	\$3,754,000	\$2,594,000	\$2,518,000
due from affiliates	\$151,901,000	\$152,449,000	\$152,538,000
reserve against notices receivable		(\$61,039,000)	(\$61,167,000)
other assets	\$11,311,000	\$8,258,000	\$8,651,000
Total Assets	\$566,513,000	\$329,759,000	\$364,317,000
Liabilities and Partners' Capital			
pre-petition accounts payable	\$1,176,000	\$1,077,000	\$1,077,000
post-petition accounts payable		\$900,000	\$3,010,000
Secured debt			
Frontier	\$5,195,000	\$5,195,000	\$5,195,000
Jefferies	\$30,328,000	\$0	\$0
Accrued expenses and other liabilities	\$59,203,000	\$60,446,000	\$49,445,000
Accrued re-organization related fees		\$5,795,000	\$8,944,000
Class 8 general unsecured claims	\$73,997,000	\$73,997,000	\$267,607,000
Partners' Capital	\$396,614,000	\$182,347,000	\$29,039,000
Total liabilities and partners' capital	\$566,513,000	\$329,757,000	\$364,317,000

Notable notations/disclosures in the Jan. 31, 2021 MOR include:

- Class 8 claims totaled \$267 million, a jump from \$74 million in the prior month's MOR
- The MOR stated that no Class 9 recovery was expected, which was based on the then existing \$267 million in Class 8 Claims.
- Currently, there are roughly \$310 million of Allowed Class 8 Claims.


³ [Doc. 2030] Filed on March 15, 2021, the last publicly disclosed information regarding the value of assets in the estate.

Value of HarbourVest Claim



Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)⁴

Asset	Low	High
Cash as of 6/30/2021	\$17.9	\$17.9
Targa Sale	\$37.0	\$37.0
8/1 CLO Flows	\$10.0	\$10.0
Uchi Bldg. Sale	\$9.0	\$9.0
Siepe Sale	\$3.5	\$3.5
PetroCap Sale	\$3.2	\$3.2
HarbourVest trapped cash	\$25.0	\$25.0
Total Cash	\$105.6	\$105.6
Trussway	\$180.0	\$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	\$18.0	\$18.0
HarbourVest CLOs	\$40.0	\$40.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	\$20.0	\$20.0
MGM (direct ownership)	\$32.0	\$32.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	\$45.0	\$45.0
Korea Fund	\$18.0	\$18.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	\$12.0	\$40.0
SE Multifamily	\$0.0	\$20.0
Affiliate Notes	\$0.0	\$70.0
Other	\$2.0	\$10.0
TOTAL	\$472.6	\$598.6



⁴ Values are based upon historical knowledge of the Debtor's assets (including cross-holdings) and publicly filed information.

HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625]

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**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,¹

Debtor.

§
§
§
§
§
§

Chapter 11

Case No. 19-34054-sgj11

**DEBTOR'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER APPROVING
SETTLEMENT WITH HARBOURVEST (CLAIM NOS. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154)
AND AUTHORIZING ACTIONS CONSISTENT THEREWITH**

TO THE HONORABLE STACEY G. C. JERNIGAN,
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE:

¹ The last four digits of the Debtor's taxpayer identification number are 6725. The headquarters and service address for the Debtor is 300 Crescent Court, Suite 700, Dallas, TX 75201.

Highland Capital Management, L.P., the above-captioned debtor and debtor-in-possession (“Highland” or the “Debtor”), files this motion (the “Motion”) for entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as **Exhibit A**, pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”), approving a settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”),² a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the *Declaration of John A. Morris in Support of the Debtor's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Settlement with HarbourVest (Claim Nos. 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154) and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* being filed simultaneously with this Motion (“Morris Dec.”), that, among other things, fully and finally resolves the proofs of claim filed by HarbourVest 2017 Global Fund L.P., HarbourVest 2017 Global AIF L.P., HarbourVest Dover Street IX Investment L.P., HV International VIII Secondary L.P., HarbourVest Skew Base AIF L.P., and HarbourVest Partners L.P. (collectively, “HarbourVest”). In support of this Motion, the Debtor represents as follows:

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Venue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

2. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are sections 105(a) and 363 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”), and Rule 9019 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

² All capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Settlement Agreement.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

3. On October 16, 2019 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, Case No. 19-12239 (CSS) (the “Delaware Court”).

4. On October 29, 2019, the official committee of unsecured creditors (the “Committee”) was appointed by the U.S. Trustee in the Delaware Court.

5. On December 4, 2019, the Delaware Court entered an order transferring venue of the Debtor’s case to this Court [Docket No. 186].³

6. On December 27, 2019, the Debtor filed that certain *Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course* [Docket No. 281] (the “Settlement Motion”). This Court approved the Settlement Motion on January 9, 2020 [Docket No. 339] (the “Settlement Order”).

7. In connection with the Settlement Order, an independent board of directors was constituted at the Debtor’s general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc., and certain operating protocols were instituted.

8. On July 16, 2020, this Court entered an order appointing James P. Seery, Jr., as the Debtor’s chief executive officer and chief restructuring officer [Docket No. 854].

9. The Debtor has continued in the possession of its property and has continued to operate and manage its business as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code. No trustee or examiner has been appointed in this chapter 11 case.

³ All docket numbers refer to the docket maintained by this Court.

B. Overview of HarbourVest's Claims

10. HarbourVest's claims against the Debtor's estate arise from its \$80 million investment in Highland CLO Funding, f/k/a Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"), pursuant to which HarbourVest obtained a 49 percent interest in HCLOF (the "Investment").

11. In brief, HarbourVest contends that it was fraudulently induced into entering into the Investment based on the Debtor's misrepresentations and omissions concerning certain material facts, including that the Debtor: (1) failed to disclose that it never intended to pay an arbitration award obtained by a former portfolio manager, (2) failed to disclose that it engaged in a series of fraudulent transfers for the purpose of preventing the former portfolio manager from collecting on his arbitration award and misrepresented the reasons changing the portfolio manager for HCLOF immediately prior to the Investment, (3) indicated that the dispute with the former portfolio manager would not impact investment activities, and (4) expressed confidence in the ability of HCLOF to reset or redeem the collateralized loan obligations ("CLOs") under its control.

12. HarbourVest seeks to rescind its Investment and claims damages in excess of \$300 million based on theories of fraud, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty (under Guernsey law), and on alleged violations of state securities laws and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO").

13. HarbourVest's allegations are summarized below.⁴

⁴ Solely for purposes of this Motion, and not for any other reason, the facts set forth herein are adopted largely from the *HarbourVest Response to Debtor's First Omnibus Objection to Certain (A) Duplicate Claims; (B) Overstated Claims; (C) Late-Filed Claims; (D) Satisfied Claims; (E) No-Liability Claims; and (F) Insufficient-Documentation Claims* [Docket No. 1057] (the "Response").

C. Summary of HarbourVest's Factual Allegations

14. At the time HarbourVest made its Investment, the Debtor was embroiled in an arbitration against Joshua Terry ("Mr. Terry"), a former employee of the Debtor and limited partner of Acis Capital Management, L.P. ("Acis LP"). Through Acis LP, Mr. Terry managed Highland's CLO business, including CLO-related investments held by Acis Loan Funding, Ltd. ("Acis Funding").

15. The litigation between Mr. Terry and the Debtor began in 2016, after the Debtor terminated Mr. Terry and commenced an action against him in Texas state court. Mr. Terry asserted counterclaims for wrongful termination and for the wrongful taking of his ownership interest in Acis LP and subsequently had certain claims referred to arbitration where he obtained an award of approximately \$8 million (the "Arbitration Award") on October 20, 2017.

16. HarbourVest alleges that the Debtor responded to the Arbitration Award by engaging in a series of fraudulent transfers and corporate restructurings, the true purposes of which were fraudulently concealed from HarbourVest.

17. For example, according to HarbourVest, the Debtor changed the name of the target fund from Acis Funding to "Highland CLO Funding, Ltd." ("HCLOF") and "swapped out" Acis LP for Highland HCF Advisor, Ltd. as portfolio manager (the "Structural Changes"). The Debtor allegedly told HarbourVest that it made these changes because of the "reputational harm" to Acis LP resulting from the Arbitration Award. The Debtor further told HarbourVest that in lieu of redemptions, resetting the CLOs was necessary, and that it would be easier to reset them under the "Highland" CLO brand instead of the Acis CLO brand.

18. In addition, HarbourVest also alleges that the Debtor had no intention of allowing Mr. Terry to collect on his Arbitration Award, and orchestrated a scheme to "denude"

Acis of assets by fraudulently transferring virtually all of its assets and attempting to transfer its profitable portfolio management contracts to non-Acis, Debtor-related entities.

19. Unaware of the fraudulent transfers or the true purposes of the Structural Changes, and in reliance on representations made by the Debtor, HarbourVest closed on its Investment in HCLOF on November 15, 2017.

20. After discovering the transfers that occurred between Highland and Acis between October and December 2017 following the Arbitration Award (the “Transfers”), on January 24, 2018, Terry moved for a temporary restraining order (the “TRO”) from the Texas state court on the grounds that the Transfers were pursued for the purpose of rendering Acis LP judgment-proof. The state court granted the TRO, enjoining the Debtor from transferring any CLO management contracts or other assets away from Acis LP.

21. On January 30, 2018, Mr. Terry filed involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Acis LP and its general partner, Acis Capital Management GP, LLC. *See In re Acis Capital Management, L.P.*, Case No. 18-30264-sgjl1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) and *In re Acis Capital Management GP, LLC*, Case No. 18-30265-sgjl1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2018) (collectively, the “Acis Bankruptcy Case”). The Bankruptcy Court overruled the Debtor’s objection, granted the involuntary petitions, and appointed a chapter 11 trustee (the “Acis Trustee”). A long sequence of events subsequently transpired, all of which relate to HarbourVest’s claims, including:

- On May 31, 2018, the Court issued a *sua sponte* TRO preventing any actions in furtherance of the optional redemptions or other liquidation of the Acis CLOs.
- On June 14, 2018, HCLOF withdrew optional redemption notices.
- The TRO expired on June 15, 2018, and HCLOF noticed the Acis Trustee that it was requesting an optional redemption.

- HCLOF's request was withdrawn on July 6, 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Acis Trustee sought an injunction preventing Highland/HCLOF from seeking further redemptions (the "Preliminary Injunction").
- The Court granted the Preliminary Injunction on July 10, 2018, pending the Acis Trustee's attempts to confirm a plan or resolve the Acis Bankruptcy.
- On August 30, 2018, the Court denied confirmation of the First Amended Joint Plan for Acis, and held that the Preliminary Injunction must stay in place on the ground that the "evidence thus far has been compelling that numerous transfers after the Josh Terry judgment denuded Acis of value."
- After the Debtor made various statements implicating HarbourVest in the Transfers, the Acis Trustee investigated HarbourVest's involvement in such Transfers, including extensive discovery and taking a 30(b)(6) deposition of HarbourVest's managing director, Michael Pugatch, on November 17, 2018.
- On March 20, 2019, HCLOF sent a letter to Acis LP stating that it was not interested in pursuing, or able to pursue, a CLO reset transaction.

**D. The Parties' Pleadings and Positions Concerning HarbourVest's
Proofs of Claim**

22. On April 8, 2020, HarbourVest filed proofs of claim against Highland that were subsequently denoted by the Debtor's claims agents as claim numbers 143, 147, 149, 150, 153, and 154, respectively (collectively, the "Proofs of Claim"). Morris Dec. Exhibits 2-7.

23. The Proofs of Claim assert, among other things, that HarbourVest suffered significant harm due to conduct undertaken by the Debtor and the Debtor's employees, including "financial harm resulting from (i) court orders in the Acis Bankruptcy that prevented certain CLOs in which HCLOF was invested from being refinanced or reset and court orders that otherwise relegated the activity of HCLOF [*i.e.*, the Preliminary Injunction]; and (ii) significant fees and expenses related to the Acis Bankruptcy that were charged to HCLOF." *See, e.g.*, Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶3.

24. HarbourVest also asserted "any and all of its right to payment, remedies, and other claims (including contingent or unliquidated claims) against the Debtor in connection with and relating to the forgoing harm, including for any amounts due or owed under the various

agreements with the Debtor in connection with relating to” the Operative Documents “and any and all legal and equitable claims or causes of action relating to the forgoing harm.” *See, e.g.,* Morris Dec. Exhibit 2 ¶4.

25. Highland subsequently objected to HarbourVest’s Proofs of Claim on the grounds that they were no-liability claims. [Docket No. 906] (the “Claim Objection”).

26. On September 11, 2020, HarbourVest filed its Response. The Response articulated specified claims under U.S. federal and state and Guernsey law, including claims for fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation (collectively, the “Fraud Claims”), U.S. State and Federal Securities Law Claims (the “Securities Claims”), violations of the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of fiduciary duty and misuse of fund assets, and an unfair prejudice claim under Guernsey law (collectively, with the Proofs of Claim, the “HarbourVest Claims”).

27. On October 18, 2020, HarbourVest filed its *Motion of HarbourVest Pursuant to Rule 3018 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Purposes of Voting to Accept or Reject the Plan* [Docket No. 1207] (the “3018 Motion”). In its 3018 Motion, HarbourVest sought for its Claims to be temporarily allowed for voting purposes in the amount of more than \$300 million (based largely on a theory of treble damages).

E. Settlement Discussions

28. In October, the parties discussed the possibility of resolving the Rule 3018 Motion.

29. In November, the parties broadened the discussions in an attempt to reach a global resolution of the HarbourVest Claims. In the pursuit thereof, the parties and their

counsel participated in several conference calls where they engaged in a spirited exchange of perspectives concerning the facts and the law.

30. During follow up meetings, the parties' interests became more defined. Specifically, HarbourVest sought to maximize its recovery while fully extracting itself from the Investment, while the Debtor sought to minimize the HarbourVest Claims consistent with its perceptions of the facts and law.

31. After the parties' interests became more defined, the principals engaged in a series of direct, arm's-length, telephonic negotiations that ultimately lead to the settlement, whose terms are summarized below.

F. Summary of Settlement Terms

32. The Settlement Agreement contains the following material terms, among others:

- HarbourVest shall transfer its entire interest in HCLOF to an entity to be designated by the Debtor;⁵
- HarbourVest shall receive an allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of \$45 million and shall vote its Class 8 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest shall receive a subordinated, allowed, general unsecured, non-priority claim in the amount of \$35 million and shall vote its Class 9 claim in that amount to support the Plan;
- HarbourVest will support confirmation of the Debtor's Plan, including, but not limited to, voting its claims in support of the Plan;
- The HarbourVest Claims shall be allowed in the aggregate amount of \$45 million for voting purposes;
- HarbourVest will support the Debtor's pursuit of its pending Plan of Reorganization; and
- The parties shall exchange mutual releases.

⁵ The NAV for HarbourVest's 49.98% interest in HCLOF was estimated to be approximately \$22 million as of December 1, 2020.

See generally Morris Dec. Exhibit 1.

BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED

33. Bankruptcy Rule 9019 governs the procedural prerequisites to approval of a settlement, providing that:

On motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Notice shall be given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any other entity as the court may direct.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a).

34. Settlements in bankruptcy are favored as a means of minimizing litigation, expediting the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and providing for the efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases. See *Myers v. Martin (In re Martin)*, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996); *Rivercity v. Herpel (In re Jackson Brewing Co.)*, 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a bankruptcy court may approve a compromise or settlement as long as the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the best interest of the estate. See *In re Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 2015). Ultimately, “approval of a compromise is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy court.” See *United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.)*, 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984); *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602–03.

35. In making this determination, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies a three-part test, “with a focus on comparing ‘the terms of the compromise with the rewards of litigation.’” *Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop.)*, 119 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing *Jackson Brewing*, 624 F.2d at 602). The Fifth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the following factors: “(1) The probability of success in the litigation, with due consideration for the uncertainty of law and fact, (2) The complexity and likely duration of the litigation and any

attendant expense, inconvenience and delay, and (3) All other factors bearing on the wisdom of the compromise.” *Id.* Under the rubric of the third factor referenced above, the Fifth Circuit has specified two additional factors that bear on the decision to approve a proposed settlement. First, the court should consider “the paramount interest of creditors with proper deference to their reasonable views.” *Id.*; *Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. United Cos. Fin. Corp. (In re Foster Mortgage Corp.)*, 68 F.3d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1995). Second, the court should consider the “extent to which the settlement is truly the product of arms-length bargaining, and not of fraud or collusion.” *Age Ref. Inc.*, 801 F.3d at 540; *Foster Mortgage Corp.*, 68 F.3d at 918 (citations omitted).

36. There is ample basis to approve the proposed Settlement Agreement based on the Rule 9019 factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit.

37. First, although the Debtor believes that it has valid defenses to the HarbourVest Claims, there is no guarantee that the Debtor would succeed in its litigation with HarbourVest. Indeed, to establish its defenses, the Debtor would be required to rely, at least in part, on the credibility of witnesses whose veracity has already been called into question by this Court. Moreover, it will be difficult to dispute that the Transfers precipitated the Acis Bankruptcy, and, ultimately, the imposition of the Bankruptcy Court’s TRO that restricted HCLOF’s ability to reset or redeem the CLOs and that is at the core of the HarbourVest Claims.

38. The second factor—the complexity, duration, and costs of litigation—also weighs heavily in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement. As this Court is aware, the events forming the basis of the HarbourVest Claims—including the Terry Litigation and Acis Bankruptcy—proceeded *for years* in this Court and in multiple other forums, and has already cost the Debtor’s estate millions of dollars in legal fees. If the Settlement Agreement is not approved, then the parties will expend significant resources litigating a host of fact-intensive

issues including, among other things, the substance and materiality of the Debtor's alleged fraudulent statements and omissions and whether HarbourVest reasonably relied on those statements and omissions.

39. Third, approval of the Settlement Agreement is justified by the paramount interest of creditors. Specifically, the settlement will enable the Debtor to: (a) avoid incurring substantial litigation costs; (b) avoid the litigation risk associated with HarbourVest's \$300 million claim; and (c) through the plan support provisions, increase the likelihood that the Debtor's pending plan of reorganization will be confirmed.

40. Finally, the Settlement Agreement was unquestionably negotiated at arm's-length. The terms of the settlement are the result of numerous, ongoing discussions and negotiations between the parties and their counsel and represent neither party's "best case scenario." Indeed, the Settlement Agreement should be approved as a rational exercise of the Debtor's business judgment made after due deliberation of the facts and circumstances concerning HarbourVest's Claims.

NO PRIOR REQUEST

41. No previous request for the relief sought herein has been made to this, or any other, Court.

NOTICE

42. Notice of this Motion shall be given to the following parties or, in lieu thereof, to their counsel, if known: (a) counsel for HarbourVest; (b) the Office of the United States Trustee; (c) the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Texas; (d) the Debtor's principal secured parties; (e) counsel to the Committee; and (f) parties requesting notice pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2002. The Debtor submits that, in light of the nature of the relief requested, no other or further notice need be given.

WHEREFORE, the Debtor respectfully requests entry of an order, substantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, (a) granting the relief requested herein, and (b) granting such other relief as is just and proper.

Dated: December 23, 2020.

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UBS Settlement [Doc. 2200-1]

Case 19-34054-sgj11 Doc 2200-1 Filed 04/15/21 Entered 04/15/21 14:37:56 Page 1 of 17

Exhibit 1
Settlement Agreement

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement”) is entered into as of March 30, 2021, by and among (i) Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“HCMLP” or the “Debtor”), (ii) Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. (n/k/a Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P.) (“Multi-Strat,” and together with its general partner and its direct and indirect wholly-owned subsidiaries, the “MSCF Parties”), (iii) Strand Advisors, Inc. (“Strand”), and (iv) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (collectively, “UBS”).

Each of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, and UBS are sometimes referred to herein collectively as the “Parties” and individually as a “Party.”

RECITALS

WHEREAS, in 2007, UBS entered into certain contracts with HCMLP and two funds managed by HCMLP—Highland CDO Opportunity Master Fund, L.P. (“CDO Fund”) and Highland Special Opportunities Holding Company (“SOHC,” and together with CDO Fund, the “Funds”) related to a securitization transaction (the “Knox Agreement”);

WHEREAS, in 2008, the parties to the Knox Agreement restructured the Knox Agreement;

WHEREAS, UBS terminated the Knox Agreement and, on February 24, 2009, UBS filed a complaint in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (the “State Court”) against HCMLP and the Funds seeking to recover damages related to the Knox Agreement, in an action captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P., et al.*, Index No. 650097/2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the “2009 Action”);

WHEREAS, UBS’s lone claim against HCMLP in the 2009 Action for indemnification was dismissed in early 2010, and thereafter UBS amended its complaint in the 2009 Action to add five new defendants, Highland Financial Partners, L.P. (“HFP”), Highland Credit Strategies Master Funds, L.P. (“Credit-Strat”), Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. (“Crusader”), Multi-Strat, and Strand, and to add new claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with contract, alter ego, and general partner liability;

WHEREAS, UBS filed a new, separate action against HCMLP on June 28, 2010, for, *inter alia*, fraudulent conveyance and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, captioned *UBS Securities LLC, et al. v. Highland Capital Management, L.P.*, Index No. 650752/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (the “2010 Action”);

WHEREAS, in November 2010, the State Court consolidated the 2009 Action and the 2010 Action (hereafter referred to as the “State Court Action”), and on May 11, 2011, UBS filed a Second Amended Complaint in the 2009 Action;

WHEREAS, in 2015, UBS entered into settlement agreements with Crusader and Credit-Strat, and thereafter UBS filed notices with the State Court in the State Court Action dismissing its claims against Crusader and Credit-Strat;

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, the State Court bifurcated claims asserted in the State Court Action for purposes of trial, with the Phase I bench trial deciding UBS's breach of contract claims against the Funds and HCMLP's counterclaims against UBS;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2017, the Funds, along with Highland CDO Opportunity Fund, Ltd., Highland CDO Holding Company, Highland Financial Corp., and HFP, purportedly sold assets with a purported collective fair market value of \$105,647,679 (the "Transferred Assets") and purported face value of over \$300,000,000 to Sentinel Reinsurance, Ltd. ("Sentinel") pursuant to a purported asset purchase agreement (the "Purchase Agreement");

WHEREAS, Sentinel treated the Transferred Assets as payment for a \$25,000,000 premium on a document entitled "Legal Liability Insurance Policy" (the "Insurance Policy");

WHEREAS, the Insurance Policy purports to provide coverage to the Funds for up to \$100,000,000 for any legal liability resulting from the State Court Action (the "Insurance Proceeds");

WHEREAS, one of the Transferred Assets CDO Fund transferred to Sentinel was CDO Fund's limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat (the "CDOF Interests");

WHEREAS, Sentinel had also received from HCMLP limited partnership interests in Multi-Strat for certain cash consideration (together with the CDOF Interests, the "MSCF Interests");

WHEREAS, the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to Strand's independent directors and the Debtor's bankruptcy advisors prior to late January 2021;

WHEREAS, in early February 2021, the Debtor disclosed the existence of the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy to UBS;

WHEREAS, prior to such disclosure, the Purchase Agreement and Insurance Policy were unknown to UBS;

WHEREAS, on November 14, 2019, following the Phase I trial, the State Court issued its decision determining that the Funds breached the Knox Agreement on December 5, 2008 and dismissing HCMLP's counterclaims;

WHEREAS, Sentinel purportedly redeemed the MSCF Interests in November 2019 and the redeemed MSCF Interests are currently valued at approximately \$32,823,423.50 (the "Sentinel Redemption");

WHEREAS, on February 10, 2020, the State Court entered a Phase I trial judgment against the Funds in the amount of \$1,039,957,799.44 as of January 22, 2020 (the "Phase I Judgment");

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action, includes, *inter alia*, UBS's claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against HCMLP, UBS's

EXECUTION VERSION

fraudulent transfer claims against HCMLP, HFP, and Multi-Strat, and UBS's general partner claim against Strand;

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2019, HCMLP filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Bankruptcy Case"). The Bankruptcy Case was transferred to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the "Bankruptcy Court") on December 4, 2019;

WHEREAS, Phase II of the trial of the State Court Action was automatically stayed as to HCMLP by HCMLP's bankruptcy filing;

WHEREAS, on May 11, 2020, UBS, Multi-Strat, Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, Ltd., and Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Asset Holdings, L.P. (collectively, the "May Settlement Parties"), entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "May Settlement") pursuant to which the May Settlement Parties agreed to the allocation of the proceeds of certain sales of assets held by Multi-Strat, including escrowing a portion of such funds, and restrictions on Multi-Strat's actions;

WHEREAS, on June 26, 2020, UBS timely filed two substantively identical claims in the Bankruptcy Case: (i) Claim No. 190 filed by UBS Securities LLC; and (ii) Claim No. 191 filed by UBS AG London Branch (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "UBS Claim"). The UBS Claim asserts a general unsecured claim against HCMLP for \$1,039,957,799.40;

WHEREAS, on August 3, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an *Order Directing Mediation* [Docket No. 912] pursuant to which HCMLP, UBS, and several other parties were directed to mediate their Bankruptcy Case disputes before two experienced third-party mediators, Retired Judge Allan Gropper and Sylvia Mayer (together, the "Mediators"). HCMLP and UBS formally met with the Mediators together and separately on numerous occasions, including on August 27, September 2, 3, and 4, and December 17, 2020, and had numerous other informal discussions outside of the presence of the Mediators, in an attempt to resolve the UBS Claim;

WHEREAS, on August 7, 2020, HCMLP filed an objection to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 928]. Also on August 7, 2020, the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund, and Crusader, Highland Crusader Fund, L.P., Highland Crusader Fund, Ltd., and Highland Crusader Fund II, Ltd. (collectively, the "Redeemer Committee"), objected to the UBS Claim [Docket No. 933]. On September 25, 2020, UBS filed its response to these objections [Docket No. 1105];

WHEREAS, on October 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each moved for partial summary judgment on the UBS Claim [Docket Nos. 1180 and 1183, respectively], and on November 6, 2020, UBS opposed these motions [Docket No. 1337];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted, as set forth therein, the motions for partial summary judgment filed by HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee and denied UBS's request for leave to file an amended proof of claim [Docket No. 1526];

EXECUTION VERSION

WHEREAS, on November 6, 2020, UBS filed *UBS's Motion for Temporary Allowance of Claims for Voting Purposes Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3018* [Docket No. 1338] (the "3018 Motion"), and on November 16, 2020, HCMLP and the Redeemer Committee each opposed the 3018 Motion [Docket Nos. 1404 and 1409, respectively];

WHEREAS, by Order dated December 8, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court granted the 3018 Motion and allowed the UBS Claim, on a temporary basis and for voting purposes only, in the amount of \$94,761,076 [Docket No. 1518];

WHEREAS, on January 22, 2021, the Debtor filed the *Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization for Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)* [Docket No. 1808] (as amended, and as may be further amended, supplemented, or otherwise modified, the "Plan");

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, the Debtor caused CDO Fund to make a claim on the Insurance Policy to collect the Insurance Proceeds pursuant to the Phase I Judgment;

WHEREAS, on March 29, 2021, UBS filed an adversary proceeding seeking injunctive relief and a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to, among other things, enjoin the Debtor from allowing Multi-Strat to distribute the Sentinel Redemption to Sentinel or any transferee of Sentinel (the "Multi-Strat Proceeding"), which relief the Debtor, in its capacity as Multi-Strat's investment manager and general partner, does not oppose;

WHEREAS, the Parties wish to enter into this Agreement to settle all claims and disputes between and among them, to the extent and on the terms and conditions set forth herein, and to exchange the mutual releases set forth herein, without any admission of fault, liability, or wrongdoing on the part of any Party; and

WHEREAS, this Agreement will be presented to the Bankruptcy Court for approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 ("Rule 9019") and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the above recitals, the covenants, conditions, and promises made herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the Parties agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

1. Settlement of Claims. In full and complete satisfaction of the UBS Released Claims (as defined below):

(a) The UBS Claim will be allowed as (i) a single, general unsecured claim in the amount of \$65,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 8 General Unsecured Claim under the Plan;¹ and (ii) a single, subordinated unsecured claim in the amount of \$60,000,000 against HCMLP, which shall be treated as a Class 9 Subordinated General Unsecured Claim under the Plan.

¹ Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Plan.

EXECUTION VERSION

(b) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the sum of \$18,500,000 (the “Multi-Strat Payment”) as follows: (i) within two (2) business days after the Order Date, the May Settlement Parties will submit a Joint Release Instruction (as defined in the May Settlement) for the release of the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement) to be paid to UBS in partial satisfaction of the Multi-Strat Payment on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date; and (ii) Multi-Strat will pay UBS the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment in immediately available funds on the date that is ten (10) business days following the Order Date, provided that, for the avoidance of doubt, the amounts held in the Escrow Account will not be paid to UBS until and unless the remainder of the Multi-Strat Payment is made.

(c) Subject to applicable law, HCMLP will use reasonable efforts to (i) cause CDO Fund to pay the Insurance Proceeds in full to UBS as soon as practicable, but no later than within 5 business days of CDO Fund actually receiving the Insurance Proceeds from or on behalf of Sentinel; (ii) if Sentinel refuses to pay the Insurance Proceeds, take legal action reasonably designed to recover the Insurance Proceeds or the MSCF Interests or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment and in addition shall provide reasonable assistance to UBS in connection with any legal action UBS takes to recover the Insurance Proceeds or to return the Transferred Assets to the Funds to satisfy the Phase I Judgment or obtain rights to the MSCF interests, including but not limited to the redemption payments in connection with the MSCF Interests; (iii) cooperate with UBS and participate (as applicable) in the investigation or prosecution of claims or requests for injunctive relief against the Funds, Multi-Strat, Sentinel, James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrio, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Transferred Assets, the transfer of the MSCF Interests, or any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, excluding the individuals listed on the schedule provided to UBS on March 25, 2021 (the “HCMLP Excluded Employees”); (iv) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with all business and trustee contacts at the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, if any, that are actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (v) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide UBS with a copy of the governing documents, prospectuses, and indenture agreements for the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd, as applicable, that are in the Debtor’s actual possession, custody, or control, (vi) as soon as reasonably practicable, provide, to the extent possible, any CUSIP numbers of the securities of the Funds, HFP, Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., Aberdeen Loan Funding Ltd, Eastland CLO Ltd, Grayson CLO Ltd, Valhalla CLO Ltd, and Governance Re Ltd., as applicable, including information regarding the location and amount of any cash related to those entities’ holdings, in each case only to the extent actually known by the Debtor after reasonable inquiry; (vii) cooperate with UBS to assign or convey any such assets described in Section 1(c)(vi) or any other assets owned or controlled by the Funds and/or HFP, including for avoidance of doubt any additional assets currently unknown to the Debtor that the Debtor discovers in the future after the Agreement Effective Date; (viii) respond as promptly as reasonably possible to requests by UBS for access to relevant documents and approve as promptly as reasonably possible requests for access to relevant documents from third parties as needed with respect to the Transferred Assets, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the

EXECUTION VERSION

MSCF Interests and any other assets currently or formerly held by the Funds or HFP, including without limitation the requests listed in **Appendix A** (provided, however, that the provision of any such documents or access will be subject to the common interest privilege and will not constitute a waiver of any attorney-client or other privilege in favor of HCMLP) that are in the Debtor's actual possession, custody, or control; (ix) preserve all documents in HCMLP's possession, custody, or control regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the MSCF Interests, or any transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel, including but not limited to the documents requested in Appendix A, from 2016 to present, and issue a litigation hold to all individuals deemed reasonably necessary regarding the same; and (x) otherwise use reasonable efforts to assist UBS to collect its Phase I Judgment against the Funds and HFP and assets the Funds and/or HFP may own, or have a claim to under applicable law ahead of all other creditors of the Funds and HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, HCMLP shall not be required to incur any out-of-pocket fees or expenses, including, but not limited to, those fees and expenses for outside consultants and professionals (the "Reimbursable Expenses"), in connection with any provision of this Section 1(c) in excess of \$3,000,000 (the "Expense Cap"), and provided further that, for every dollar UBS recovers from the Funds (other than the assets related to Greenbriar CLO Ltd. or Greenbriar CLO Corp.), Sentinel, Multi-Strat (other than the amounts set forth in Section 1(b) hereof), or any other person or entity described in Section 1(c)(iii) in connection with any claims UBS has that arise out of or relate to the Phase I Judgment, the Purchase Agreement, the Insurance Policy, the Transferred Assets, the MSCF Interests, or the Insurance Proceeds (the "UBS Recovery"), UBS will reimburse HCMLP ten percent of the UBS Recovery for the Reimbursable Expenses incurred by HCMLP, subject to: (1) the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and (2) UBS's receipt and review of invoices and time records (which may be redacted as reasonably necessary) for outside consultants and professionals in connection with such efforts described in this Section 1(c), up to but not exceeding the Expense Cap after any disputes regarding the Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved pursuant to procedures to be agreed upon, or absent an agreement, in a manner directed by the Bankruptcy Court; and provided further that in any proceeding over the reasonableness of the Reimbursable Expenses, the losing party shall be obligated to pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the prevailing party; and provided further that any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c) shall be conducted in consultation with UBS, including but not limited to the selection of necessary outside consultants and professionals to assist in such litigation; and provided further that UBS shall have the right to approve HCMLP's selection of outside consultants and professionals to assist in any litigation in which HCMLP is a co-plaintiff with UBS or a plaintiff pursuing claims on behalf of or for UBS's benefit pursuant to this Section 1(c).

(d) Redeemer Appeal.

(i) On the Agreement Effective Date, provided that neither the Redeemer Committee nor any entities acting on its behalf or with any assistance from or coordination with the Redeemer Committee have objected to this Agreement or the 9019 Motion (as defined below), UBS shall withdraw with prejudice its appeal of the *Order Approving Debtor's Settlement with (A) the Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Claim No. 72) and (B) the Highland Crusader Funds (Claim No. 81), and Authorizing Actions Consistent Therewith* [Docket No. 1273] (the "Redeemer Appeal"); and

EXECUTION VERSION

(ii) The Parties have stipulated to extend the deadline for the filing of any briefs in the Redeemer Appeal to June 30, 2021 and will agree to such further extensions as necessary to facilitate this Settlement Agreement.

(e) As of the Agreement Effective Date, the restrictions and obligations set forth in the May Settlement, other than those in Section 7 thereof, shall be extinguished in their entirety and be of no further force or effect.

(f) On the Agreement Effective Date, the Debtor shall instruct the claims agent in the Bankruptcy Case to adjust the claims register in accordance with this Agreement.

(g) On the Agreement Effective Date, any claim the Debtor may have against Sentinel or any other party, and any recovery related thereto, with respect to the MSCF Interests shall be automatically transferred to UBS, without any further action required by the Debtor. For the avoidance of doubt, the Debtor shall retain any and all other claims it may have against Sentinel or any other party, and the recovery related thereto, unrelated to the MSCF Interests.

2. Definitions.

(a) “Agreement Effective Date” shall mean the date the full amount of the Multi-Strat Payment defined in Section 1(b) above, including without limitation the amounts held in the Escrow Account (as defined in the May Settlement), is actually paid to UBS.

(b) “HCMLP Parties” shall mean (a) HCMLP, in its individual capacity; (b) HCMLP, as manager of Multi-Strat; and (c) Strand.

(c) “Order Date” shall mean the date of an order entered by the Bankruptcy Court approving this Agreement pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 9019 and section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.

(d) “UBS Parties” shall mean UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch.

3. Releases.

(a) **UBS Releases.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the UBS Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue (A) the HCMLP Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, and (B) the MSCF Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), except as expressly set forth below, for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys’ fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known

EXECUTION VERSION

or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the “UBS Released Claims”), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to (1) the obligations of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties under this Agreement, including without limitation the allowance of or distributions on account of the UBS Claim or the settlement terms described in Sections 1(a)-(g) above; (2) the Funds or HFP, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy, or such prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, and/or Insurance Policy by UBS; (3) James Dondero or Mark Okada, or any entities, including without limitation Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, Dugaboy Investment Trust, and NexBank, SSB, owned or controlled by either of them, other than the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties (but for the avoidance of doubt, such releases of the HCMLP Parties and MSCF Parties shall be solely with respect to such entities and shall not extend in any way to James Dondero or Mark Okada in their individual capacity or in any other capacity, including but not limited to as an investor, officer, trustee, or director in the HCMLP Parties or MSCF Parties); (4) Sentinel or its subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, assigns, employees, or directors, including James Dondero, Isaac Leventon, Scott Ellington, Andrew Dean, Christopher Walter, Jean Paul Sevilla, Matthew DiOrto, Katie Irving, and/or any other current or former employee or director of the Funds or Sentinel and/or any other former employee or former director of any of the HCMLP Parties that is believed to be involved with the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, MSCF Interests, or Transferred Assets, including for any liability with respect to the prosecution, enforcement, collection, or defense of the Phase I Judgment, Purchase Agreement, the MSCF Interests, any potentially fraudulent transfer of assets from the Funds to Sentinel and/or Insurance Policy, excluding the HCMLP Excluded Employees; (5) the economic rights or interests of UBS in its capacity as an investor, directly or indirectly (including in its capacity as an investment manager and/or investment advisor), in any HCMLP-affiliated entity, including without limitation in the Redeemer Committee and Credit Strat, and/or in such entities’ past, present or future subsidiaries and feeders funds (the “UBS Unrelated Investments”); and (6) any actions taken by UBS against any person or entity, including any HCMLP Party or MSCF Party, to enjoin a distribution on the Sentinel Redemption or the transfer of any assets currently held by or within the control of CDO Fund to Sentinel or a subsequent transferee or to seek to compel any action that only such person or entity has standing to pursue or authorize in order to permit UBS to recover the Insurance Proceeds, Transferred Assets, the Phase I Judgment or any recovery against HFP; provided, however, that, from and after the date hereof, any out-of-pocket fees or expenses incurred by HCMLP in connection with this Section 3(a)(6) will be considered Reimbursable Expenses and shall be subject to, and applied against, the Expense Cap as if they were incurred by HCMLP pursuant to Section 1(c) subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date and after any disputes regarding such Reimbursable Expenses have been resolved in the manner described in Section 1(c).

(b) **HCMLP Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the HCMLP Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of

EXECUTION VERSION

their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "HCMLP Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement; and (b) the obligations of the UBS Parties in connection with the UBS Unrelated Investments.

(c) **Multi-Strat Release.** Upon the occurrence of the Agreement Effective Date, and to the maximum extent permitted by law, each of the MSCF Parties hereby forever, finally, fully, unconditionally, irrevocably, and completely releases, relieves, acquits, remises, exonerates, forever discharges, and covenants never to sue any of the UBS Parties and each of their current and former advisors, attorneys, trustees, directors, officers, managers, members, partners, employees, beneficiaries, shareholders, agents, participants, subsidiaries, parents, affiliates, successors, designees, and assigns (each in their capacities as such), for and from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, promises, acts, agreements, liens, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitation, attorneys' fees and related costs), damages, injuries, suits, actions, and causes of action of whatever kind or nature, whether known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, contingent or fixed, at law or in equity, or statutory or otherwise, including, without limitation, any claims, defenses, and affirmative defenses, whether known or unknown, including, without limitation, those that have been or could have been alleged or asserted in the State Court Action or the Bankruptcy Case (collectively, the "Multi-Strat Released Claims"), provided, however, that notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, such releases shall not apply to the obligations of the UBS Parties under this Agreement or Section 7 of the May Settlement.

4. **No Third Party Beneficiaries.** Except for the parties released by this Agreement, no other person or entity shall be deemed a third-party beneficiary of this Agreement.

5. **UBS Covenant Not to Sue.** Subject to the occurrence of the Agreement Effective date, if UBS ever controls any HCMLP-affiliated defendant in the State Court Action by virtue of the prosecution, enforcement, or collection of the Phase I Judgment (collectively, the "Controlled State Court Defendants"), UBS covenants on behalf of itself and the Controlled State Court Defendants, if any, that neither UBS nor the Controlled State Court Defendants will assert or pursue any claims that any Controlled State Court Defendant has or may have against any of the HCMLP Parties; provided, however, that nothing shall prohibit UBS or a Controlled State Court Defendant from taking any of the actions set forth in Section 3(a)(1)-(6); provided further, however, if and to the extent UBS receives any distribution from any Controlled State Court Defendant that is derived from a claim by a Controlled State Court Defendant against the Debtor, subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 3(a), which distribution is directly

EXECUTION VERSION

attributable to any property the Controlled State Court Defendant receives from the Debtor and separate and distinct from property owned or controlled by CDO Fund, SOHC, or Multi-Strat, then such recovery shall be credited against all amounts due from the Debtor's estate on account of the UBS Claim allowed pursuant to Section 1(a) of this Agreement, or if such claim has been paid in full, shall be promptly turned over to the Debtor or its successors or assigns.

6. Agreement Subject to Bankruptcy Court Approval.

(a) The force and effect of this Agreement and the Parties' obligations hereunder are conditioned in all respects on the approval of this Agreement and the releases herein by the Bankruptcy Court. The Parties agree to use reasonable efforts to have this Agreement expeditiously approved by the Bankruptcy Court by cooperating in the preparation and prosecution of a mutually agreeable motion and proposed order (the "9019 Motion") to be filed by the Debtor no later than five business days after execution of this Agreement by all Parties unless an extension is agreed to by both parties.

7. Representations and Warranties.

(a) Each UBS Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the UBS Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any UBS Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such UBS Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any UBS Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such UBS Party.

(b) Each HCMLP Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the HCMLP Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any HCMLP Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such HCMLP Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any HCMLP Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such HCMLP Party.

(c) Each MSCF Party represents and warrants that (i) it has full authority to enter into this Agreement and to release the Multi-Strat Released Claims and has not sold, transferred, or assigned any Multi-Strat Released Claim to any other person or entity, and (ii) no person or entity other than such MSCF Party has been, is, or will be authorized to bring, pursue, or enforce any Multi-Strat Released Claim on behalf of, for the benefit of, or in the name of (whether directly or derivatively) such MSCF Party.

EXECUTION VERSION

8. No Admission of Liability. The Parties acknowledge that there is a bona fide dispute with respect to the UBS Claim. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed, expressly or by implication, as an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing by HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person, and the execution of this Agreement does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or wrongdoing on the part of HCMLP, the MSCF Parties, Strand, UBS, or any other person.

9. Successors-in-Interest. This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of each of the Parties and their representatives, successors, and assigns.

10. Notice. Each notice and other communication hereunder shall be in writing and will, unless otherwise subsequently directed in writing, be delivered by email and overnight delivery, as set forth below, and will be deemed to have been given on the date following such mailing.

HCMLP Parties or the MSCF Parties

Highland Capital Management, L.P.
300 Crescent Court, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Attention: General Counsel
Telephone No.: 972-628-4100
E-mail: notices@HighlandCapital.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones LLP
Attention: Jeffrey Pomerantz, Esq.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone No.: 310-277-6910
E-mail: jpomerantz@pszjlaw.com

UBS

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: Elizabeth Kozlowski, Executive Director and Counsel
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Telephone No.: 212-713-9007
E-mail: elizabeth.kozlowski@ubs.com

UBS Securities LLC
UBS AG London Branch
Attention: John Lantz, Executive Director
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019

EXECUTION VERSION

Telephone No.: 212-713-1371
E-mail: john.lantz@ubs.com

with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to:

Latham & Watkins LLP
Attention: Andrew Clubok
Sarah Tomkowiak
555 Eleventh Street, NW, Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20004-1304
Telephone No.: 202-637-3323
Email: andrew.clubok@lw.com
sarah.tomkowiak@lw.com

11. Advice of Counsel. Each of the Parties represents that such Party has: (a) been adequately represented by independent legal counsel of its own choice, throughout all of the negotiations that preceded the execution of this Agreement; (b) executed this Agreement upon the advice of such counsel; (c) read this Agreement, and understands and assents to all the terms and conditions contained herein without any reservations; and (d) had the opportunity to have this Agreement and all the terms and conditions contained herein explained by independent counsel, who has answered any and all questions asked of such counsel, or which could have been asked of such counsel, including, but not limited to, with regard to the meaning and effect of any of the provisions of this Agreement.

12. Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the subject matter of this Agreement, and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations and agreements, written or oral and executed or unexecuted, concerning such subject matter. Each of the Parties acknowledges that no other Party, nor any agent of or attorney for any such Party, has made any promise, representation, or warranty, express or implied, written or oral, not otherwise contained in this Agreement to induce any Party to execute this Agreement. The Parties further acknowledge that they are not executing this Agreement in reliance on any promise, representation, or warranty not contained in this Agreement, and that any such reliance would be unreasonable. This Agreement will not be waived or modified except by an agreement in writing signed by each Party or duly authorized representative of each Party.

13. No Party Deemed Drafter. The Parties acknowledge that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and are the result of arm's-length negotiations between the Parties and their chosen counsel. Each Party and its counsel cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. In any construction to be made of this Agreement, the Agreement will not be construed against any Party.

14. Future Cooperation. The Parties agree to cooperate and execute such further documentation as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the intent of this Agreement.

15. Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts with the same force and effect as if executed in one complete document. Each Party's signature hereto will signify acceptance of, and agreement to, the terms and provisions contained in this Agreement.

11

EXECUTION VERSION


Photographic, electronic, and facsimile copies of signed counterparts may be used in lieu of the originals of this Agreement for any purpose.

16. Governing Law; Venue; Attorneys' Fees and Costs. The Parties agree that this Agreement will be governed by and will be construed according to the laws of the State of New York without regard to conflict-of-law principles. Each of the Parties hereby submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court during the pendency of the Bankruptcy Case and thereafter to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts located in the Borough of Manhattan, New York, with respect to any disputes arising from or out of this Agreement. In any action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and costs (including experts).


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IT IS HEREBY AGREED.


HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

By: 
Name: James P. Seery Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory


**HIGHLAND MULTI STRATEGY CREDIT
FUND, L.P. (f/k/a Highland Credit
Opportunities CDO, L.P.)**

By: 
Name: James P. Seery Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory


**HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO,
Ltd.**

By: 
Name: James P. Seery Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory

**HIGHLAND CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES CDO
ASSET HOLDINGS, L.P.**

By: 
Name: James P. Seery Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory


STRAND ADVISORS, INC.

By: 
Name: James P. Seery Jr.
Its: Authorized Signatory


EXECUTION VERSION


UBS SECURITIES LLC

By: 
Name: John Lantz
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: 
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

UBS AG LONDON BRANCH

By: 
Name: William Chandler
Its: Authorized Signatory

By: 
Name: Elizabeth Kozlowski
Its: Authorized Signatory

EXECUTION VERSION

APPENDIX A

- The search parameters (custodians, date ranges, search terms) used to locate the documents produced to UBS on February 27, 2021 (and any additional parameters used for the previous requests from UBS);
- Identity of counsel to, and trustees of, CDO Fund or SOHC;
- Current or last effective investment manager agreements for CDO Fund and SOHC, including any management fee schedule, and any documentation regarding the termination of those agreements;
- The tax returns for the CDO Fund and SOHC from 2017-present;
- Communications between any employees of Sentinel (or its affiliates) and any employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or any of Dondero, Leventon, or Ellington from 2017-present;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, or June 30, 2018 Memorandum entitled “Tax Consequences of Sentinel Acquisition of HFP/CDO Opportunity Assets” (the “Tax Memo”), including without limitation (i) amendments to these documents, (ii) transfer of assets pursuant to these documents, (iii) board minutes or resolutions regarding or relating to these documents, (iv) claims made on the Insurance Policy; (v) communications with the IRS regarding the asset transfer pursuant to these documents; and (vi) any similar asset purchase agreements, capital transfer agreements, or similar agreements;
- Documents or communications regarding or relating to the value of any assets transferred pursuant to the Insurance Policy or Purchase Agreement, including without limitation those assets listed in Schedule A to the Purchase Agreement, from 2017 to present, including documentation supporting the \$105,647,679 value of those assets as listed in the Tax Memo;
- Documents showing the organizational structure of Sentinel and its affiliated entities, including information on Dondero’s relationship to Sentinel;
- Any factual information provided by current or former employees of the HCMLP Parties, CDO Fund, SOHC, or Sentinel regarding or relating to the Purchase Agreement, Insurance Policy, Tax Memo, and/or transfer of assets pursuant to those documents;
- Debtor’s settlement agreements with Ellington and Leventon;
- Copies of all prior and future Monthly Reports and Valuation Reports (as defined in the Indenture, dated as of December 20, 2007, among Greenbriar CLO Ltd., Greenbriar CLO Corp., and State Street Bank and Trust Company); and
- Identity of any creditors of CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP and amount of debts owed to those creditors by CDO Fund, SOHC, or HFP, including without limitation any debts owed to the Debtor.

Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management

OUR FOUNDER

[RETURN TO ABOUT \(/ABOUT/\)](#)

Warren Hellman: One of the good guys

Warren Hellman was a devoted family man, highly successful businessman, active philanthropist, dedicated musician, arts patron, endurance athlete and all-around good guy. Born in New York City in 1934, he grew up in the Bay Area, graduating from the University of California at Berkeley. After serving in the U.S. Army and attending Harvard Business School, Warren began his finance career at Lehman Brothers, becoming the youngest partner in the firm's history at age 26 and subsequently serving as President. After a distinguished career on Wall Street, Warren moved back west and **co-founded Hellman & Friedman**, building it into one of the industry's leading private equity firms.

Warren deeply believed in the power of people to accomplish incredible things and used his success to improve and enrich the lives of countless people. Throughout his career, Warren helped found or seed many successful businesses including Matrix Partners, Jordan Management Company, **Farallon Capital Management** and Hall Capital Partners.

Within the community, Warren and his family were generous supporters of dozens of organizations and causes in the arts, public education, civic life, and public health, including creating and running the San Francisco Free Clinic. Later in life, Warren became an accomplished 5-string banjo player and found great joy in sharing the love of music with others. In true form, he made something larger of this avocation to benefit others by founding the Hardly Strictly Bluegrass Festival, an annual three-day, free music festival that draws hundreds of thousands of people together from around the Bay Area.

An accomplished endurance athlete, Warren regularly completed 100-mile runs, horseback rides and combinations of the two. He also was an avid skier and national caliber master ski racer and served as president of the U.S. Ski Team in the late 1970s, and is credited with helping revitalize the Sugar Bowl ski resort in the California Sierras.

In short, Warren Hellman embodied the ideal of living life to the fullest. He had an active mind and body, and a huge heart. We are lucky to call him our founder. **Read more about Warren.** (<https://hf.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Warren-Hellman-News-Release.pdf>)



SFChronicle/SFGate/Liz Hafalia



Robert Holmgren



no caption

<https://hf.com/warren-hellman/>

1/2

Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020





Julie Segal

CORNER OFFICE

GCM Grosvenor to Go Public

The \$57 billion alternatives manager will become a public company after merging with a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald.

August 03, 2020



Chicago, IL (Tim Boyle/Bloomberg)

In a sign of the times, GCM Grosvenor will become a public company through a SPAC.

The Chicago-based alternative investments firm is planning to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company in a deal valued at \$2 billion. The 50-year-old firm has \$57 billion in assets in private equity, infrastructure, real estate, credit, and absolute return investments.

"We have long valued having external shareholders and we wanted to preserve the accountability and focus that comes with that," Michael Sacks, GCM Grosvenor's chairman and CEO, said in a statement.

GCM Grosvenor will combine with CF Finance Special Acquisition Corp, a SPAC backed by Cantor Fitzgerald, according to an announcement from both companies on Monday. After the company goes public, Sacks will continue to lead GCM Grosvenor, which is owned by management and Hellman & Friedman, a private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman, which has owned a minority stake of the Chicago asset manager since 2007, will sell its equity as

<https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1ms8f4rt98f1g/GCM-Grosvenor-to-Go-Public>

1/3

Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman

Case Study – Large Loan Origination

Debt origination for an affiliate of Simon Property Group Inc. and Farallon Capital Management

Date	June 2007	Transaction Overview <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In June 2007, Lehman Brothers co-originated a loan in the aggregate amount of \$321 million (Lehman portion: \$121 million) with JP Morgan to a special purpose affiliate of a joint venture between Simon Property Group Inc (“Simon”) and Farallon Capital Management (“Farallon”) secured by the shopping center known as Gurnee Mills Mall (the “Property”) located in Gurnee, IL . The Property consists of a one-story, 200 store discount mega-mall comprised of 1,808,506 square feet anchored by Burlington Coat Factory, Marshalls, Bed Bath & Beyond and Kohls among other national retailers. Built in 1991, the Property underwent a \$5 million interior renovation in addition to a \$71 million redevelopment between 2004 and 2005. As of March 2007, the Property had a in-line occupancy of 99.5%.
Asset Class	Retail	
Asset Size	1,808,506 Sq. Ft.	
Sponsor	Simon Property Group Inc. / Farallon Capital Management	
Transaction Type	Refinance	
Total Debt Amount	Lehman Brothers: \$121 million JP Morgan: \$200 million	



Lehman Brothers Role

- Simon and Farallon comprised the sponsorship which eventually merged with The Mills Corporation in early 2007 for \$25.25 per common share in cash. The total value of the transaction was approximately \$1.64 billion for all of the outstanding common stock, and approximately \$7.9 billion including assumed debt and preferred equity.
- Lehman and JP Morgan subsequently co-originated \$321 million loan at 79.2% LTV based on an appraisal completed in March by Cushman & Wakefield. The Loan was used to refinance the indebtedness secured by the Property.

Sponsorship Overview

- The Mills Corporation, based in Chevy Chase MD is a developer owner and manager of a diversified portfolio of retail destinations including regional shopping malls and entertainment centers. They currently own 38 properties in the United States totaling 47 million square feet.

LEHMAN BROTHERS

32

Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley

James P. Seery, Jr.

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Sidley Austin LLP

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New York, New York 10019

(212) 839-5300 (tel)

(212) 839-5599 (fax)

Attorneys for the Steering Group

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----	X
	:
In re:	: Chapter 11
	:
BLOCKBUSTER INC., <i>et al.</i> ,	: Case No. 10-14997 (BRL)
	:
Debtors.	: (Jointly Administered)
	:
-----	X

**THE BACKSTOP LENDERS' OBJECTION TO THE MOTION OF LYME REGIS TO
ABANDON CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO GRANT
STANDING TO LYME REGIS TO PURSUE CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE**

1. The Steering Group of Senior Secured Noteholders who are Backstop Lenders -- Icahn Capital LP, Monarch Alternative Capital LP, Owl Creek Asset Management, L.P., Stonehill Capital Management LLC, and Värde Partners, Inc. (collectively, the "Backstop Lenders") -- hereby file this objection (the "Objection") to the Motion of Lyme Regis Partners, LLC ("Lyme Regis") to Abandon Certain Causes of Action or, in the Alternative, to Grant Standing to Lyme Regis to Pursue Claims on Behalf of the Estate (the "Motion") [Docket No. 593].

Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor's G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates



Over 25 years earlier, here is a group at a party. From the left, Bob Zinn, Dave Lowenthal, Rory Little, Joe Nesler, Jon Polonsky (in front of Joe), John Motulsky and Mark Windfeld-Hansen (behind bottle!) Motulsky circulated this photo at the reunion. Thanks John!



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him)
General Counsel

More

 Message



Joseph H. Nesler (He/Him) ·



Yale Law School

3rd

General Counsel

Winnetka, Illinois, United States ·

[Contact info](#)

500+ connections

 Message

More

Open to work

Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel roles

[See all details](#)

About


I have over 38 years of experience representing participants in the investment management industry with respect to a wide range of legal and regulatory matters, including SEC, DOL, FINRA, and NFA regulations and examinations. ... [see more](#)

Activity

522 followers

Posts Joseph H. created, shared, or commented on in the last 90 days are displayed here.

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/josephnesler/>



 Message

Dalphi Capital Management, LLC
Aug 2020 – Jul 2021 · 1 yr



Winston & Strawn LLP
Sep 2018 – Jul 2020 · 1 yr 11 mos
Greater Chicago Area

The Law Offices of Joseph H. Nesler, LLC
Feb 2016 – Aug 2018 · 2 yrs 7 mos



Independent Consultant to Grosvenor Capital Management,
L.P.

General Counsel

Managing Director, General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer (April 2004 – April 2015)

Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders

Re: Update & Notice of Distribution

As you know, in October 2020, the Bankruptcy Court approved a settlement of the Redeemer Committee's and the Crusader Funds' claims against Highland Capital Management L.P. ("HCM"), as a result of which the Redeemer Committee was allowed a general unsecured claim of \$137,696,610 against HCM and the Crusader Funds were allowed a general unsecured claim of \$50,000 against HCM (collectively, the "Claims"). In addition, as part of the settlement, various interests in the Crusader Funds held by HCM and certain of its affiliates are to be extinguished (the "Extinguished Interests"), and the Redeemer Committee and the Crusader Funds received a general release from HCM and a waiver by HCM of any claim to distributions or fees that it might otherwise receive from the Crusader Funds (the "Released Claims" and, collectively with the Extinguished Interests, the "Retained Rights").

On April 30, 2021, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee consummated the sale of the Claims against HCM and the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds to Jessup Holdings LLC (“Jessup”) for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing. The sale specifically excluded the Crusader Funds’ investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and excluded certain specified provisions of the settlement agreement with HCM (the “Settlement Agreement”), including, but not limited to, the Retained Rights. The sale of the Claims and investments was made with no holdbacks or escrows.

A&M CRF, pursuant to the Plan and Scheme and with the approval of House Hanover, the Redeemer Committee and the Board of the Master Fund, now intends to distribute the proceeds from the Jessup transaction (\$78 million), net of any applicable tax withholdings and with no reserves for the Extinguished Claims or the Released Claims. In addition, the distribution will include approximately \$9.4 million in proceeds that have been redistributed due to the cancellation

and extinguishment of the interests and shares in the Crusader Funds held by HCM, Charitable DAF and Eames in connection with the Settlement Agreement, resulting in a total gross distribution of \$87.4 million. Distributions will be based on net asset value as of June 30, 2021.

Please note that A&M CRF intends to make the distributions by wire transfer no later than July 31, 2021. Please confirm your wire instructions on or before **July 20, 2021**. If there are any revisions to your wire information, please use the attached template to provide SEI and A&M CRF your updated information on investor letterhead. This information should be sent on or before **July 20, 2021** to Alvarez & Marsal CRF and SEI at CRFInvestor@alvarezandmarsal.com and AIFS-IS_Crusader@seic.com, respectively.

The wire payments will be made to the investor bank account on file with an effective and record date of July 1, 2021. Should you have any questions, please contact SEI or A&M CRF at the e-mail addresses listed above.

Sincerely,

Alvarez & Marsal CRF Management, LLC

By: 

Steven Varner
Managing Director

EXHIBIT A-3



Ross Tower
500 N. Akard Street, Suite 3800
Dallas, Texas 75201-6659
Main 214.855.7500
Fax 214.855.7584
munsch.com
Direct Dial 214.855.7587
Direct Fax 214.978.5359
drukovina@munsch.com

May 11, 2022

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Ms. Eitel:

By way of follow-up to the letter Douglas Draper sent to your offices on October 4, 2021 and my letter dated November 3, 2021, I write to provide additional information regarding the systemic abuses of bankruptcy process occasioned during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland” or the “Debtor”). Those abuses, as detailed in our prior letters, include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to line the pockets of Debtor management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of stakeholders and third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds and in violation of investors’ due process rights and various fiduciary duties and duties of candor to the Bankruptcy Court and all constituents. In particular, I write this letter to further detail:

1. Actions and omissions by the Debtor that have but a single apparent purpose: to spend the assets of the Highland estate to enrich those currently managing the estate at the expense of the business owners (the equity). Currently, the Highland estate has more than enough assets to pay 100% of the allowed creditors’ claims. But doing so would deprive the current steward, Jim Seery, as well as his professional cohorts, the opportunity to reap tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars, in fees. This motivation explains the acts and omissions described below—all designed to prop up a façade that the post-confirmation bankruptcy machinations are necessary, and to avoid any scrutiny of that façade, and to foreclose any investigation into a contrary thesis.

2. The Debtor’s intentional understatement of the value of the estate for personal gain, the gain of professionals, and the gain of affiliated or related secondary claims-buyers.

3. The failure to adhere to fiduciary duties to maximize the value of estate assets and failure to contest baseless proofs of claim to enable Highland to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern and to preserve value for all stakeholders.

4. The gross misuse of estate assets by the Debtor and Debtor professionals in pursuing baseless and stale claims against former insiders of the Debtor when the current value of the estate (over

\$650 million with the recent completion of the MGM sale, which includes over \$200 million in cash) greatly exceeds the estate's general unsecured claims (\$410 million).

5. The failure of the Debtor's CRO and CEO, Jim Seery, to adhere to his fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the estate. As evidenced by the chart below, all general unsecured claims could have been resolved using \$163 million of debtor cash and other liquidity. Instead, proofs of claim were inflated and sold to Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill") and Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), which are both affiliates of Grosvenor (the largest investor in the Crusader Funds, which became the largest creditor in the bankruptcy). Mr. Seery has a long-standing relationship with Grosvenor and was appointed to the Independent Board (the board charged with managing the Debtor's estate) by the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, on which Grosvenor held five of nine seats.

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 (\$65.0 net of other assets)
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0
TOTAL	\$270.0	\$95.0		\$150.0 to \$163.0

As highlighted in the prior letters to your office and as further detailed herein, this is the type of systemic abuse of process that is something lawmakers and the Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee (the "EOUST") should be concerned about. Accordingly, we urge the EOUST to exercise its "broad administrative, regulatory, and litigation/enforcement authorities . . . to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders—debtors, creditors, and the public."¹ Specifically, we believe it would be appropriate for the EOUST to undertake an investigation to confirm the current value of the estate and to ensure that the claims currently being pursued by the Debtor are intended to benefit creditors of the estate, and not just to further enrich Debtor professionals and Debtor management.

BACKGROUND

The Players

James Dondero – co-founder of Highland in 1993. Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

¹ <https://www.justice.gov/ust>.

Highland – Highland Capital Management, L.P., the Debtor. Highland is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as adviser to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

Strand – Strand Advisors, Inc., a Delaware corporation. The general partner of Highland.

The Independent Board – the managing board installed after Highland’s bankruptcy filing. To avoid a protracted dispute, and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors of Strand, who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland’s business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Pursuant to an agreement with the Creditors’ Committee that was approved by the Bankruptcy Court, Mr. Dondero, UBS, and the Redeemer Committee each were permitted to choose one director. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James P. Seery, Jr.²

Creditors’ Committee – On October 29, 2019, the bankruptcy court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, which consisted of: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).

James P. Seery, Jr. – a member of the Independent Board, and the Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor. Beginning in March 2020, Mr. Seery ran day-to-day operations and negotiations with the Creditors’ Committee, investors, and employees in return for compensation of \$150,000 per month and generous incentives and stands to earn millions more for administering the Debtor’s post-confirmation liquidation. Judge Nelms and John Dubel remained on the Independent Board, receiving weekly updates and modest compensation.

Acis – Acis Capital Management, L.P., a former affiliate of Highland. Acis is currently owned and controlled by Josh Terry, a former employee of Highland. Acis (Joshua Terry) was a member of Highland’s Creditors’ Committee.

UBS – UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch, collectively. UBS asserted claims against Highland arising out of a default on a 2008 warehouse lending facility (to which Highland was neither a party nor a guarantor). Highland had paid UBS twice for full releases of claims UBS asserted against Highland – approximately \$110 million in 2008 and an additional \$70.5 million via settlement with Barclays, the Crusader Funds, and Credit Strategies in June 2015. UBS was a member of the Creditors’ Committee and appointed John Dubel to the Independent Board.

² See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

HarbourVest – HarbourVest Partners, LLC. HarbourVest is a private equity fund of funds and one of the largest private equity investment managers globally. HarbourVest has approximately \$75 billion in assets under management. HarbourVest has deep ties with Grosvenor and has jointly with Grosvenor sponsored 59 LBO transactions in the last two years.

The Crusader Funds – a group of Highland-managed funds formed between 2000 and 2002. During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds’ manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the “Redeemer Committee” and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors’ receiving a return of their full investment plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been paid when made. Subsequently, when disputes regarding management of the Crusader Funds’ liquidation arose, the Redeemer Committee instituted an arbitration against Highland, resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of approximately \$190 million. Nonetheless, due to offsets and double-counting, the Debtor initially estimated the value of the Redeemer arbitration award at \$105 million to \$110 million. In a 9019 settlement with the Debtor, the Crusader Funds ultimately received allowed claims of \$137 million, plus \$17 million of sundry claims and retention of an interest in Cornerstone Healthcare Group, Inc., an acute-health-care company, valued at over \$50 million. Notably, UBS objected to the Crusader Funds’ 9019 settlement, arguing that the Redeemer arbitration award was actually worth much less—between \$74 and \$128 million. The Crusader Funds sold their allowed claims to Stonehill, in which Grosvenor is the largest investor. This sale to an affiliated fund without approval of other investors in the fund is a violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

The Redeemer Committee – The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Funds was a group of investors in the Crusader Funds that oversaw the liquidation of the funds. The Redeemer Committee was comprised of nine members. Grosvenor held five seats. Concord held one seat.

Grosvenor – GCM Grosvenor is a global alternative asset management firm with over \$59 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor has one of the largest operations in the Cayman Islands, with more than half of their assets under management originating through its Cayman operations. Unlike most firms operating in the Cayman Islands, Grosvenor has its own corporate and fiduciary services firm. This structure provides an additional layer of opacity to anonymous corporations from the British Virgin Islands (which includes significant Russian assets), Hong Kong (which includes significant Chinese assets), and Panama (which includes significant South American assets). As a registered investment adviser, Grosvenor must adhere to know-your-customer regulations, must report suspicious activities, and must not facilitate non-compliance or opacity. In 2020, Michael Saks and other insiders distributed all of Grosvenor’s assets to shareholders and sold the firm to a SPAC originated by Cantor Fitzgerald.³ In 2020, the equity market valued asset managers and financial-services firms at decade-high valuations. It makes little sense that Grosvenor would use the highly dilutive SPAC process (as opposed to engaging

³ See <https://www.wsj.com/articles/gcm-grosvenor-to-merge-with-cantor-fitzgerald-spac-11596456900>. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently released a rule proposal that is focused on enhancing disclosure requirements around special purpose acquisition companies, including additional disclosures about SPAC sponsors, conflicts of interest and sources of dilution, business combination transactions between SPACs and private operating companies, and fairness of these transactions. See <https://www.pionline.com/regulation/sec-proposes-enhanced-spac-disclosure-rule>.

in a traditional IPO or other strategic-sale alternatives) unless such a structure was employed to avoid the diligence and management-liability tail inherent in more traditional processes.

Farallon – Farallon Capital Management, L.L.C. Farallon is a hedge fund that manages capital on behalf of institutions and individuals and was previously the largest hedge fund in the world. Farallon has approximately \$27 billion in assets under management. Grosvenor is a significant investor in Farallon. Grosvenor and Farallon are further linked by Hellman & Friedman, LLC, an American private equity firm. Hellman & Friedman owned a stake in Grosvenor from 2007 until it went public in 2020 and seeded Farallon’s initial capital.

Muck – Muck Holdings, LLC. Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon. Together with Jessup Holdings, LLC (described below), Muck acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Stonehill – Stonehill Capital Management, LLC. Stonehill provides portfolio management for pooled investment vehicles. It has approximately \$3 billion in assets under management, which we have reason to believe includes approximately \$1 billion from Grosvenor.

Jessup – Jessup Holdings, LLC. Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill. Together with Muck (Farallon), Stonehill acquired 90.28% of the general unsecured claims (inclusive of Class 8 and Class 9) in the Highland bankruptcy.

Marc Kirschner/Teneo - The Debtor retained Marc Kirschner to pursue over \$1 billion in claims against former insiders and affiliates of the Debtor despite the significant solvency of the estate (\$650 million in assets versus \$410 million in claims). Kirschner’s bankruptcy restructuring firm was purchased by Teneo (which also purchased the restructuring practice of KPMG). Teneo is sponsored by LetterOne, a London-based private equity firm owned by Mikhail Fridman, a Russian oligarch. Fridman is also the primary investor in Concord Management, LLC (“Concord”), which held a position on the Redeemer Committee. During the resolution of a 2018 arbitration involving a Debtor-managed fund, the Highland Credit Strategies Fund, evidence emerged demonstrating that Concord was operating as an unregistered investment adviser of Russian money from Alfa-Bank, Russia’s largest privately held bank and a key part of Fridman’s Alfa Group Consortium. –That money that was funneled into BVI-domiciled shell companies into the Cayman Islands, then into various hedge funds and private equity funds in the U.S. Evidence of these activities was presented by the Debtor to Grosvenor, and the Debtor asked to have Concord removed from the Redeemer Committee. Concord was never removed. Concord is a large investor in Grosvenor. Grosvenor, in turn, is a large investor in Stonehill and Farallon.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland’s historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland’s funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved investors in the Crusader Funds. As explained above, a group of Crusader Funds investors sued after the funds’ manager temporarily suspended redemptions during the financial crisis. That dispute resolved with the formation of the “Redeemer Committee” and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors’

receiving a return of their investments plus a profit, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite the successful liquidation of the Crusader Funds, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of \$189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of \$110 million once the award was confirmed).

In view of the expected arbitration award and believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.⁴

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Creditors' Committee. At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.⁵

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of Strand. To avoid a protracted dispute and to

⁴ *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

⁵ *See In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director of Strand, on the condition that he would be replaced by the Independent Board.⁶

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the independent directors, Mr. Seery. Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.⁷ Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.⁸

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").⁹ There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of

⁶ Frank Waterhouse and Scott Ellington, Highland employees, remained as officers of Strand, Chief Financial Officer and General Counsel, respectively.

⁷ See Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

⁸ See Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

⁹ See Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.¹⁰ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate. This becomes all the more important when a debtor or an estate holds substantial assets through non-debtor subsidiaries or vehicles, as is the case here; hence, the purpose of Rule 2015.3.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee's Office did anything to ensure compliance. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below. Additionally, the lack of proper and accurate information and intentional hiding of material information led creditors to vote for the Debtor's plan and the Bankruptcy Court to confirm that plan which, we believe, would not have happened had the Debtor complied with its fiduciary and reporting duties.

As Mr. Draper and I have already highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest.

The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."¹¹ Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-

¹⁰ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

¹¹ See Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

value determinations.¹² Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

Despite these transparency problems, the Debtor's confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor's failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court's order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.¹³

Because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly appointed management, and the Creditors' Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the Debtor to Quietly Sell Assets Without Observing Best Practices

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

- The Debtor sold approximately \$25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over \$70 million; the Debtor likewise sold \$6 million of Portola Pharma shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for \$18 million.
- The Debtor divested interests worth \$145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for \$35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year).
- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to the debtor (20% less than Mr. Dondero received in funds he managed).
- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth \$50 million) and Targa (worth \$37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or

¹² During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. See Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

¹³ See "Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

outside stakeholders, resulting in a loss to the estate of over \$10 million versus cost and \$20 million versus fair market value.

- The Debtor “sold” interests in certain investments commonly referred to as PetroCap without engaging in a public sale process and without exploring any other method of liquidating the asset.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the “ordinary course of business,” the Debtor’s management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors. Equally as troubling, for certain similar sale transactions the Debtor *did* seek Bankruptcy Court approval, thus acknowledging that such approval was necessary or, at a minimum, that disclosures regarding non-estate asset sales are required.

The Lack of Transparency Permitted the “Inner Circle” to Manipulate the Estate for Personal Gain

Largely because of the Debtor’s failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic because the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor’s affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate’s asset value decreased by approximately \$200 million in a matter of months in the wake of the global pandemic. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the \$200 million impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). A Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors’ Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates’ 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-Debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. The Debtor’s “inner circle” – the Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors’ Committee (and its counsel) – had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Seery’s Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

Mr. Seery’s compensation package encouraged, and the lack of transparency permitted, manipulation of the estate and settlement of creditors’ claims at inflated amounts.

Upon his initial appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of \$60,000 per month for the first three months, \$50,000 per month for the following three months, and \$30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.¹⁴

When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he his compensation package was handsomely improved. His base salary, which was on the verge of dropping to \$30,000 per month, was increased *retroactively* back to March 15, 2020, to \$150,000 per month. Additionally, his employment agreement contemplated a discretionary "Restructuring Fee"¹⁵ that would be calculated in one of two ways:

- (1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to \$1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a "Case Resolution Plan," \$500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and \$750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.
- (2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to \$500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, \$250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and was intended to provide a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to steer Highland through the Chapter 11 case and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern.

Despite the structure of his compensation package, Mr. Seery saw greater value in aligning himself with creditors and the Creditors' Committee. To that end, he publicly alienated and maligned Mr. Dondero, and he found willing allies in the Creditors' Committee. The posturing also paved the way for Mr. Seery to bestow upon the hold-out creditors exorbitant settlements at the expense of equity and earn his Restructuring Fee. In fact, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee (both members of the Creditors' Committee),¹⁶ leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS (also a member of the Creditors' Committee) claims to resolve. In other words, Mr. Seery had curried favor with two of the four members of the Creditors' Committee who would ultimately approve his Restructuring Fee and future compensation following plan consummation.

Ultimately, the confirmed Plan appointed Mr. Seery as the Claimant Trustee, which continued his compensation of \$150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary") and provided that the Oversight Board and Mr. Seery would negotiate additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.¹⁷ Mr. Seery's success fee presumably is (or will be) based on whether his liquidation of

¹⁴ See Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.

¹⁵ See Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

¹⁶ See Dkt. 864, p. 8, l. 24 – p. 9, l. 8.

¹⁷ See Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

the estate outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large “success fee” and severance payment. In fact, during a deposition taken on October 21, 2021, Mr. Seery testified that he expected to make “a few million dollars a year” for each year during the years that he will take to liquidate the Debtor, although we estimate that, based on the estate’s nearly \$650 million value today, Mr. Seery’s success fee could approximate \$50 million.

Mr. Seery Enters into Inflated Settlements

Even before his appointment as CEO and CRO of the Debtor, Mr. Seery had effectively seized control of the Debtor as its *de facto* chief executive officer.¹⁸ Thus, while he was in the process of negotiating his compensation agreement, he was simultaneously negotiating settlements with the remaining creditors to ensure he earned his Restructuring Fee, even if he did so at inflated amounts. One transaction that highlights this is the settlement with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee.

In connection with Mr. Seery’s appointment as CEO and CRO, the Debtor announced that it had reached an agreement in principle with the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee. Even *UBS*, one of the members of the Creditors’ Committee, thought the settlement was inflated. In its objection to the Debtor’s 9019 motion, UBS stated:¹⁹

The Redeemer Claim is based on an Arbitration Award that required the Debtor, inter alia, to pay \$118,929,666 (including prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees) in damages and to pay Redeemer \$71,894,891 (including prejudgment interest) in exchange for all of Crusader’s shares in Cornerstone. Pursuant to that same Arbitration Award, the Debtor also retained the right to receive \$32,313,000 in Deferred Fees upon Crusader’s liquidation. As shown below, after accounting for those reciprocal obligations to the Debtor and depending on the true value of the Cornerstone shares to be tendered (which is disputed), the actual value of the Arbitration Award to Redeemer is between \$74,911,557 and \$128,011,557.³

Under the Proposed Settlement, however, Redeemer stands to gain far more because the Debtor has inexplicably agreed to release its rights to Crusader’s Cornerstone shares and the Deferred Fees (with a combined value that could be as much as \$115,913,000)—providing a substantial windfall to Redeemer. The Debtor has failed to provide sufficient information to permit this Court to meaningfully evaluate the true value of the Proposed Settlement, including the fair value of the Cornerstone shares, which it must do in order for this Court to have the information it needs to approve the Proposed Settlement. Depending on the valuation of the Cornerstone shares, the value of the Proposed Settlement to Redeemer may be as much as \$253,609,610—which substantially exceeds the face amount of the Redeemer Claim.

¹⁸ See Dkt. 864, p. 6, l. 18 – 22.

¹⁹ See Dkt. 1190, p. 6 – 7.

In the meantime, other general unsecured creditors of the Debtor will receive a much lower percentage recovery than they would if those assets were instead transferred to the Debtor's estate, as required by the Arbitration Award, and evenly distributed among the Debtor's creditors. The Proposed Settlement is only in the best interests of Redeemer and, as such, it should be rejected.

³ The potential range of value attributable to the Cornerstone shares is significant because, according to the Debtor's liquidation analysis, the Debtor expects to have only \$195 million total in value to distribute, and only \$161 million to distribute to general unsecured creditors under its proposed plan. See Liquidation Analysis [Dkt. No. 1173-1]; First Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Dkt. No. 1079].

UBS was right. Mr. Seery agreed to a settlement that substantially overpaid the Redeemer Committee, and UBS only agreed to withdraw its objection and appeal of the Redeemer Committee's settlement when the Debtor bestowed upon UBS its own lavish settlement.²⁰

It is worth noting that the Redeemer Committee ultimately sold its bankruptcy claim for \$78 million in cash, but the sale excluded, and the Crusader Funds retained, its investment in Cornerstone Healthcare Group Holding Inc. and certain non-cash consideration.²¹ At the end of the day, the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee cashed out of their bankruptcy claims for total consideration at the very least of \$135 million, meaning they received 105% of the highest estimate (according to UBS) of the net amount of their arbitration award.²²

The Inner Circle Doesn't Object to Inflated Settlements

Following the Bankruptcy Court's approval of settlements with Acis/Josh Terry and the Crusader Funds/the Redeemer Committee, Mr. Seery turned his attention to the two remaining critical holdouts: HarbourVest and UBS. HarbourVest, a private equity fund-of-funds with approximately \$75 billion under management, had invested pre-bankruptcy \$80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO

²⁰ See Dkt 2199. Under the terms of the UBS Settlement, UBS received a Class 8 claim in the amount of \$65 million, a Class 9 claim in the amount of \$60 million, a payment in cash of \$18.5 million from a non-Debtor fund managed by the Debtor, and the Debtor's agreement to assist UBS in pursuing other claims against former Debtor affiliates related to a default on a credit facility during the Global Financial Crisis. Importantly, over the course of the preceding 11 years, UBS had already received payments totaling \$180 million in connection with this dispute, and just prior to bankruptcy, UBS and the Debtor had reached a settlement in principle in which the Debtor would pay UBS just \$7 million and \$10 million in future business.

²¹ See Exh. B.

²² The estimation of a total recovery of \$135 million includes attributing \$48 million to the retained Cornerstone investment. The \$48 million valuation equated to a ~45% interest in Cornerstone, which was valued pre-pandemic at approximately \$107 million. Following COVID, Cornerstone's long-term acute care facilities flourished. Additionally, Cornerstone held a direct investment of over 800,000 shares in MGM, which was held on its books at approximately \$72 per share. The per-share closing price on the sale of MGM to Amazon exceeded \$164, which would have increased the company's valuation (irrespective of the post-COVID growth) by more than \$70 million, bring Crusader Funds' windfall to more than \$205 million.

Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A charitable fund called the Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. ("DAF") held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining ~2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees.

Before Highland filed bankruptcy, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment into HCLOF because Highland allegedly failed to disclose facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry, which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately \$15 million in legal fees and costs. In Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over \$300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that the Debtor and Debtor's counsel initially argued was absurd. Indeed, Debtor management valued HarbourVest's claims at \$0, which was consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.²³ Nevertheless, as one of the final creditor claims to be resolved, Mr. Seery ultimately agreed to give HarbourVest a \$45 million Class 8 claim and a \$35 million Class 9 claim.²⁴ At that time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive 71.32% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. Thus, HarbourVest's total \$80 million in allowed claims would result in HarbourVest receiving \$32 million in cash.²⁵ The cash consideration was offset by HarbourVest's agreement to convey its interest in HCLOF to the Debtor (or its designee) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was \$22.5 million. In other words, from the outside looking in, the Debtor agreed to pay \$9.5 million for a spurious claim.

Oddly enough, no creditors (other than former insiders) objected. What the inner circle presumably knew was that the settlement was actually a windfall for the Debtor. As we have previously detailed, the \$22.5 million valuation of HCLOF that the Debtor utilized in seeking approval of the settlement was based upon September 2020 figures when the economy was still reeling from the pandemic. The value of that investment rebounded rapidly, particularly because of the pending MGM sale to Amazon that was disclosed to the Debtor but not the public (i.e., material non-public information). We have subsequently learned that the actual value of the HCLOF at the time the Bankruptcy Court approved the HarbourVest settlement was at least \$44 million—a value that Mr. Seery would have known but that was not disclosed to the Court or the public.

Likewise, there were no objections to the UBS settlement, which is puzzling. As detailed in the Debtor's 64-page objection to the UBS proof of claim and the Redeemer Committee's 431-page objection to the UBS proof of claim, UBS's claims against the Debtor were razor thin and largely foreclosed by res judicata and a settlement and release executed in connection with the June 2015 settlement. Moreover, the publicly available information indicated that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by \$200 million, from \$556 million on October 16,

²³ See Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.

²⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

²⁵ We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately \$27 million.

2019, to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021),²⁶

- Allowed claims against the estate increased by \$236 million from December 2020 to January 2021, with Class 8 claims ballooning \$74 million in December to \$267 million in January;
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for Class 8 Claims decreased from 87.44% to 71.32% in just a matter of months.

The Liquidation Analysis estimated total assets remaining for distribution to general unsecured claims to be \$195 million, with general unsecured claims totaling \$273 million. By the time the UBS settlement was presented to the court for approval, the allowed Class 8 Claims had increased to \$309,345,000, reducing the distribution to Class 8 creditors to 62.99%. Surely significant creditors like the Redeemer Committee—whose projected distribution dropped from \$119,527,515 when it voted for the Plan to \$86,105,194 with the HarbourVest and UBS claims included—should have taken notice.

Mr. Seery Stacks the Oversight Board

As previously disclosed, we believe Mr. Seery facilitated the sale of the four largest claims in the estate to Farallon and Stonehill. Based upon conversations with representatives of Farallon, Mr. Seery contacted them directly to encourage their acquisition of claims in the bankruptcy estate.²⁷ We believe Mr. Seery did so by disclosing the true value of the estate versus what was publicly disclosed in court filings, demonstrating that there was substantial upside to the claims as compared to what was included in the Plan Analysis. For example, publicly available information at the time Farallon and Stonehill acquired the UBS claim indicated the purchase would have made no economic sense: the publicly disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Farallon and Stonehill would have lost money on the claim acquisition. We can only conclude Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), which based upon accurately disclosed financial statements would indicate they were likely to recover close to 100% on both Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

As set forth in the previous letters, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers Farallon, through Muck, and Stonehill, through Jessup. The four claims purchased by Farallon and Stonehill comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin, collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims:

²⁶ Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473].

²⁷ We believe Mr. Seery made similar calls to representatives of Stonehill. We are informed and believe that Mr. Seery has long-standing relationships with both Farallon and Stonehill.

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

From the information we have been able to gather, it appears that Stonehill and Farallon purchased these claims for the following amounts:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ²⁸
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0
TOTAL	\$270.0	\$95.0		\$150.0 - \$165.0

As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) are overseeing the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth below, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly \$650 million and has approximately \$200 million in cash, which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating \$50 million. Thus, it is a warranted and logical deduction that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. As set forth in previous letters, there are three primary reasons to believe this:

- The scant publicly available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that was actually publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims; and
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

For example, consider the sale of the Crusader Funds' claims, which we *know* was sold for \$78 million. Based upon the publicly available information at the time of the acquisition, the expected distribution would have been \$86 million. Surely a sophisticated hedge fund would not invest \$78 million in a particularly contentious bankruptcy if it believed its maximum return was \$86 million years later.

²⁸ Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

Ultimately, the Plan, Mr. Seery's compensation package, and the lack of transparency to everyone other than the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee permitted Debtor management and the Creditors' Committee to support grossly inflated claims (at the expense of residual stakeholders) in a grossly understated estate, which facilitated the sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In doing so, Mr. Seery installed on the Reorganized Debtor's Oversight Board friendly faces who stand to make \$370 million on ~\$150 million investment. And Mr. Seery's plan has already worked. Notably, while the confirmed Plan was characterized by the Debtor as a monetization plan,²⁹ the newly installed Oversight Board supported, and the Court approved, paying Mr. Seery the much more lucrative Case Resolution Fee, netting Mr. Seery \$1.5 million more than he was entitled to receive under his employment agreement.

In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

Asset	Value as of Aug. 2021		March 2022 High Estimate updated for MGM closing
	Low	High	
Cash as of 4/25/22	\$17.9	\$17.9	
Targa Sale	\$37.0	\$37.0	
8/1 CLO Flows	\$10.0	\$10.0	
Uchi Bldg. Sale	\$9.0	\$9.0	
Siepe Sale	\$3.5	\$3.5	
PetroCap Sale	\$3.2	\$3.2	
Park West Sale	\$3.5	\$3.5	
HCLOF trapped cash	\$25.0	\$25.0	
Total Cash	\$105.6	\$105.6	\$200
Trussway	\$180.0	\$180.0	\$180.0
Cornerstone (125mm; 16%)	\$18.0	\$18.0	\$25.0
HCLOF	\$40.0	\$40.0	\$20.0
CCS Medical (in CLOs and Highland Restoration)	\$20.0	\$20.0	\$30.0
MGM (direct ownership)	\$32.0	\$32.0	\$0.0
Multi-Strat (45% of 100mm; MGM; CCS)	\$45.0	\$45.0	\$30.0
Korea Fund	\$18.0	\$18.0	\$20.0
Celtic (in Credit-Strat)	\$12.0	\$40.0	\$40.0
SE Multifamily	\$0.0	\$20.0	\$20.0
Affiliate Notes	\$0.0	\$70.0	\$70.0
Other	\$2.0	\$10.0	\$10.0

²⁹ See Dkt. 194., p.5.

Highland Restoration Capital Partners			
TOTAL	\$472.6	\$598.6	\$645.0

The Bankruptcy Professionals are Draining the Estate

Yet another troubling aspect of the Highland bankruptcy has been the rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the Estate, largely through invented, unnecessary, and greatly overstaffed and overworked offensive litigation. The sums expended between case filing and the effective date of the Plan (the “Effective Date”) are staggering:

Professional	Fees	Expenses
Hunton Andrews Kurth	\$1,147,059.42	\$2,747.84
FTI Consulting, Inc.	\$6,176,551.20	\$39,122.91
Teneo Capital, LLC	\$1,221,468.75	\$6,257.07
Marc Kirschner	\$137,096.77	
Sidley Austin LLP	\$13,134,805.20	\$211,841.25
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones	\$23,978,627.25	\$334,232.95
Mercer (US) Inc.	\$202,317.65	\$2,449.37
Deloitte Tax LLP	\$553,412.60	
Development Specialists, Inc.	\$5,562,531.12	\$206,609.54
James Seery ³⁰	\$5,100,000.00	
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP		
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP	\$2,645,729.72	\$5,207.53
Kurtzman Carson Consultants LLC	\$2,054,716.00	
Foley & Lardner LLP	\$629,088.00	
Casey Olsen Cayman Limited	\$280,264.00	
ASW Law Limited	\$4,976.00	
Houlihan Lokey Financial Advisors, Inc.	\$766,397.00	
Berger Harris, LLP		
Hayward PLLC	\$825,629.50	\$46,482.92
	\$64,420,670.18	\$854,951.38
Total Fees and Expenses		\$65,275,621.56

“The [bankruptcy] estate is not a cash cow to be milked to death by professionals seeking compensation for services rendered to the estate which have not produced a benefit commensurate with the fees sought.” *In re Chas. A. Stevens & Co.*, 105 B.R. 866, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).

³⁰ This amount includes Mr. Seery’s success fee, which was paid a month following the Effective Date.

The rate at which Debtor professionals have drained the estate is in stark contrast to the treatment of the employees who stayed with the Debtor (without a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive program) on the promise they would be made whole for prepetition deferred compensation that had not yet vested, only to be stiffed and summarily terminated. Even worse, some of these employees have been targeted by the litigation sub-trust for acts they took in the course and scope of their employment.

Following the Effective Date, siphoning of estate assets continues. Mr. Seery still receives base compensation of \$150,000 per month, and he expects to receive compensation of at least “a few million dollars a year” according to his own deposition testimony. In addition, his retention was conditioned upon receiving a to-be-negotiated success fee and severance payment (notably, none of which is disclosed publicly).

Likewise, Teneo Capital, LLC was retained as the litigation adviser. For its services post-Effective Date, it is compensated \$20,000 per month for Mr. Kirschner as trustee for the Litigation Subtrust, plus the regularly hourly fees of any additional Teneo personnel, plus a “Litigation Recovery Fee.” The Litigation Recovery Fee is equal to 1.5% of Net Litigation Proceeds up to \$100 million and 2.0% of Net Litigation Proceeds above. Interestingly, although “Net Litigation Proceeds” is defined as gross litigation proceeds less certain fees incurred in pursuing the litigation, net proceeds are not reduced by Mr. Kirschner’s monthly fee, contingency fees charged by any other professionals, or litigation funding financing. Moreover, Teneo is given credit for any litigation recoveries regardless of whether those recoveries stem from actions commenced by the litigation trustee. The Debtor has not disclosed, and is not required to disclose, the terms upon which any professionals have been engaged following the Effective Date, including Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, counsel for the Litigation Subtrust. Based upon pre-Effective Date monthly expenses, the number of lawyers that attend various matters on behalf of the Debtor,³¹ and the addition of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP and Teneo, we believe the Debtor could be spending as much as \$5-\$7 million per month.

The Reorganized Debtor and the Highland Claimant Trust recently filed heavily redacted, quarterly post-confirmation reports.³² Of note, the Reorganized Debtor disclosed that it has disbursed \$81,983,611 since the Effective Date but disclosed that it has only paid \$47,793 in priority claims and \$6,918,473 in general unsecured claims, while still estimating a total recovery to general unsecured claims of \$205,144,544. The Highland Claimant Trust disclosed that it has disbursed an additional \$7,152,331 since the Effective Date.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an extreme example of the abuses that can occur if the federal bench, federal government appointees, and federal lawmakers do not police federal bankruptcy proceedings by

³¹ In connection with a recent two-day trial on an administrative claim, the Debtor was represented by John Morris (\$1,245.00 per hour), Greg Demo (\$950 per hour), and Hayley Winograd (\$695 per hour), and was assisted by paralegal La Asia Canty (\$460 per hour). The Debtor’s local counsel, Zachery Annable (\$300 per hour), was also present, and Jeffrey Pomerantz (\$1,295 per hour) observed the trial via WebEx. Despite the army of lawyers, Mr. Morris handled virtually the entire proceeding, with Ms. Winograd examining only two small witnesses. Messrs. Pomerantz, Demo, and Annable played no active role in the proceedings.

³² Dkt 3325 and 3326.


permitting debtors-in-possession to hide material information, violate duties of transparency and candor, and manipulate information and transactions to benefit disclosed and undisclosed insiders or “friends” of insiders. Bankruptcy should not be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. We therefore encourage your office to investigate the problems inherent in the Highland bankruptcy. At a minimum, we ask that the EOUST seek orders from the Bankruptcy Court compelling the Debtor to undertake the following actions:

1. turn over all financial reports that should have been disclosed during the pendency of the bankruptcy, including 2015.3 reports;
2. provide a detailed disclosure of the assets Reorganized Debtor;
3. provide a copy of the executed Claimant Trust Agreement, which should already have been disclosed;
4. disclose all solvency analyses prepared by the Debtor; and
5. provide copies of all agreements for the engagement of Debtor professionals post-confirmation, including the terms of Mr. Seery’s success fee and severance agreement, compensation agreements for personnel of the Reorganized Debtor, and the fee arrangement with Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP.

Sincerely,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By:


Davor Rukavina, Esq.

DR:

EXHIBIT A

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*Counsel for Plaintiffs the Dugaboy Investment Trust and the
Hunter Mountain Investment Trust*

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

In re:

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.,

Reorganized Debtor.

DUGABOY INVESTMENT TRUST and
HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

HIGHLAND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P. and
HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST,

Defendants.

§
§ Chapter 11
§
§ Case No. 19-34054-sgj11
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§ Adversary Proceeding No.
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**COMPLAINT TO (I) COMPEL DISCLOSURES
ABOUT THE ASSETS OF THE HIGHLAND CLAIMANT TRUST AND
(II) DETERMINE (A) RELATIVE VALUE OF THOSE ASSETS, AND
(B) NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS IN THE CLAIMANT TRUST**

Plaintiffs The Dugaboy Investment Trust (“Dugaboy”) and Hunter Mountain Investment Trust (“Hunter Mountain” and collectively with Dugaboy, the “Plaintiffs”) file this adversary complaint (the “Complaint”) against defendants Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“HCMLP” or the “Debtor”) and the Highland Claimant Trust (the “Claimant Trust,” and collectively with HCMLP, the “Defendants”), seeking: (1) disclosures about and an accounting of the assets and liabilities currently held in the Claimant Trust; (2) a determination of the value of those assets; and (3) declaratory relief setting forth the nature of Plaintiffs’ interests in the Claimant Trust.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. As holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests¹ that vest into Claimant Trust Interests once all creditors are paid in full, and as defendants in litigation pursued by Marc S. Kirschner (“Kirschner”) as Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust (which seeks to recover damages on behalf of the Claimant Trust), Plaintiffs file this Complaint to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the Claimant Trust, which was established to monetize and liquidate the assets of the HCMLP bankruptcy estate.

2. HCMLP’s October 21, 2022 and January 24, 2023 post-confirmation reports show that even with inflated claims and below market sales of assets, cash available is more than enough to pay class 8 and class 9 creditors in full. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the entire estate would benefit from a close evaluation of current assets and liabilities. Such evaluation will also show whether assets were marked below appraised value during the pandemic and unreasonably held on the books *at those values*, along with overstated liabilities, to justify continued litigation. That litigation serves to enable James P. Seery (“Mr. Seery”) and other estate professionals to carefully extract nearly every last dollar out of the estate with (along with incentive fees), leaving little or

¹ Capitalized terms not defined have the meanings set forth herein. If no meaning is set forth herein, the terms have the meaning set forth in the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) [[Docket No. 1808](#)].

nothing for the owners that built the company. While grave harm has already been done, valuation now would at least enable the Court to put an end to this already long-running case and salvage some value for equity. As this Court observed in the *In re ADPT DFW Holdings* case, where there is significant uncertainty about insolvency, protections must be put in place so that the conduct of the case itself does not deplete the equity. In some cases, the protection is in the form of an equity committee; here a prompt valuation of the estate is needed.

3. Upon information and belief, during the pendency of HCMLP's bankruptcy proceedings, creditor claims and estate assets have been sold in a manner that fails to maximize the potential return to the estate, including Plaintiffs. Rather, Mr. Seery, first acting as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer of the Debtor and then as the Claimant Trustee, facilitated the sale of creditor claims to entities with undisclosed business relationships with Mr. Seery, who he knew would approve his inflated compensation when the hidden but true value of the estate's assets were realized. Because Mr. Seery and the Debtor have failed to operate the estate in the required transparent manner, they have been able to justify pursuit of unnecessary avoidance actions (for the benefit of the professionals involved), even though the assets of the estate, if managed in good faith, should be sufficient to pay all creditors.

4. Further, by understating the value of the estate and preventing open and robust scrutiny of sales of the estate's assets, Mr. Seery and the Debtor have been able to justify actions to further marginalize equity holders that otherwise would be in the money, such as including plan and trust provisions that disenfranchise equity holders by preventing them from having any input or information unless the Claimant Trustee certifies that all other interest holders have been paid in full. Because of the lack of transparency to date, unless the relief sought herein is granted, there will be no checks and balances to prevent a wrongful failure to certify, much less any process to

ensure that the estate has been managed in good faith so as to enable all interest holders, including the much-maligned equity holders, to receive their due.

5. By demonizing the estate equity holders, withholding information, and manipulating the sales of claims and assets, Mr. Seery and the Claimant Trust have maximized the potential for a grave miscarriage of justice. The estate had over \$550 million in assets on the petition date, with far less in non-disputed non-contingent liabilities.

6. By June 30, 2022, the estate had \$550 million in cash and approximately \$120 million of other assets despite paying what appears in reports to be over \$60 million in professional fees and selling assets non-competitively, on information and belief, at least \$75 million below market price.²

7. On information and belief, the value of the assets in the estate as of 6/1/22 was:

<u>Highland Capital Assets</u>		<u>Value in Millions</u>	
		<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Cash as of Feb 1, 2022		\$125.00	\$125.00
Recently Liquidated	\$246.30		
Highland Select Equity	\$55.00		
Highland MultiStrat Credit Fund	\$51.44		
MGM Shares	\$26.00		
Portion of HCLOF	\$37.50		
Total of Recent Liquidations	\$416.24	\$416.24	\$416.24
Current Cash Balance		\$541.24	\$541.24
Remaining Assets			
Highland CLO Funding, LTD		\$37.50	\$37.50
Korea Fund		\$18.00	\$18.00
SE Multifamily		\$11.98	\$12.10
Affiliate Notes ³		\$50.00	\$60.00
Other (Misc. and legal)		\$5.00	\$20.00
Total (Current Cash + Remaining Assets)		\$663.72	\$688.84

² Examples of non-competitive sales are set forth in letters to the United States Trustee dated October 5, 2021, November 3, 2021 and May 11, 2022, annexed hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, as is further detail about claims buyers.

³ Some of the Affiliate Notes should have been forgiven as of the MGM sale, but litigation continues over that also.

8. By June 2022, Mr. Seery had also engineered settlements making the inflated face amount of the major claims against the estate \$365 million, but which traded for significantly less.

Creditor	Class 8	Class 9	Beneficiary	Purchase Price
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Claim buyer 1	\$65 million
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Claim buyer 2	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Claim buyer 2	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Claim buyers 1 & 2	\$50.0
TOTAL	\$270.0	\$95.0		\$150.0 million

9. Mr. Seery made no efforts to buy the claims into the estate or resolve the estate efficiently. Mr. Seery never made a proposal to the residual holders or Mr. Dondero and never responded to the over the many settlement offers from Mr. Dondero with a reorganization (as opposed to liquidation) plan, even though many of Mr. Dondero's offers were in excess of the amounts paid by the claims buyers.

10. Instead, Mr. Seery brokered transactions enabling colleagues with long-standing but undisclosed business relationships to buy the claims without the knowledge or approval of the Court. Because the claims sellers were on the creditors committee, Mr. Seery and those creditors had been notified that “Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court.” These transactions are particularly suspect because the claims buyers paid amounts equivalent to the value the Plan estimated would be paid three years later. Sophisticated buyers would not pay what appeared to be full price unless they had material non-public information that the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the public estimates made at the time of Plan confirmation – as indeed they have been.

11. On information and belief, Mr. Seery provided that information to claims buyers rather than buying the claims in to the estate for the roughly \$150 million for which they were sold.

By May 2021, when the claims transfers were announced to the Court, the estate had over 100 million in cash and access to additional liquidity to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

12. Specifically, Mr. Seery could and should have investigated seeking sufficient funds from equity to pay all claims and return the estate to the equity holders. This was an obvious path because the estate had assets sufficient to support a \$59 million line of credit, as Mr. Seery eventually obtained. If funds had been raised to pay creditors in the amounts for which claims were sold, much of the massive administrative costs run up by the estate would never have been incurred. One such avoided cost would be the post-effective date litigation now pursued by Mr. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee for the Litigation Sub-Trust, whose professionals likely charge over \$2000 an hour for senior lawyers and over \$800 an hour for first year associates (data obtained from other cases because, of course, there has been no disclosure in the HCMLP bankruptcy of the cost of the Kirschner litigation). But buying the claims to resolve the bankruptcy and enabling equity to resume operations would not have had the critical benefit to Mr. Seery that his scheme contained: placing the decision on his incentive bonus, perhaps as much as \$30 million, in the hands of grateful business colleagues who received outsized rewards for the claims they were steered into buying. The parameters of Mr. Seery's incentive compensation is yet another item cloaked in secrecy, contrary to the general rule that the hallmark of the bankruptcy process is transparency.

13. But worse still, even with all of the manipulation that appears to have occurred, Plaintiffs believe that the combination of cash and other assets held by the Claimant Trust in its own name and held in various funds, reserve accounts, and subsidiaries, if not depleted by

unnecessary litigation, would be sufficient to pay all Claimant Trust Beneficiaries in full, with interest now.

14. In short, it appears that the professionals representing HCMLP, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust are litigating claims against Plaintiffs and others, even though the only beneficiaries of any recovery from such litigation would be Plaintiffs in this adversary proceeding (and of course the professionals pressing the claims). It is only the cost of the pursuit of those claims that threatens to depress the value of the Claimant Trust sufficiently to justify continued pursuit of the claims, creating a vicious cycle geared only to enrich the professionals, including Mr. Seery, and to strip equity holders of any meaningful recovery.

15. Based upon the restrictions imposed on Plaintiffs, including the unprecedented inability for Plaintiffs, as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, to access virtually any financial information related to the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs have little to no insight into the value of the Claimant Trust assets versus the Claimant Trust's obligations and no method to independently ascertain those amounts until Plaintiffs become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. Because Mr. Seery and the professionals benefiting from Mr. Seery's actions have ensured that Plaintiffs are in the dark regarding the estate's assets and liabilities, as well as the estate's professional and incentive fees that are rapidly depleting the estate, there is a compelling need for the relief sought herein.

16. In bringing this Complaint, Plaintiffs are seeking transparency about the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust and their value—information that would ultimately benefit all creditors and parties-in-interest by moving forward the administration of the Bankruptcy Case.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This adversary proceeding arises under and relates to the above-captioned Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (the “Bankruptcy Case”) pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas (the “Court”).

18. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.

19. This matter is a core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(A) and (O).

20. In the event that it is determined that the Court, absent consent of the parties, cannot enter final order or judgments over this matter, Plaintiffs do not consent to the entry of a final order by the Court.

THE PARTIES

21. Dugaboy is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

22. Hunter Mountain is a trust formed under the laws of Delaware.

23. HCMLP is a limited partnership formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

24. The Claimant Trust is a statutory trust formed under the laws of Delaware with a business address of 100 Crescent Court, Suite 1850, Dallas, Texas 75201.

CASE BACKGROUND

25. On October 16, 2019 (the “Petition Date”), HCMLP, a 25-year Delaware limited partnership in good standing, filed for Chapter 11 restructuring in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.

26. At the time of its chapter 11 filing, HCMLP had approximately \$550 million in assets and had only insignificant debt owing to Jeffries, with whom it had a brokerage account, and one other entity, Frontier State Bank. [Dkt. No. 1943, ¶ 8]. HCMLP’s reason for seeking

bankruptcy protection was to restructure judgment debt stemming from an adverse arbitration award of approximately \$190 million issued in favor of the Redeemer Committee of the Crusader Funds, which, after offsets and adjustments, would have been resolved for about \$110 million. Indeed, the Redeemer Committee sold its claim for about \$65 million, well below the expected \$110 million,⁴ and indeed, even below amounts for which Dondero offered to buy the claim.

27. At the urging of the newly-appointed Unsecured Creditors Committee (the “Committee”), and over the objection of HCMLP and its management, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court transferred the bankruptcy case to this Court on December 4, 2019. It seems likely that the creditors sought this transfer to take advantage of antipathy the Court had exhibited to HCMLP and its management in the ACIS bankruptcy.⁵ Shortly after the transfer, and likewise influenced by the adverse characterizations of HCMLP management in the ACIS bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, notwithstanding the Debtor’s apparent solvency, sought appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.

28. To avoid the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee and the potential liquidation of a potentially solvent estate, the Committee and the Debtor agreed that Strand Advisors, Inc., HCMLP’s general partner, would appoint a three-member independent board (the “Independent Board”) to manage HCMLP during its bankruptcy. The three board members were:

⁴ Reports that Redeemer Committee was paid \$78 million note that in addition to the claim, the Committee sold other assets as well, which on information and belief, amounted to about \$13 million.

⁵ For example, at a hearing in Delaware Bankruptcy Court on the Motion to Transfer Venue to this Court, Mr. Pomerantz, counsel for Debtor stated, “The debtor filed the case in this district because it wanted a judge to preside over this case that would look at what’s going on with this debtor, with this debtor’s management, this debtor’s post-petition conduct, without the baggage of what happened in a previous case, which contrary to what Acis and the committee says, has very little to do with this debtor.” [December 2, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79, Case No. 19012239 (CSS), [Docket No. 181](#)]. The taint of the ACIS case can be seen in that, without having read or even seen the supposedly offending complaint, during the ACIS case Judge Jernigan called Mr. Dondero not just vexatious, but “transparently vexatious,” for allegedly having sued Moody’s for failing to downgrade certain CLOs that ACIS had been manipulating in violation of its indentures and even though the Plaintiff in the supposedly offending case was not Mr. Dondero or any company he controlled [September 23, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 51-52, In re Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLC, Case No. 18-30264-SGJ-11, [Docket No. 1186](#)].

- a. James P. Seery, Jr. – (who was selected by arbitration awardee and Committee member, the Redeemer Committee);
- b. John Dubel – (who was selected by Committee member UBS); and
- c. Former Judge Russell Nelms – (who was selected by the Debtor).

29. The Bankruptcy Court almost immediately let the Debtor’s professionals know that its feelings about Mr. Dondero and other equity holders had not changed – a disclosure that led inexorably to the many acts that now threaten to wipe out entirely the value of the equity. For example, at one of the earliest hearings, the Court rejected recommendations by Judge Nelms, suggesting he was bamboozled because he was under management’s spell. Specifically, Judge Jernigan admitted that normally “Bankruptcy Courts should defer heavily to the reasonable exercise of business judgment by a board... But I’m concerned that Dondero or certain in-house counsel has -- you know, they’re smart, they’re persuasive... they have exercised their powers of persuasion or whatever to make the Board and the professionals think that there is some valid prospect of benefit to Highland with these [actions], when it’s really all about . . . Mr. Dondero.” [February 19, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 177.]

30. At around the same time that the Court telegraphed animus towards Mr. Dondero, it also squelched oversight by responsible professionals who could and would have ensured transparency. When the Committee and the Debtor reported to the Court that they had agreed to use Judge Jones and Judge Isgur in Houston as mediators to potentially resolve the bankruptcy case, Judge Jernigan stated that she was “surprised that Judge Jones’ or Judge Isgur’s staff expressed that they had availability.” Debtor’s counsel then asked if he could independently follow up with staff for Judges Jones and Isgur regarding their availabilities, and Judge Jernigan said, “I’ll take it from here.” Six days later, Judge Jernigan simply said, “my continued thought on that [mediation by Judges Jones and Isgur] is that they just don’t have meaningful time.” [July 14, 2020 Hearing Transcript at 121] In retrospect, this avoided scrutiny of the case by professionals

who would recognize and potentially curtail the Court's unprecedented, immediately biased conduct of the case. This sent a powerful message to Mr. Seery and the other professionals who developed strategies to enrich themselves to the detriment of any possibility of a quick reorganization with equity regaining control.

31. Meanwhile, not realizing the turn the bankruptcy was about to take, Mr. Dondero had agreed to step down as CEO of the Debtor and to the appointment of an Independent Board only because he was assured that new, independent management would expedite an exit from bankruptcy, preserve the Debtor's business as a going concern, and retain and compensate key employees whose work was critical to ensuring a successful reorganization.

32. None of that happened. Almost immediately, Mr. Seery emerged as the de facto leader of the Independent Board. On July 14, 2020, the Court retroactively appointed Mr. Seery Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, vesting him with the fiduciary responsibilities of a registered advisor to investors and fiduciary responsibilities to the estate. [Dkt. No. 854]. And although Mr. Seery publicly represented that he intended to restructure and preserve HCMLP's business, privately he was engineering a much different plan.

33. Indeed, Mr. Seery's public-facing statements stand in stark contrast to what actually happened under his direction and control. For example, initially Mr. Seery reported consistently positive reviews of the Debtor's employees, describing the Debtor's staff as a "lean" and "really good team." He also testified: "My experience with our employees has been excellent. The response when we want to get something done, when I want to get something done, has been first-rate. The skill level is extremely high."

34. Yet despite these glowing reviews, Mr. Seery failed to put a key employee retention program into place, and although key employees supported Mr. Seery and the Debtor through the

plan process, ultimately Mr. Seery fired most of those employees. It was clear that Mr. Seery was firing anyone with perceived loyalty to Mr. Dondero, no doubt leaving remaining staff fearful of challenging Mr. Seery, lest they too be fired.

35. From the start, and before there was much litigation to speak of, the Court regularly referred to Mr. Dondero and related parties as “vexatious litigants,” emboldening the Debtor to do the same, even while admitting it had not presented evidence that Mr. Dondero was a vexatious litigant. This was plainly a carryover from the ACIS case where the Court labelled Mr. Dondero a “transparently” vexatious litigant based pleadings she had only heard about from parties opposing Dondero and admittedly had not read herself. Ironically, the first time Mr. Dondero was labeled “vexatious” by the Court in the HCM case, he was defending himself from three lawsuits initiated by the Debtor and had commented in proposed settlements in the case, but had not himself initiated any actions in the case. Thereafter, though, the Debtor and its professionals repeated the mantra that Dondero and his companies were vexatious litigants to successfully oppose sharing information about the estate with them.

36. In addition to the Debtor’s mistreatment of employees, under the control of the Independent Board, most of the ordinary checks and balances that the hallmark of bankruptcy were ignored. Despite providing regular and robust financial information to the Committee, the Debtor inexplicably failed and refused to file quarterly 2015.3 reports, leaving stakeholders, including Plaintiffs, in the dark about the value of the estate and the mix of assets it held. Amplifying the lack of transparency, Mr. Seery further engineered transactions to hide the real value of the estate.

37. For example, he authorized the Debtor to settle the claims of HarbourVest (which claims had initially been valued at \$0) for \$80 million, in order to acquire HarborVest’s interest in Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (“HCLOF”), gain HarborVest’s vote in favor of its Plan, and hide

the value of Debtor's interest in HCLOF by placing it into a non-reporting subsidiary. This created another pocket of non-public information because the pleadings supporting the 9019 settlement valued the HCLOF interest at \$22 million, when, on information and belief, it was worth \$40 million at the time and over \$60 million 90 days later when the MGM sale was announced.

38. At the same time, Mr. Seery and the Independent Board deliberately shut out equity holders from any discussion surrounding the plan of reorganization or HCMLP's efforts to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. Indeed, as noted above, Mr. Seery failed to meaningfully respond to the many proposals made by residual equity holders to resolve the estate and never encouraged any dialogue between creditors and equity holders. These failures only contributed to the difficulty of getting stakeholders' buy-in for a reorganization plan and significantly undermined an efficient exit from bankruptcy.

39. Worse still, while knowing that HCMLP had sufficient resources to emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern (and, on information and belief, while knowing that the estate was solvent), Mr. Seery and the Independent Board failed to propose any plan of reorganization that contemplated HCMLP's continued post-confirmation existence. Instead, and inexplicably, the very first plan proposed contemplated liquidation of the company, as did all subsequent plans.

40. While secretly engineering the total destruction of HCMLP, Mr. Seery also privately settled multiple proofs of claim against the estate at inflated levels that were unreasonable multiples of the Debtor's original estimates. He did this notwithstanding the Debtor's early and vehement objection to many of the claims as baseless. But instead of litigating those objections in a manner that would have exposed the true value of the claims, on information and belief, Mr. Seery settled the claims as a means of brokering sales of the claims at 50-60% of their face values. That is, the inflated values softened up claims sellers to be willing to sell. Had the Debtor instead

fought the inflated proofs of claim in open court, it could have settled the claims for closer to true value and ensured that the estate had sufficient resources to pay them.

41. It is also no coincidence that virtually all original proofs of claim were sold to buyers that had prior business relationships with Mr. Seery and/or affiliates of Grosvenor (company with which Mr. Seery has a long personal history)—buyers that ultimately would be positioned to approve a favorable compensation and bonus structure for Mr. Seery.

42. That the claims sales happened at all is curious in light of the scant publicly-available information about the value of the estate. It would have been impossible, for example, for any of the claims buyers to conduct even modest due diligence to ascertain whether the purchases made economic sense. In fact, the publicly-available information purported to show a net decrease in the estate's asset value by approximately \$200 million in a matter of months during the global pandemic. Given the sophistication of the claims-buyers, their purchases of claims at prices that exceeded published expected recoveries (according to the schedules then available to the public) would only make sense if they obtained inside information regarding the transactions undertaken by Debtor management that would justify the transfer pricing.

43. And indeed, the claims could and would be monetized for much more than the publicly-available information suggested (as only one with inside information would know). In October 2022, \$250 million was paid to Class 8 holders. That is about 85% of the inflated proofs of claim and \$90 million more than plan projections. On information and belief, claims buyers have thus had an over 170% annualized return thus far, with more to come. On information and belief, Mr. Seery will use this “success” to justify an incentive bonus estimated in the range of \$30 million.

44. At the same time, the Claimant Trust has made no distributions to Contingent Claimant Trust Interest holders and has argued in various proceedings that no such distributions are likely. No wonder. The cost of holding open the estate, including unnecessary litigation costs, appears to have exceeded \$140 million post-confirmation, and seems geared to ensure that no such distributions can occur, even though it can now be projected that the litigation is not needed to pay creditors. *See* **Docket No. 3410-1**.

45. It is worth noting that it appears that virtually all of the claims trades brokered on behalf of Committee members seem to have occurred while those entities remained on the Committee. Yet at the outset of their service, Committee members were instructed by the United States Trustee that “Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may *not* purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court.” Thus, the claims trades violated Committee members’ fiduciary duty to the estate while lining the pockets of Mr. Seery and other Debtor professionals, to the detriment of creditors and residual equity holders.

46. The sales of claims were not the only transactions shrouded in secrecy. As further detailed in other litigation, assets were sold with insufficient disclosures, no competitive bidding, no data room, and without inviting equity (which may have at one time had the knowledge to make the highest bid) to participate in the sales process. Indeed, on occasion assets were sold for amounts less than Mr. Dondero’s written offers. This exacerbated the harms caused by the lack of transparency characterized by the Court’s indifference to the Debtor’s complete failure to abide its Rule 2015 disclosure obligations.

47. In short, the lack of transparency combined with at least the appearance of bias, if not actual bias of the Bankruptcy Court, emboldened and enabled an opportunistic CRO to

manipulate the bankruptcy to enrich himself, his long-time business associates, and the professionals continuing to litigate to collect fees to pay claims that could have been resolved with money left over for equity but for that manipulation.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Plaintiffs Hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests

48. As of the Petition Date, HCMLP had three classes of limited partnership interests (Class A, Class B, and Class C). *See* Disclosure Statement [[Docket No. 1473](#)], ¶ F(4).

49. The Class A interests were held by Dugaboy, Mark Okada (“Okada”), personally and through family trusts, and Strand Advisors, Inc. (“Strand”), HCMLP’s general partner. The Class B and C interests were held by Hunter Mountain. *Id.*

50. In the aggregate, HCMLP’s limited partnership interests were held: (a) 99.5% by Hunter Mountain; (b) 0.1866% by Dugaboy, (c) 0.0627% by Okada, and (d) 0.25% by Strand.

51. On February 22, 2021, the Court entered the Order (i) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization (as Modified) and (ii) Granting Related Relief [[Docket No. 1943](#)] (the “Confirmation Order”) [[Docket No. 1808](#)] (the “Plan”).

52. In the Plan, General Unsecured Claims are Class 8 and Subordinated Claims are Class 9. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(8) and (9).

53. In the Plan, HCMLP classified Hunter Mountain’s Class B Limited Partnership Interest and Class C Limited Partnership Interest (together, Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests) as Class 10, separately from that of the holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests, which are Class 11 and include Dugaboy’s Limited Partnership Interest. *See* Plan, Article III, ¶ H(10) and (11).

54. According to the Plan, Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class A Limited Partnership Interests are subordinate to the Contingent Claimant Trust Interests distributed to the Holders of Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests. *See* Plan, Article I, ¶44.

55. In the Confirmation Order, the Court found that the Plan properly separately classified those equity interests because they represent different types of equity security interests in HCMLP and different payment priorities pursuant to that certain Fourth Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership of Highland Capital Management, L.P., dated December 24, 2015, as amended (the “Limited Partnership Agreement”). Confirmation Order, ¶36; Limited Partnership Agreement, §3.9 (Liquidation Preference).

56. The Court overruled objections to the Plan lodged by entities it deemed related to Mr. Dondero, including Dugaboy. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that Dugaboy has a residual ownership interest in HCMLP and therefore “technically” had standing to object to the Plan. *See* Confirmation Order, ¶¶ 17-18.

57. Based on the Debtor’s financial projections at the time of confirmation, however, the Court found that the plan objectors’ “economic interests in the Debtor appear to be extremely remote.” *Id.*, ¶ 19; *see also id.*, ¶ 17 (“the remoteness of their economic interests is noteworthy”).

58. The Plan went Effective (as defined in the Plan) on August 11, 2021, and HCMLP became the Reorganized Debtor (as defined in the Plan) on the Effective Date. *See* Notice of Occurrence of the Effective Date of Confirmed Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. [Docket No. 2700].

59. The Plan created the Claimant Trust, which was established for the benefit of Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, which is defined to mean:

the Holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims, Holders of Allowed Subordinated Claims, including, upon Allowance, Disputed General Unsecured Claims and Disputed

Subordinated Claims that become Allowed following the Effective Date, and, only upon certification by the Claimant Trustee that the Holders of such Claims have been paid indefeasibly in full plus, to the extent all Allowed unsecured Claims, excluding Subordinated Claims, have been paid in full post-petition interest from the Petition Date at the Federal Judgment Rate in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the Claimant Trust Agreement and all Disputed Claims in Class 8 and Class 9 have been resolved, Holders of Allowed Class B/C Limited Partnership Interests, and Holders of Allowed Class A Limited Partnership Interests

See Plan, Article I, ¶27; *see also* Claimant Trust Agreement, Article I, 1.1(h).

60. Plaintiffs hold Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, which will vest into Claimant Trust Interests upon indefeasible payment of Allowed Claims.

61. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

62. In its Post Confirmation Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 2022 [**Docket No. 3582**], Debtor stated that it distributed \$255,201,228 to holders of general unsecured claims, which is 64% of the total allowed general unsecured claims of \$387,485,568. This amount is far greater than was anticipated at the time of confirmation of the Plan.

B. Debtor Has Failed To Disclose Claimant Trust Assets

63. Upon information and belief, the value of the estate as held in the Claimant Trust has changed markedly since Plan confirmation. Not only have many of the assets held by the estate fluctuated in value based on market conditions, with some increasingly in value dramatically, but Plaintiffs are aware that many of the major assets of the estate have been liquidated or sold since Plan confirmation, locking in increased value to the estate.

64. The estate is solvent and has always been solvent. Nonetheless, Mr. Seery has remained committed to maximizing professional fees and incentive fees by increasing the total claims amount to justify litigation to satisfy those inflated claims.

65. As noted above, by June of 2022, starting with \$125 million in cash, the estate liquidated other assets of over \$416 million, building a cash war chest of over \$541 million. Thus, with the remaining less-liquid assets, the total value of the estate's assets as of June 2022 was over \$688 million.

66. Contrasting those assets with the claims against the estate demonstrates that further collection of assets was (and is) unnecessary.

67. As set forth above, while the inflated face amount of the claims was \$365 million, those claims were sold for about \$150 million. The estate therefore easily had the resources to retire the claims for the sale amounts, leaving an operating business in the hands of its equity owners.

68. Instead, Mr. Seery liquidated estate assets at less-than-optimal prices, without competitive process, without including residual equity holders, and in all cases required strict non-disclosure agreements from the buyers to prevent any information flowing to the public, the residual equity, or the Court. This uncharacteristic secrecy enabled Mr. Seery and the professionals to maintain the delicate balance of keeping just enough assets to pay professionals and incentive fees but still maintain the pretense that further litigation was needed.

69. Each effort by Plaintiffs, Mr. Dondero and related companies to obtain information to attempt to stop the continued looting has been vigorously opposed, and ultimately rejected by an apparently biased Court. Plaintiffs were unable to force the Debtor to provide the most basic of reports, including Rule 2015 statements, and Plaintiffs' efforts to obtain even the most basic details regarding asset sales and professional fees have all been denied. Rather, such details are in the hands of a select few, such as the Oversight Board of the Claimant Trust.

70. The Plan requires the Claimant Trustee to determine the fair market value of the Claimant Trust Assets as of the Effective Date and to notify the applicable Claimant Trust

Beneficiaries of such a valuation, as well as distribute tax information to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries as appropriate. *See* Plan, ¶ Art. IV(B)(9).

71. But no like information regarding valuation of the Claimant Trust Assets is available to Plaintiffs as holders of Contingent Claimant Trust Interests, even though Plaintiffs, as contingent beneficiaries of a Delaware statutory trust, are entitled to financial information relating to the trust.

C. Plaintiffs Are Kirschner Adversary Proceeding Defendants

72. On October 15, 2021, Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust, commenced the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding against twenty-three defendants, including Plaintiffs, alleging various causes of action. *See Marc S. Kirschner, as Litigation Trustee of the Litigation Sub-Trust vs. James Dondero, et al.*, Adv. Pro. No. 21-03076-sgj, Adv. Proc. No. 21-03076, **Docket No. 1** (as amended by **Docket No. 158**).

73. The Litigation Sub-Trust was established within the Claimant Trust as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Claimant Trust for the purpose of investigating, prosecuting, settling, or otherwise resolving the Estate Claims, with any proceeds therefrom to be distributed by the Litigation Sub-Trust to the Claimant Trust for distribution to the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries. *See* Plan, Article IV, ¶ (B)(4).

74. Any recovery from the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding will be distributed to Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

75. Depending on the realization of asset value less debts, Plaintiffs may become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.

76. The Litigation Sub-Trust is pursuing claims against Plaintiffs in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding, which, if they become Claimant Trust Beneficiaries, would be the

recipients of distributions of such recovery (less the cost of litigation). Therefore, Plaintiffs need the requested information in order to properly analyze and evaluate the claims asserted against them in the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding and to determine whether those claims have any validity.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Disclosures of Claimant Trust Assets and Request for Accounting)

77. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

78. Due to the lack of transparency into the assets of the Claimant Trust, Plaintiffs are unable to determine whether their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests may vest into Claimant Trust Interests.

79. Certain information about the Claimant Trust Assets has already been provided to others, including Claimant Trust Beneficiaries and the Oversight Board for the Claimant Trust.

80. Information about the Claimant Trust Assets would help Plaintiffs evaluate whether settlement of the Kirschner Adversary Proceeding is feasible, which would further the administration of the bankruptcy estate, benefitting all parties in interest.

81. This Court specifically retained jurisdiction to ensure that distributions to Holders of Allowed Equity Interests are accomplished pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. *See* Plan, Article XI.

82. The Plan provides that distributions to Allowed Equity Interests will be accomplished through the Claimant Trust and Contingent Claimant Trust Interests. *See* Plan Article III, (H)(10) and (11).

83. The Defendants should be compelled to provide information regarding the Claimant Trust assets, including the amount of cash and the remaining non-cash assets, and its liabilities.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment Regarding Value of Claimant Trust Assets)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

85. Once Defendants are compelled to provide information about the Claimant Trust assets, Plaintiffs seek a determination from the Court of the relative value of the Claimant Trust assets compared to the bankruptcy estate obligations.

86. If the value of the Claimant Trust assets exceeds the obligations of the estate, then several currently pending adversary proceedings aimed at recovering value for HCMLP's estate are not necessary to pay creditors in full. As such, the pending adversary proceedings could be brought to a swift close, allowing creditors to be paid and the Bankruptcy Case to be brought to a close.

87. In addition, professionals associated with the estate—including but not limited to Mr. Seery, Pachulski, Development Specialists, Inc., Kurtzman Carson Consultants, Quinn Emanuel, Mr. Kirschner, and Hayward & Associates—are continuing to incur millions of dollars a month in professional fees, thereby further eroding an estate that is either solvent or could be bridged by a settlement that would pay the spread between current assets and current allowed creditor claims. Fees for Pachulski range from \$460 an hour for associates to \$1,265 per hour for partners, and fees for Quinn Emanuel lawyers range from \$830 an hour for first year associate to over \$2100 per hour for senior partners. At these rates, depletion of the estate will occur rapidly.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Declaratory Judgment and Determination Regarding Nature of Plaintiff's Interests)

88. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege the allegations in each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

89. In the event that the Court determines that the Claimant Trust assets exceed the obligations of the bankruptcy estate in an amount sufficient so that all Allowable Claims may be indefeasibly paid, Plaintiffs seek a declaration and a determination that the conditions are such that their Contingent Claimant Trust Interests are likely to vest into Claimant Trust Interests, making them Claimant Trust Beneficiaries.⁶

90. Such a declaration and a determination by the Court would further assist parties in interest, such as Plaintiffs, to ascertain whether the estate is capable of paying all creditors in full and also paying some amount to residual interest holders, as contemplated by the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

- (i) On the First Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek an order compelling Defendants to disclose the assets currently held in the Claimant Trust; and
- (ii) On the Second Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination of the relative value of those assets in comparison to the claims of the Claimant Trust Beneficiaries; and
- (iii) On the Third Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs seek a determination that the conditions are such that all current Claimant Trust Beneficiaries could be paid in full, with such payment causing Plaintiffs' Contingent Claimant Trust Interests to vest into Claimant Trust Interests; and

⁶ To be clear, Plaintiffs do not ask the Court to determine that they are Claimant Trust Beneficiaries or otherwise to convert their contingent interests into non-contingent interests. All of that must be done according to the terms of the Plan and the Claimant Trust Agreement.

(iv) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

Dated: February __, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

STINSON LLP

Draft

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EXHIBIT A-1

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EDWARD M. HELLER
(1926-2013)

October 5, 2021

Mrs. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. – USBC Case No. 19-34054sgj11

Dear Nan,

The purpose of this letter is to request that your office investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of claims by members of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (“Creditors’ Committee”) in the bankruptcy of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland” or “Debtor”). As described in detail below, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an immediate investigation into whether non-public inside information was furnished to claims purchasers. Further, there is reason to suspect that selling Creditors’ Committee members may have violated their fiduciary duties to the estate by tying themselves to claims sales at a time when they should have been considering meaningful offers to resolve the bankruptcy. Indeed, three of four Committee members sold their claims without advance disclosure, in violation of applicable guidelines from the U.S. Trustee’s Office. This letter contains a description of information and evidence we have been able to gather, and which we hope your office will take seriously.

By way of background, Highland, an SEC-registered investment adviser, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 16, 2019, listing over \$550 million in assets and net \$110 million in liabilities. The case eventually was transferred to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan. Highland’s decision to seek bankruptcy protection primarily was driven by an expected net \$110 million arbitration award in favor of the “Redeemer Committee.”¹ After nearly 30 years of successful operations, Highland and its co-founder, James Dondero, were advised by Debtor’s counsel that a court-approved restructuring of the award in Delaware was in Highland’s best interest.

¹ The “Redeemer Committee” was a group of investors in a Debtor-managed fund called the “Crusader Fund” that sought to redeem their interests during the global financial crisis. To avoid a run on the fund at low-watermark prices, the fund manager temporarily suspended redemptions, which resulted in a dispute between the investors and the fund manager. The ultimate resolution involved the formation of the “Redeemer Committee” and an orderly liquidation of the fund, which resulted in the investors receiving their investment plus a return versus the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had the fund been liquidated when the redemption requests were made.

October 5, 2021

Page 2

I became involved in Highland's bankruptcy through my representation of The Dugaboy Investment Trust ("Dugaboy"), an irrevocable trust of which Mr. Dondero is the primary beneficiary. Although there were many issues raised by Dugaboy and others in the case where we disagreed with the Court's rulings, we will address those issues through the appeals process.

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace the existing management of the Debtor. To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero reached an agreement with the Creditors' Committee to resign as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. The agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.² It was expected that the new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero.

Judge Jernigan confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan"). We have appealed certain aspects of the Plan and will rely upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine whether our arguments have merit. I write instead to call to your attention the possible disclosure of non-public information by Committee members and other insiders and to seek review of actions by Committee members that may have breached their fiduciary duties—both serious abuses of process.

1. The Bankruptcy Proceedings Lacked The Required Transparency, Due In Part To the Debtor's Failure To File Rule 2015.3 Reports

Congress, when it drafted the Bankruptcy Code and created the Office of the United States Trustee, intended to ensure that an impartial party oversaw the enforcement of all rules and guidelines in bankruptcy. Since that time, the Executive Office for United States Trustees (the "EOUST") has issued guidance and published rules designed to effectuate that purpose. To that end, EOUST recently published a final rule entitled "*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*" (the "Periodic Reporting Requirements"). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST's commitment to maintaining "uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor's financial condition and business activities" and "to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor's financial affairs." 85 Fed. Reg. 82906. The goal of the Periodic Reporting Requirements is to "assist the court and parties in interest in ascertaining, [among other things], the following: (1) Whether there is a substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the bankruptcy estate; . . . (3) whether there exists gross mismanagement of the bankruptcy estate; . . . [and] (6) whether the debtor is engaging in the unauthorized disposition of assets through sales or otherwise" *Id.*

Transparency has long been an important feature of federal bankruptcy proceedings. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other

² See Appendix, pp. A-3 - A-14.

October 5, 2021

Page 3

information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires.” See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that “the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest.” This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.³ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) requires a creditors’ committee to share information it receives with those who “hold claims of the kind represented by the committee” but who are not appointed to the committee. In the case of the Highland bankruptcy, the transparency that the EOUST mandates and that creditors’ committees are supposed to facilitate has been conspicuously absent. I have been involved in a number of bankruptcy cases representing publicly-traded debtors with affiliated non-debtor entities, much akin to Highland’s structure here. In those cases, when asked by third parties (shareholders or potential claims purchasers) for information, I directed them to the schedules, monthly reports, and Rule 2015.3 reports. In this case, however, no Rule 2015.3 reports were filed, and financial information that might otherwise be gleaned from the Bankruptcy Court record is unavailable because a large number of documents were filed under seal or heavily redacted. As a result, the only means to make an informed decision as to whether to purchase creditor claims and what to pay for those claims had to be obtained from non-public sources.

It bears repeating that the Debtor and its related and affiliated entities failed to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3. There should have been at least four such reports filed on behalf of the Debtor and its affiliates during the bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. Trustee’s Office in Dallas did nothing to compel compliance with the rule.

The Debtor’s failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee’s Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task “fell through the cracks.”⁴ This excuse makes no sense in light of the years of bankruptcy experience of the Debtor’s counsel and financial advisors. Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show “cause” to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor’s failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors’ Committee often refer to the Debtor’s structure as a “byzantine empire,” the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.⁵ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily

³ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement “for cause,” including that “the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available.” Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

⁴ See Doc. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 49:5-21).

⁵ During a deposition, the Debtor’s Chief Restructuring Officer, Mr. Seery, identified most of the Debtor’s assets “[o]ff the top of [his] head” and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities

October 5, 2021

Page 4

available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency, and the U.S. Trustee's Office did nothing to rectify the problem.

By contrast, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding (i) transactions involving assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly owned subsidiaries, (ii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (iii) transactions involving entities managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (iv) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest, (v) transactions involving entities not managed by the Debtor and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest, (vi) transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and (vii) weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee had real-time, actual information with respect to the financial affairs of non-debtor affiliates, and this is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3.

After the claims at issue were sold, I filed a Motion to Compel compliance with the reporting requirement. Judge Jernigan held a hearing on the motion on June 10, 2021. Astoundingly, the U.S. Trustee's Office took no position on the Motion and did not even bother to attend the hearing. Ultimately, on September 7, 2021, the Court denied the Motion as "moot" because the Plan had by then gone effective. I have appealed that ruling because, again, the Plan becoming effective does not alleviate the Debtor's burden of filing the requisite reports.

The U.S. Trustee's Office also failed to object to the Court's order confirming the Debtor's Plan, in which the Court appears to have released the Debtor from its obligation to file any reports after the effective date of the Plan that were due for any period prior to the effective date, an order that likewise defeats any effort to demand transparency from the Debtor. The U.S. Trustee's failure to object to this portion of the Court's order is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements, which recognize the U.S. Trustee's duty to ensure that debtors timely file all required reports.

2. There Was No Transparency Regarding The Financial Affairs Of Non-Debtor Affiliates Or Transactions Between The Debtor And Its Affiliates

The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities created additional transparency problems for interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate assets held in non-Debtor subsidiaries. In making an investment decision, it would be important to know if the assets of a subsidiary consisted of cash, marketable securities, other liquid assets, or operating businesses/other illiquid assets. The Debtor's failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports hid from public view the composition of the assets and the corresponding liabilities at the subsidiary level. During the course of proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the asset mix and liabilities of the Debtor's affiliates and controlled entities. Although Judge Jernigan held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity. In the Appendix, I have included a schedule of such sales.

Of particular note, the Court authorized the Debtor to place assets that it acquired with "allowed claim dollars" from HarbourVest (a creditor with a contested claim against the estate) into a specially-created non-debtor entity ("SPE").⁶ The Debtor's motion to settle the

below the Debtor. *See* Appendix, p. A-19 (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

⁶ Prior to Highland's bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. ("HCLOF"). A dispute later arose between HarbourVest

October 5, 2021

Page 5

HarbourVest claim valued the asset acquired (HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF) at \$22 million. In reality, that asset had a value of \$40 million, and had the asset been placed in the Debtor entity, its true value would have been reflected in the Debtor's subsequent reporting. By instead placing the asset into an SPE, the Debtor hid from public view the true value of the asset as well as information relating to its disposition; all the public saw was the filed valuation of the asset. The U.S. Trustee did not object to the Debtor's placement of the HarbourVest assets into an SPE and apparently just deferred to the judgment of the Creditors' Committee about whether this was appropriate.⁷ Again, when the U.S. Trustee's Office does not require transparency, lack of transparency significantly increases the need for non-public information. Because the HarbourVest assets were placed in a non-reporting entity, no potential claims buyer without insider information could possibly ascertain how the acquisition would impact the estate.

3. The Plan's Improper Releases And Exculpation Provisions Destroyed Third-Party Rights

In addition, the Debtor's Plan contains sweeping release, exculpation provisions, and a channeling injunction requiring that any permitted causes of action to be vetted and resolved by the Bankruptcy Court. On their face, these provisions violate *Pacific Lumber*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses. The U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas has, in all cases but this one, vigorously protected the rights of third parties against such exculpation clauses. In this case, the U.S. Trustee's Office objected to the Plan, but it did not pursue that objection at the confirmation hearing (nor even bother to attend the first day of the hearing),⁸ nor did it appeal the order of the Bankruptcy Court approving the Plan and its exculpation clauses.

As a result of this failure, third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor are now barred from asserting or channeled into the Bankruptcy Court to assert any claim against the Debtor or its management for transactions that occurred at the non-debtor affiliate level. Those investors' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims, nor given the opportunity to "opt out." Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so. While the agreements executed by investors may limit the exposure of fund managers, typically those provisions require the fund manager to obtain a third-party fairness opinion where there is a conflict between the manager's duty to the estate and his duty to fund investors.

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million and represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement.⁹ That representation is untrue;

and Highland, and HarbourVest filed claims in the Highland bankruptcy approximating \$300 million in relation to damages allegedly due to HarbourVest as a result of that dispute. Although the Debtor initially placed no value on HarbourVest's claim (the Debtor's monthly operating report for December 2020 indicated that HarbourVest's allowed claims would be \$0), eventually the Debtor entered into a settlement with HarbourVest—approved by the Bankruptcy Court—which entitled HarbourVest to \$80 million in claims. In return, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to the SPE designated by the Debtor and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan.

⁷ Dugaboy has appealed the Bankruptcy Court's ruling approving the placement of the HarbourVest assets into a non-reporting SPE.

⁸ See [Doc. 1894](#) (Feb. 2, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 10:7-14).

⁹ See [Doc. 2389](#) (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at

October 5, 2021

Page 6

MultiStrat did not have separate legal counsel and instead was represented only by the Debtor's counsel.¹⁰ If that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement in some way unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse to third parties, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

The U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharmaceuticals that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.¹¹ It has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the Plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.¹² This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release. Highland's Plan does not provide for consent by third parties (or an opt-out provision), nor does it require that released parties provide value for their releases. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas did not lodge an objection to the Plan's release and exculpation provisions. Several parties have appealed this issue to the Fifth Circuit.

4. The Lack Of Transparency Facilitated Potential Insider Trading

The biggest problem with the lack of transparency at every step is that it created a need for access to non-public confidential information. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) were the only parties with access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But the public did not.

In the context of this non-transparency, it is notable that three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims that were sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹³ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims¹⁴:

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we have reason to believe that Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon)

Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

¹⁰ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

¹¹ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), [Doc. 3778 at 17-25](#).

¹² See *id.* at 22.

¹³ See Appendix, p. A-25.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

October 5, 2021

Page 7

and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the Reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims.¹⁵ In particular, there are three primary reasons we believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

We believe the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ¹⁶
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0 ¹⁷

To elaborate on our reasons for suspicion, an analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- There was a \$200 million dissipation in the estate's asset value, which started at a scheduled amount of \$556 million on October 16, 2019, then plummeted to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020, and then increased only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021.¹⁸

¹⁵ A timeline of relevant events can be found at Appendix, p. A-26.

¹⁶ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71. Because the transaction included “the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds,” the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

¹⁷ Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean that Stonehill and Farallon paid \$50 million for claims worth only \$46.4 million. See Appendix, p. A-28. If, however, Stonehill and Farallon had access to information that only came to light later—i.e., that the estate was actually worth much, much more (between \$472-600 million as opposed to \$364 million)—then it makes sense that they would pay what they did to buy the UBS claim.

¹⁸ Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Doc. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Doc. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which we believe was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Appendix, p. A-25. It is also notable that the January 2021

October 5, 2021

Page 8

- The total amount of allowed claims against the estate increased by \$236 million; indeed, just between the time the Debtor's disclosure statement was approved on November 24, 2020, and the time the Debtor's exhibits were introduced at the confirmation hearing, the amount of allowed claims increased by \$100 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy went from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.¹⁹

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information without conducting thorough due diligence to be satisfied that the assets of the estate would not continue to deteriorate or that the allowed claims against the estate would not continue to grow.

There are other good reasons to investigate whether Muck and Jessup (through Farallon and Stonehill) had access to material, non-public information that influenced their claims purchasing. In particular, there are close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand. What follows is our understanding of those relationships:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material, undisclosed relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery.²⁰ Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While at Lehman, Mr. Seery did a substantial amount of business with Farallon. After the Lehman collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in these bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Fund from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate.
- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors'

monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

¹⁹ See Appendix, pp. A-25, A-28.

²⁰ See Appendix, pp. A-2; A-62 – A-69.

October 5, 2021

Page 9

committee.

It does not seem a coincidence that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The nature of the relationships and the absence of public data warrants an investigation into whether the claims purchasers may have had access to non-public information.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also warrants investigation. In particular, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. We know, for example, that Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to investigate whether selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. We believe an investigation will reveal whether negotiations of the sale and the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Fund indicates that the Crusader Fund and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²¹ We also know that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Fund, and the Redeemer Committee that potentially dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. Presumably such an agreement, if it existed, would impose affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and grant the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. An investigation by your office is necessary to determine whether there were any such agreement, which would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the guidelines provided to committee members that require a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. The instructions provided by the U.S. Trustee's Office (in this instance the Delaware Office) state:

²¹ See Appendix, pp. A-70 – A-71.

October 5, 2021

Page 10

In the event you are appointed to an official committee of creditors, the United States Trustee may require periodic certifications of your claims while the bankruptcy case is pending. Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing a creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion. You are hereby notified that the United States Trustee may share this information with the Securities and Exchange Commission if deemed appropriate.

In this case, no Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not necessarily prohibited, the circumstances surrounding claims trading often times prompt investigation due to the potential for abuse. This case warrants such an investigation due to the following:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The sales allegedly occurred after the Plan was confirmed, and certain other matters immediately thereafter came to light, such as the Debtor's need for an exit loan (although the Debtor testified at the confirmation hearing that no loan was needed) and the inability of the Debtor to obtain Directors and Officer insurance;
- d) The Debtor settled a dispute with UBS and obligated itself (using estate assets) to pursue claims and transfers and to transfer certain recoveries to UBS, as opposed to distributing those recoveries to creditors, and the Debtor used third-party assets as consideration for the settlement²²;
- e) The projected recovery to creditors changed significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- f) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Further, there is reason to believe that insider claims-trading negatively impacted the estate's ultimate recovery. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, made numerous offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed Plan of Reorganization. The Creditors' Committee did not timely respond to these efforts. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its

October 5, 2021

Page 11

members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that some members may have been contractually constrained from doing so, which itself warrants investigation.

We encourage the EOUST to question and explore whether, at the time that Mr. Dondero's proposed plan was filed, the Creditors' Committee members already had committed to sell their claims and therefore were contractually restricted from accepting Mr. Dondero's materially better offer. If that were the case, the contractual tie-up would have been a violation of the Committee members' fiduciary duties. The reason for the U.S. Trustee's guideline concerning the sale of claims by Committee members was to allow a public hearing on whether Committee members were acting within the bounds of their fiduciary duties to the estate incident to the sale of any claim. The failure to enforce this guideline has left open questions about sale of Committee members' claims that should have been disclosed and vetted in open court.

In summary, the failure of the U.S. Trustee's Office to demand appropriate reporting and transparency created an environment where parties needed to obtain and use non-public information to facilitate claims trading and potential violations of the fiduciary duties owed by Creditors' Committee members. At the very least, there is enough credible evidence to warrant an investigation. It is up to the bankruptcy bar to alert your office to any perceived abuses to ensure that the system is fair and transparent. The Bankruptcy Code is not written for those who hold the largest claims but, rather, it is designed to protect all stakeholders. A second Neiman Marcus should not be allowed to occur.

We would appreciate a meeting with your office at your earliest possible convenience to discuss the contents of this letter and to provide additional information and color that we believe will be valuable in making a determination about whether and what to investigate. In the interim, if you need any additional information or copies of any particular pleading, we would be happy to provide those at your request.

Very truly yours,

/s/Douglas S. Draper

Douglas S. Draper

DSD:dh

EXHIBIT A-2



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November 3, 2021

Via E-Mail and Federal Express

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
Office of the General Counsel
Executive Office for U.S. Trustees
20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
Nan.r.Eitel@usdoj.gov

Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. Bankruptcy Case
Case No. 19-34054 (SGJ) Bankr. N.D. Tex.

Dear Ms. Eitel:

I am a senior bankruptcy practitioner who has worked closely with Douglas Draper (representing separate, albeit aligned, clients) in the above-referenced Chapter 11 case. I have represented debtors-in-possession on multiple occasions, have served as an adjunct professor of law teaching advanced corporate restructuring, and consider myself not only a bankruptcy expert, but an expert on the practicalities and realities of how estates and cases are administered and, therefore, how they could be manipulated for personal interests. I write to follow up on the letter that Douglas sent to your offices on October 4, 2021, on account of additional information my clients have learned in this matter. So that you understand, my clients in the case are NexPoint Advisors, L.P. and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors, L.P., both of whom are affiliated with and controlled by James Dondero, and I write this letter on their behalf and based on information they have obtained.

I share Douglas' view that serious abuses of the bankruptcy process occurred during the bankruptcy of Texas-headquartered Highland Capital Management, L.P. ("Highland" or the "Debtor") which, left uninvestigated and unaddressed, may represent a systemic issue that I believe would be of concern to your office and within your office's sphere of authority. Those abuses include potential insider trading and breaches of fiduciary duty by those charged with protecting creditors, understated estimations of estate value seemingly designed to benefit insiders and management, gross mistreatment of employees who were key to the bankruptcy process, and ultimately a plan aimed at liquidating an otherwise viable estate, to the detriment of third-party investors in Debtor-managed funds. To be clear, I recognize that the Bankruptcy Court has ruled the way that it has and I am not criticizing the Bankruptcy Court or seeking to attack any of its orders. Rather, as has been and will be shown, the Bankruptcy Court acted on misinformation presented to it, intentional lack of transparency, and manipulation of the facts and circumstances by the fiduciaries of the estate. I therefore wish to add my voice to Douglas' aforementioned letter, provide additional information, encourage your investigation, and offer whatever information or assistance I can.

The abuses here are akin to the type of systemic abuse of process that took place in the bankruptcy of Neiman Marcus (in which a core member of the creditors' committee admittedly attempted to perpetrate a massive fraud on creditors), and which is something that lawmakers should be concerned

about, particularly to the extent that debtor management and creditors' committee members are using the federal bankruptcy process to shield themselves from liability for otherwise harmful, illegal, or fraudulent acts.

BACKGROUND

Highland Capital Management and its Founder, James Dondero

Highland Capital Management, L.P. is an SEC-registered investment advisor co-founded by James Dondero in 1993. A graduate of the University of Virginia with highest honors, Mr. Dondero has over thirty years of experience successfully overseeing investment and business activities across a range of investment platforms. Of note, Mr. Dondero is chiefly responsible for ensuring that Highland weathered the global financial crisis, evolving the firm's focus from high-yield credit to other areas, including real estate, private equity, and alternative investments. Prior to its bankruptcy, Highland served as advisor to a suite of registered funds, including open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds, and an exchange-traded fund.

In addition to managing Highland, Mr. Dondero is a dedicated philanthropist who has actively supported initiatives in education, veterans' affairs, and public policy. He currently serves as a member of the Executive Board of the Southern Methodist University Cox School of Business and sits on the Executive Advisory Council of the George W. Bush Presidential Center.

Circumstances Precipitating Bankruptcy

Notwithstanding Highland's historical success with Mr. Dondero at the helm, Highland's funds—like many other investment platforms—suffered losses during the financial crisis, leading to myriad lawsuits by investors. One of the most contentious disputes involved a group of investors who had invested in Highland-managed funds collectively termed the "Crusader Funds." During the financial crisis, to avoid a run on the Crusader Funds at low-watermark prices, the funds' manager temporarily suspended redemptions, leading investors to sue. That dispute resolved with the formation of an investor committee self-named the "Redeemer Committee" and the orderly liquidation of the Crusader Funds, which resulted in investors' receiving a return of their investments plus a return, as opposed to the 20 cents on the dollar they would have received had their redemption requests been honored when made.

Despite this successful liquidation, the Redeemer Committee sued Highland again several years later, claiming that Highland had improperly delayed the liquidation and paid itself fees not authorized under the parties' earlier settlement agreement. The dispute went to arbitration, ultimately resulting in an arbitration award against Highland of \$189 million (of which Highland expected to make a net payment of \$110 million once the award was confirmed).

Believing that a restructuring of its judgment liabilities was in Highland's best interest, on October 16, 2019, Highland—a Delaware limited partnership—filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.¹

On October 29, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court appointed the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Creditors' Committee"). The Creditors' Committee Members (and the contact individuals for those members) are: (1) The Redeemer Committee of the Highland Crusader Fund (Eric Felton), (2) Meta e-Discovery (Paul McVoy), (3) UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch (Elizabeth

¹ *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-12239-CSS (Bankr. D. Del.) ("Del. Case"), Dkt. 1.

Kozlowski), and (4) Acis Capital Management, L.P. and Acis Capital Management GP, LLP (Joshua Terry).² At the time of their appointment, creditors agreeing to serve on the Creditors' Committee were given an Instruction Sheet by the Office of the United States Trustee, instructing as follows:

Creditors wishing to serve as fiduciaries on any official committee are advised that they may not purchase, sell or otherwise trade in or transfer claims against the Debtor while they are committee members absent an order of the Court. By submitting the enclosed Questionnaire and accepting membership on an official committee of creditors, you agree to this prohibition. The United States Trustee reserves the right to take appropriate action, including removing the creditor from any committee, if the information provided in the Questionnaire is inaccurate, if the foregoing prohibition is violated, or for any other reason the United States Trustee believes is proper in the exercise of her discretion.

See Instruction Sheet, Ex. A (emphasis in original).

In response to a motion by the Creditors' Committee, on December 4, 2019, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court unexpectedly transferred the bankruptcy case to the Northern District of Texas, to Judge Stacey G.C. Jernigan's court.³

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF HIGHLAND'S COURT-ADMINISTERED BANKRUPTCY

Mr. Dondero Gets Pushed Out of Management and New Debtor Management Announces Plans to Liquidate the Estate

From the outset of the case, the Creditors' Committee and the U.S. Trustee's Office in Dallas pushed to replace Mr. Dondero as the sole director of the Debtor's general partner, Strand Advisors, Inc. ("Strand"). To avoid a protracted dispute and to facilitate the restructuring, on January 9, 2020, Mr. Dondero agreed to resign as the sole director, on the condition that he would be replaced by three independent directors who would act as fiduciaries of the estate and work to restructure Highland's business so it could continue operating and emerge from bankruptcy as a going concern. As Mr. Draper previously has explained, the agreement approved by the Bankruptcy Court allowed Mr. Dondero, UBS (which held one of the largest claims against the estate), and the Redeemer Committee each to choose one director, and also established protocols for operations going forward. Mr. Dondero chose The Honorable Former Judge Russell F. Nelms, UBS chose John Dubel, and the Redeemer Committee chose James Seery.⁴

In brokering the agreement, Mr. Dondero made clear his expectations that new, independent management would not only preserve Highland's business by expediting an exit from bankruptcy in three to six months, but would also preserve jobs and enable continued collaboration with charitable causes supported by Highland and Mr. Dondero. Unfortunately, those expectations did not materialize. Rather, it quickly became clear that Strand's and Highland's management was being dominated by one of the

² Del. Case, Dkt. 65.

³ See *In re Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P.*, Case No. 19-34054 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), Dkt. 186. All subsequent docket references are to the docket of the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.

⁴ See Stipulation in Support of Motion of the Debtor for Approval of Settlement with the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 338; Order Approving Settlement with Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Governance of the Debtor and Procedures for Operations in the Ordinary Course, Dkt. 339.

independent directors, Mr. Seery (as will be seen, for his self-gain). Shortly after his placement on the Board, on March 15, 2020, Mr. Seery became de facto Chief Executive Officer, after which he immediately took steps to freeze Mr. Dondero out of operations completely, to the detriment of Highland's business and its employees. The Bankruptcy Court formally approved Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO and Chief Restructuring Officer on July 14, 2020.⁵ Although Mr. Seery publicly represented that his goal was to restructure the Debtor's business and enable it to emerge as a going concern, privately he was engineering a much different plan. Less than two months after Mr. Seery's appointment as CEO/CRO, the Debtor filed its initial plan of reorganization, disclosing for the first time its intention to terminate substantially all employees by the end of 2020 and to liquidate Highland's assets by 2022.⁶

Over objections by Mr. Dondero and numerous other stakeholders, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed Highland's Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization on February 22, 2021 (the "Plan").⁷ There are appeals of that Plan, as well as many of the other rulings made by the Bankruptcy Court, currently pending before the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Transparency Problems Pervade the Bankruptcy Proceedings

The Regulatory Framework

As you are aware, one of the most important features of federal bankruptcy proceedings is transparency. The EOUST instructs that "Debtors-in-possession and trustees must account for the receipt, administration, and disposition of all property; provide information concerning the estate and the estate's administration as parties in interest request; and file periodic reports and summaries of a debtor's business, including a statement of receipts and disbursements, and such other information as the United States Trustee or the United States Bankruptcy Court requires." See <http://justice.gov/ust/chapter-11-information> (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1), 1107(a)). And Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2015.3(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in possession shall file periodic financial reports of the value, operations, and profitability of each entity that is not a publicly traded corporation or a debtor in a case under title 11, and in which the estate holds a substantial or controlling interest." This rule requires the trustee or a debtor in possession to file a report for each non-debtor affiliate prior to the first meeting of creditors and every six months thereafter until the effective date of a plan of reorganization. Fed R. Bankr. P. 2015.3(b). Importantly, the rule does not absolve a debtor from filing reports due prior to the effective date merely because a plan has become effective.⁸ Notably, the U.S. Trustee has the duty to ensure that debtors in possession properly and timely file all required reports. 28 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(F), (H).

The entire purpose of these guidelines and rules is to ensure that external stakeholders can fairly evaluate the progress of bankruptcy proceedings, including compliance with legal requirements. Particularly in large bankruptcies, creditors and investors alike should expect that debtors, their

⁵ See Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854.

⁶ See Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. dated August 12, 2020, Dkt. 944.

⁷ See Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified); and (II) Granting Related Relief, Dkt. 1943.

⁸ After notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court may grant relief from the Rule 2015.3 disclosure requirement "for cause," including that "the trustee or debtor in possession is not able, after a good faith effort, to comply with th[e] reporting requirements, or that the information required by subdivision (a) is publicly available." Fed. R. Bankr. 2015.3(d).

management, and representatives on creditors' committees abide by their reporting obligations and all other legal requirements. Bankruptcy is not meant to be a safe haven for lawlessness, nor is it designed to obfuscate the operations of the debtor. Instead, transparency is mandatory so that the debtor is accountable to stakeholders and so that stakeholders can ensure that all insiders are operating for the benefit of the estate.

In Highland's Bankruptcy, the Regulatory Framework Is Ignored

Against this regulatory backdrop, and on the heels of high-profile bankruptcy abuses like those that occurred in the context of the Neiman Marcus bankruptcy, the Highland bankruptcy offered almost no transparency to stakeholders. Traditional reporting requirements were ignored. This opened the door to numerous abuses of process and potential violations of federal law, as detailed below.

As Mr. Draper already has highlighted, one significant problem in Highland's bankruptcy was the Debtor's failure to file *any* of the reports required under Bankruptcy Rule 2015.3, either on behalf of itself or its affiliated entities. Typically, such reports would include information like asset value, income from financial operations, profits, and losses for each non-publicly traded entity in which the estate has a substantial or controlling interest. This was very important here, where the Debtor held the bulk of its value—hundreds of millions of dollars—in non-debtor subsidiaries. The Debtor's failure to file the required Rule 2015.3 reports was brought to the attention of the Debtor, the Bankruptcy Court, and the U.S. Trustee's Office. During the hearing on Plan confirmation, the Debtor was questioned about the failure to file the reports. The sole excuse offered by the Debtor's Chief Restructuring Officer and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Seery, was that the task "fell through the cracks."⁹ Nor did the Debtor or its counsel ever attempt to show "cause" to gain exemption from the reporting requirement. That is because there was no good reason for the Debtor's failure to file the required reports. In fact, although the Debtor and the Creditors' Committee often refer to the Debtor's structure as a "byzantine empire," the assets of the estate fall into a handful of discrete investments, most of which have audited financials and/or are required to make monthly or quarterly net-asset-value or fair-value determinations.¹⁰ Rather than disclose financial information that was readily available, the Debtor appears to have taken deliberate and strategic steps to avoid transparency.

In stark contrast to its non-existent public disclosures, the Debtor provided the Creditors' Committee with robust weekly information regarding transactions involving assets held by the Debtor or its wholly-owned subsidiaries, transactions involving managed entities and non-managed entities in which the Debtor held an interest, transactions involving non-discretionary accounts, and weekly budget-to-actuals reports referencing non-Debtor affiliates' 13-week cash flow budget. In other words, the Committee member had real-time financial information with respect to the affairs of non-debtor affiliates, which is precisely the type of information that should have been disclosed to the public pursuant to Rule 2015.3. Yet, the fact that the Committee members alone had this information enabled some of them to trade on it, for their personal benefit.

The Debtor's management failed and refused to make other critical disclosures as well. As explained in detail below, during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor sold off sizeable assets without any notice and without seeking Bankruptcy Court approval. The Debtor characterized these transactions as the "ordinary course of business" (allowing it to avoid the Bankruptcy Court approval process), but

⁹ See Dkt. 1905 (Feb. 3, 2021 Hr'g Tr. at 49:5-21).

¹⁰ During a deposition, Mr. Seery identified most of the Debtor's assets "[o]ff the top of [his] head" and acknowledged that he had a subsidiary ledger that detailed the assets held by entities below the Debtor. See Exh. A (Jan. 29, 2021 Dep. Tr. at 22:4-10; 23:1-29:10).

they were anything but ordinary. In addition, the Debtor settled the claims of at least one creditor—former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty—without seeking court approval of the settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. We understand that the Debtor paid Mr. Daugherty \$750,000 in cash as part of that settlement, done as a “settlement” to obtain Mr. Daugherty’s withdrawal of his objection to the Debtor’s plan.

Despite all of these transparency problems, the Debtor’s confirmed Plan contains provisions that effectively release the Debtor from its obligation to file *any* of the reports due for *any* period prior to the effective date—thereby sanctioning the Debtor’s failure and refusal to follow the rules. The U.S. Trustee also failed to object to this portion of the Court’s order of confirmation, which is directly at odds with the spirit and mandate of the Periodic Reporting Requirements recently adopted by the EOUST and historical rules mandating transparency.¹¹

As will become apparent, because neither the federal Bankruptcy Court nor the U.S. Trustee advocated or demanded compliance with the rules, the Debtor, its newly-appointed management, and the Creditors’ Committee charged with protecting the interests of all creditors were able to manipulate the estate for the benefit of a handful of insiders, seemingly in contravention of law.

Debtor And Debtor-Affiliate Assets Were Deliberately Hidden and Mischaracterized

Largely because of the Debtor’s failure to file Rule 2015.3 reports for affiliate entities, interested parties and creditors wishing to evaluate the worth and mix of assets held in non-Debtor affiliates could not do so. This is particularly problematic, because during proceedings, the Debtor sold \$172 million in assets, which altered the mix of assets and liabilities of the Debtor’s affiliates and controlled entities. In addition, the estate’s asset value decreased by approximately \$200 million in a matter of months. Absent financial reporting, it was impossible for stakeholders to determine whether the \$200 impairment in asset value reflected actual realized losses or merely temporary mark-downs precipitated by problems experienced by certain assets during the pandemic (including labor shortages, supply-chain issues, travel interruptions, and the like). Although the Bankruptcy Court held that such sales did not require Court approval, a Rule 2015.3 report would have revealed the mix of assets and the corresponding reduction in liabilities of the affiliated or controlled entity—information that was critical in evaluating the worth of claims against the estate or future investments into it.

One transaction that was particularly problematic involved alleged creditor HarbourVest, a private equity fund with approximately \$75 billion under management. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy, HarbourVest had invested \$80 million into (and obtained 49.98% of the outstanding shares of) a Highland fund called Acis Loan Funding, later rebranded as Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (“HCLOF”). A charitable fund called Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (“DAF”) held 49.02% member interests in HCLOF, and the remaining 2.00% was held by Highland and certain of its employees. Prior to Highland’s bankruptcy proceedings, a dispute arose between HarbourVest and Highland, in which HarbourVest claimed it was duped into making the investment because Highland allegedly failed to disclose key facts relating to the investment (namely, that Highland was engaged in ongoing litigation with former employee, Josh Terry,

¹¹ See “*Procedures for Completing Uniform Periodic Reports in Non-Small Business Cases Filed Under Chapter 11 of Title 11*” (the “Periodic Reporting Requirements”). The Periodic Reporting Requirements reaffirmed the EOUST’s commitment to maintaining “uniformity and transparency regarding a debtor’s financial condition and business activities” and “to inform creditors and other interested parties of the debtor’s financial affairs.” 85 Fed. Reg. 82906.

which would result in HCLOF's incurring legal fees and costs). HarbourVest alleged that, as a result of the Terry lawsuit, HCLOF incurred approximately \$15 million in legal fees and costs.¹²

In the context of Highland's bankruptcy, however, HarbourVest filed a proof of claim alleging that it was due over \$300 million in damages in the dispute, a claim that bore no relationship to economic reality. As a result, Debtor management initially valued HarbourVest's claims at \$0, a value consistently reflected in the Debtor's publicly-filed financial statements, up through and including its December 2020 Monthly Operating Report.¹³ Eventually, however, the Debtor announced a settlement with HarbourVest which entitled HarbourVest to \$45 million in Class 8 claims and \$35 million in Class 9 claims.¹⁴ At the time, the Debtor's public disclosures reflected that Class 8 creditors could expect to receive approximately 70% payout on their claims, and Class 9 creditors could expect 0.00%. In other words, HarbourVest's total \$80 million in allowed claims would allow HarbourVest to realize a \$31.5 million return.¹⁵

As consideration for this potential payout, HarbourVest agreed to convey its interest in HCLOF to a special-purpose entity ("SPE") designated by the Debtor (a transaction that involved a trade of securities) and to vote in favor of the Debtor's Plan. In its pleadings and testimony in support of the settlement, the Debtor represented that the value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF was \$22.5 million. It later came to light, however, that the actual value of that asset was at least \$44 million.

There are numerous problems with this transaction which may not have occurred with the requisite transparency. As a registered investment advisor, the Debtor had a fiduciary obligation to disclose the true value of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF to investors in that fund. The Debtor also had a fiduciary obligation to offer the investment opportunity to the other investors prior to purchasing HarbourVest's interest for itself. Mr. Seery has acknowledged that his fiduciary duties to the Debtor's managed funds and investors supersedes any fiduciary duties owed to the Debtor and its creditors in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the Debtor and its management appear to have misrepresented the value of the HarbourVest asset, brokered a purchase of the asset without disclosure to investors, and thereafter placed the HarbourVest interest into a non-reporting SPE.¹⁶ This meant that no outside stakeholder had any ability to assess the value of that interest, nor could any outsider possibly ascertain how the acquisition of that interest impacted the bankruptcy estate. In the absence of Rule 2015.3 reports or listing of the HCLOF interest on the Debtor's balance sheet, it was impossible to determine at the time of the HarbourVest settlement (or thereafter) whether the Debtor properly accounted for the asset on its balance sheet.

Highland engaged in several other asset sales in bankruptcy without disclosing those sales in advance to outside stakeholders or investors, and without offering investors in funds impacted by the sales the opportunity to purchase the assets. For example:

¹² Assuming that HarbourVest were entitled to fraud damages as it claimed, the true amount of its damages was less than \$7.5 million (because HarbourVest only would have borne 49.98% of the \$15 million in legal fees).

¹³ See Monthly Operating Report for Highland Capital Management for the Month Ending December 2020, Dkt. 1949.

¹⁴ Class 8 consists of general unsecured claims; Class 9 consists of subordinated claims.

¹⁵ We have reason to believe that HarbourVest's Class 8 and Class 9 claims were contemporaneously sold to Farallon Capital Management—an SEC-registered investment advisor—for approximately \$28 million.

¹⁶ Even former Highland employee Patrick Daugherty recognized the problematic nature of asset dispositions like the one involving HarbourVest, commenting that such transactions "have left [Mr. Seery] and Highland vulnerable to a counter-attack under the [Investment] Advisors Act." See Ex. B.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 8

- The Debtor sold approximately \$25 million of NexPoint Residential Trust shares that today are valued at over \$70 million; the Debtor likewise sold \$6 million of PTLA shares that were taken over less than 60 days later for \$18 million.
- The Debtor divested interests worth \$145 million held in certain life settlements (which paid on the death of the individuals covered, whose average age was 90) for \$35 million rather than continuing to pay premiums on the policies, and did so without obtaining updated estimates of the life settlements' value, to the detriment of the fund and investors (today two of the covered individuals have a life expectancy of less than one year);
- The Debtor sold interests in OmniMax without informing the Bankruptcy Court, without engaging in a competitive bidding process, and without cooperating with other funds managed by Mr. Dondero, resulting in what we believe is substantially lesser value to investors;
- The Debtor sold interests in Structural Steel Products (worth \$50 million) and Targa (worth \$37 million), again without any process or notice to the Bankruptcy Court or outside stakeholders, resulting in what we believe is diminished value for the estate and investors.

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define what constitutes a transaction in the "ordinary course of business," the Debtor's management was able to characterize these massive sales as ordinary course transactions when they were anything but ordinary, resulting in diminution in value to the estate and its creditors.

In summary, the consistent lack of transparency throughout bankruptcy proceedings facilitated sales and deal-making that failed to maximize value for the estate and precluded outside stakeholders from evaluating or participating in asset purchases or claims trading that might have benefitted the estate and outside investors in Debtor-managed funds.

The Debtor Reneged on Its Promise to Pay Key Employees, Contrary to Sworn Testimony

Highland's bankruptcy also diverges from the norm in its treatment of key employees, who usually can expect to be fairly compensated for pre-petition work and post-petition work done for the benefit of the estate. That did not happen here, despite the Debtor's representation to the Bankruptcy Court that it would.

By way of background, prior to its bankruptcy, Highland offered employees two bonus plans: an Annual Bonus Plan and a Deferred Bonus Plan. Under the Annual Bonus Plan, all of Highland's employees were eligible for a yearly bonus payable in up to four equal installments, at six-month intervals, on the last business day of each February and August. Under the Deferred Bonus Plan, Highland's employees were awarded shares of a designated publicly traded stock, the right to which vested 39 months later. Under both bonus plans, the only condition to payment was that the employee be employed by Highland at the time the award (or any portion of it) vested.

At the outset of the bankruptcy proceedings, the Debtor promised that pre-petition bonus plans would be honored. Specifically, in its Motion For Entry of an Order Authorizing the Debtor to Pay and Honor Ordinary Course Obligations Under Employee Bonus Plans and Granting Related Relief, the Debtor informed the Court that employee bonuses "continue[d] to be earned on a post-petition basis," and that "employee compensation under the Bonus Plans [was] critical to the Debtor's ongoing

Ms. Nan R. Eitel
November 3, 2021
Page 9

operations and that any threat of nonpayment under such plans *would have a potentially catastrophic impact on the Debtor's reorganization efforts.*"¹⁷ Significantly, the Debtor explained to the Court that its operations were leanly staffed, such that all employees were critical to ongoing operations and such that it expected to compensate all employees. As a result of these representations, key employees continued to work for the Debtor, some of whom invested significant hours at work ensuring that the Debtor's new management had access to critical information for purposes of reorganizing the estate.

Having induced Highland's employees to continue their employment, the Debtor abruptly changed course, refusing to pay key employees awards earned pre-petition under the Annual Bonus Plan and bonuses earned pre-petition under the Deferred Bonus Plan that vested post-petition. In fact, Mr. Seery chose to terminate four key employees just before the vesting date in an effort to avoid payment, despite his repeated assurances to the employees that they would be "made whole." Worse still, notwithstanding the Debtor's failure and refusal to pay bonuses earned and promised to these terminated employees, in Monthly Operating Reports signed by Mr. Seery under penalty of perjury, the Debtor continued to treat the amounts owed to the employees as post-petition obligations, which the Debtor continued to accrue as post-petition liabilities even after termination of their employment.

The Debtor's misrepresentations to the Bankruptcy Court and to the employees themselves fly in the face of usual bankruptcy procedure. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, administrative expenses like key employee salaries are an "actual and necessary cost" that provides a "benefit to the state and its creditors."¹⁸ It is undisputed that these employees continued to work for the Debtor, providing an unquestionable benefit to the estate post-petition, but were not provided the promised compensation, for reasons known only to the Debtor.

Again, this is not business as usual in bankruptcy proceedings, and if we are to ensure the continued success of debtors in reorganization proceedings, it is important that key employees be paid in the ordinary course for their efforts in assisting debtors and that debtor management be made to live up to promises made under penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy courts.

There Is Substantial Evidence that Insider Trading Occurred

Perhaps one of the biggest problems with the lack of transparency at every step is that it facilitated potential insider trading. The Debtor (as well as its advisors and professionals) and the Creditors' Committee (and its counsel) had access to critical information upon which any reasonable investor would rely. But because of the lack of reporting, the public did not.

Mr. Draper's October 4, 2021 letter sets forth in detail the reasons for suspecting that insider trading occurred, but his explanation bears repeating here. In the context of a non-transparent bankruptcy proceeding, three of the four members of the Creditors' Committee and one non-committee member sold their claims to two buyers, Muck Holdings LLC ("Muck") and Jessup Holdings LLC ("Jessup"). The four claims sold comprise the largest four claims in the Highland bankruptcy by a substantial margin,¹⁹ collectively totaling almost \$270 million in Class 8 claims and \$95 million in Class 9 claims:

¹⁷ See Dkt. 177, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

¹⁸ *Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.)*, 151 F.3d 434, 437 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Transamerican Natural Gas Corp.*, 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992)).

¹⁹ See Ex. C.

<u>Claimant</u>	<u>Class 8 Claim</u>	<u>Class 9 Claims</u>	<u>Date Claim Settled</u>
Redeemer Committee	\$136,696,610	N/A	October 28, 2020
Acis Capital	\$23,000,000	N/A	October 28, 2020
HarbourVest	\$45,000,000	\$35,000,000	January 21, 2021
UBS	\$65,000,000	\$60,000,000	May 27, 2021
TOTAL:	\$269,696,610	\$95,000,000	

Muck is owned and controlled by Farallon Capital Management ("Farallon"), and we believe Jessup is owned and controlled by Stonehill Capital Management ("Stonehill"). As the purchasers of the four largest claims in the bankruptcy, Muck (Farallon) and Jessup (Stonehill) will oversee the liquidation of the reorganized Debtor and the payment over time to creditors who have not sold their claims. These two hedge funds also will determine the performance bonus due to Mr. Seery for liquidating the estate. As set forth in the attached balance sheet dated August 31, 2021, we estimate that the estate today is worth nearly \$600 million,²⁰ which could result in Mr. Seery's receipt of a performance bonus approximating \$50 million.

This is concerning because there is substantial evidence that Farallon and Stonehill may have been provided material, non-public information to induce their purchase of these claims. We agree with Mr. Draper that there are three primary reasons to believe that non-public information was made available to facilitate these claims purchases:

- The scant publicly-available information regarding the Debtor's estate ordinarily would have dissuaded sizeable investment in purchases of creditors' claims;
- The information that actually was publicly available ordinarily would have compelled a prudent investor to conduct robust due diligence prior to purchasing the claims;
- Yet these claims purchasers spent in excess of \$100 million (and likely closer to \$150 million) on claims, ostensibly without any idea of what they were purchasing.

Credible information indicates that the claims purchases of Stonehill and Farallon can be summarized as follows:

<u>Creditor</u>	<u>Class 8</u>	<u>Class 9</u>	<u>Purchaser</u>	<u>Purchase Price</u>
Redeemer	\$137.0	\$0.0	Stonehill	\$78.0 ²¹
ACIS	\$23.0	\$0.0	Farallon	\$8.0
HarbourVest	\$45.0	\$35.0	Farallon	\$27.0
UBS	\$65.0	\$60.0	Stonehill and Farallon	\$50.0

²⁰ See Ex. D.

²¹ See Ex. E. Because the transaction included "the majority of the remaining investments held by the Crusader Funds," the net amount paid by Stonehill for the Claims was approximately \$65 million.

An analysis of publicly-available information would have revealed to any potential investor that:

- The estate's asset value had decreased by \$200 million, from \$556 million on October 16, 2019, to \$328 million as of September 30, 2020 (increasing only slightly to \$364 million as of January 31, 2021).²²
- Allowed claims against the estate increased by a total amount of \$236 million.
- Due to the decrease in the value of the Debtor's assets and the increase in the allowed claims amount, the ultimate projected recovery for creditors in bankruptcy decreased from 87.44% to 62.99% in just a matter of months.²³

No prudent investor or hedge fund investing third-party money would purchase substantial claims out of the Highland estate based on this publicly-available information absent robust due diligence demonstrating that the investment was sound.

As discussed by Mr. Draper, the very close relationships between the claims purchasers, on the one hand, and the selling Creditors' Committee members and the Debtor's management, on the other hand also raise red flags. In particular:

- Farallon and Stonehill have long-standing, material relationships with the members of the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Seery. Mr. Seery formerly was the Global Head of Fixed Income Loans at Lehman Bros. until its collapse in 2009. While Mr. Seery was Global Head, Lehman Bros. did substantial business with Farallon. After Lehman's collapse, Mr. Seery joined Sidley & Austin as co-head of the corporate restructuring and bankruptcy group, where he worked with Matt Clemente, counsel to the Creditors' Committee in Highland's bankruptcy proceedings.
- In addition, Grovesnor, one of the lead investors in the Crusader Funds from the Redeemer Committee (which appointed Seery as its independent director) both played a substantial role on the Creditors' Committee and is a large investor in Farallon and Stonehill. It is unclear whether Grovesnor, a registered investment advisor, notified minority investors in the Crusader Funds or Farallon and Stonehill of these facts.
- According to Farallon principals Raj Patel and Michael Linn, while at Sidley, Mr. Seery assisted Farallon in its acquisition of claims in the Lehman estate, and Farallon realized more than \$100 million in claims on those trades.

²² Compare Jan. 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report [Dkt. 2030], with Disclosure Statement (approved on Nov. 24, 2020) [Dkt. 1473]. The increase in value between September 2020 and January 2021 is attributable to the Debtor's settlement with HarbourVest, which granted HarbourVest a Class 8 claim of \$45 million and a Class 9 Claim of \$35 million, and in exchange the Debtor received HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF, which in reality was worth approximately \$44.3 million as of January 31, 2021. See Ex. C. It is also notable that the January 2021 monthly financial report values Class 8 claims at \$267 million, an exponential increase over their estimated value of \$74 million in December 2020.

²³ See Ex. F.

- Also while at Sidley, Mr. Seery represented the Steering Committee in the Blockbuster Video bankruptcy; Stonehill (through its Managing Member, John Motulsky) was one of the five members of the Steering Committee.
- Mr. Seery left Sidley in 2013 to become the President and Senior Investment Partner of River Birch Capital, a hedge fund founded by his former Lehman colleagues. He left River Birch in October 2017 just before the fund imploded. In 2017, River Birch and Stonehill Capital were two of the biggest note holders in the Toys R Us bankruptcy and were members of the Toys R Us creditors' committee.

I strongly agree with Mr. Draper that it is suspicious that two firms with such significant ties to Mr. Seery have purchased \$365 million in claims. The aggregate \$150 million purchase price paid by Farallon and Stonehill is 56% of all Class 8 claims, virtually the full plan value expected to be realized after two years. We believe it is worth investigating whether these claims buyers had access to material, non-public information regarding the actual value of the estate.

Other transactions occurring during the Highland bankruptcy also reinforce the suspicion that insider trading occurred. In particular, it appears that one of the claims buyers, Stonehill, used non-public information obtained incident to the bankruptcy to purchase stock in NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund (NYSE: NHF), a publicly traded, closed-end '40 Act fund with many holdings in common with assets held in the Highland estate outlined above. Stonehill is a registered investment adviser with \$3 billion under management that has historically owned very few equity interests, particularly equity interests in a closed-end fund. As disclosed in SEC filings, Stonehill acquired enough stock in NHF during the second quarter of 2021 to make it Stonehill's eighth largest equity position.

The timing of the acquisitions of claims by Farallon and Stonehill also raises suspicion. For example, although notices of the transfer of the claims were filed immediately after the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and prior to the effective date of the Plan, it seems likely that negotiations began much earlier. Transactions of this magnitude do not take place overnight and typically require robust due diligence. Muck was formed on March 9, 2021, more than a month before it filed notice that it was purchasing the Acis claim. If the negotiation or execution of a definitive agreement for the purchase began before or contemporaneously with Muck's formation, then there is every reason to believe that selling Creditors' Committee members and/or Debtor management provided Farallon with critical non-public information well before the Creditors' Committee members sold their claims and withdrew from the Committee. Indeed, Mr. Patel and Mr. Linn have stated to others that they purchased the Acis and HarbourVest claims in late January or early February. This is strong evidence that negotiation and/or agreements relating to the purchase of claims from Creditors' Committee members preceded the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan and the resignation of those members from the Committee.

Likewise, correspondence from the fund adviser to the Crusader Funds indicates that the Crusader Funds and the Redeemer Committee had "consummated" the sale of the Redeemer Committee's claims and other assets on April 30, 2021, "for \$78 million in cash, which was paid in full to the Crusader Funds at closing."²⁴ In addition, that there was a written agreement among Stonehill, the Crusader Funds, and the Redeemer Committee that sources indicate dates back to the fourth quarter of 2020. That agreement presumably imposed affirmative and negative covenants upon the seller and granted the purchaser discretionary approval rights during the pendency of the sale. Such an agreement would necessarily conflict with the Creditors' Committee members' fiduciary obligations.

²⁴ See Ex. E.

The sale of the claims by the members of the Creditors' Committee also violates the instructions provided to committee members by the U.S. Trustee that required a selling committee member to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court prior to any sale of such member's claim. No such Court approval was ever sought or obtained, and the Dallas U.S. Trustee's Office took no action to enforce this guideline. The Creditors' Committee members were sophisticated entities, and they were privy to inside information that was not available to other unsecured creditors. For example, valuations of assets placed into a specially-created affiliated entities, such as the assets acquired in the HarbourVest settlement, and valuations of assets held by other entities owned or controlled by the Debtor, were available to the selling Creditors' Committee members, but not to other creditors or parties-in-interest.

While claims trading itself is not prohibited, there is reason to believe that the claims trading that occurred in the Highland bankruptcy violated federal law:

- a) The selling parties were *three* of the four Creditors' Committee members, and each one had access to information they received in a fiduciary capacity;
- b) Some of the information they received would have been available to other parties-in-interest if Rule 2015.3 had been enforced;
- c) The projected recovery to creditors decreased significantly between the approval of the Disclosure Statement and the confirmation of the Debtor's Plan; and
- d) There was a suspicious purchase of stock by Stonehill in NHF, a closed-end fund previously affiliated with Highland (and now managed by NexPoint Advisors, L.P.) that is publicly traded on the New York stock exchange. The Debtor's assets and the positions held by the closed-end fund are similar.

Mr. Seery's Compensation Structure Encouraged Misrepresentations Regarding the Value of the Estate and Assets of the Estate

An additional problem in Highland's bankruptcy is that Mr. Seery, as an Independent Director as well as the Debtor's CEO and CRO, received financial incentives that encouraged claims trading and dealing in insider information.

Mr. Seery received sizeable compensation for his heavy-handed role in Highland's bankruptcy. Upon his appointment as an Independent Director in January 2020, Mr. Seery received compensation from the Debtor of \$60,000 per month for the first three months, \$50,000 per month for the following three months, and \$30,000 per month for remaining months, subject to adjustment by agreement with the Debtor.²⁵ When Mr. Seery subsequently was appointed the Debtor's CEO and CRO in July 2020, he received additional compensation, including base compensation of \$150,000 per month retroactive to March 2020 and for so long as he served in those roles, as well as a "Restructuring Fee."²⁶ Mr. Seery's employment agreement contemplated that the Restructuring Fee could be calculated in one of two ways:

- (1) If Mr. Seery were able to resolve a material amount of outstanding claims against the estate, he would be entitled to \$1 million on confirmation of what the Debtor termed a

²⁵ See Dkt. 339, ¶ 3.

²⁶ See Dkt. 854, Ex. 1.

"Case Resolution Plan," \$500,000 at the effective date of the Case Resolution Plan, and \$750,000 upon completion of distributions to creditors under the plan.

- (2) If, by contrast, Mr. Seery were not able to resolve the estate and instead achieved a "Monetization Vehicle Plan," he would be entitled to \$500,000 on confirmation of the Monetization Vehicle Plan, \$250,000 at the effective date of that plan, and—most importantly—a to-be-determined "contingent restructuring fee" based on "performance under the plan after all material distributions" were made.

The Restructuring Fee owed for a Case Resolution Plan was materially higher than that payable under the Monetization Vehicle Plan and provided a powerful economic incentive for Mr. Seery to resolve creditor claims in any way possible. Notably, at the time of Mr. Seery's formal appointment as CEO/CRO, he had already negotiated settlements in principle with Acis and the Redeemer Committee, leaving only the HarbourVest and UBS claims to resolve.

Further, after the Plan's effective date, as appointed Claimant Trustee, Mr. Seery was promised compensation of \$150,000 per month (termed his "Base Salary"), subject to the negotiation of additional "go-forward" compensation, including a "success fee" and severance pay.²⁷ Mr. Seery's success fee presumably will be based on whether the Plan outperforms what was disclosed in the Plan Analysis. In other words, Mr. Seery had a financial incentive to grossly understate the value of the estate in public disclosures, not only to facilitate claims trading and resolution of the biggest claims in bankruptcy (for purposes of obtaining the larger Case Resolution Fee) but also to ensure that he eventually receives a large "success fee." Again, we estimate that, based on the estate's nearly \$600 million value today, Mr. Seery's success fee could approximate \$50 million.

One excellent example of the way in which Mr. Seery facilitated claims trading and thereby lined his own pockets is the sale of UBS's claim. Based on the publicly-available information at the time Stonehill and Farallon purchased the UBS claim, the purchase made no economic sense. At the time, the publicly-disclosed Plan Analysis estimated that there would be a 71.32% distribution to Class 8 creditors and a 0.00% distribution to Class 9 creditors, which would mean believe is that, at the time of their claims purchase, the estate actually was worth much, much more (between \$472-\$600 million). If, prior to their claims purchases, Mr. Seery (or others in the Debtor's management) apprised Stonehill and Farallon of the true estate value (which was material, non-public information at the time), then the value they paid for the UBS claim made sense, because they would have known they were likely to recover close to 100% on Class 8 and Class 9 claims.

But perhaps the most important evidence of mismanagement of this bankruptcy proceeding and misalignment of financial incentives is the Debtor's repeated refusal to resolve the estate in full despite dozens of opportunities to do so. Immediately prior to the Plan confirmation hearing, Judge Jernigan suggested that the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero attempt to reach a settlement. Mr. Dondero, through counsel, already had made 35 offers of settlement that would have maximized the estate's recovery, even going so far as to file a proposed plan of reorganization. Some of these offers were valued between \$150 and \$232 million. And we now believe that as of August 1, 2020, the Debtor's estate had an actual value of at least \$460 million, including \$105 million in cash and a \$50 million revolving credit facility. With Mr. Dondero's offer, the Debtor's cash and the credit facility could have resolved the estate, which would have enabled the Debtor to pay all proofs of claim, leave a residual estate intact for equity holders, and allow the company to continue to operate as a going concern.

²⁷ See Plan Supplement, Dkt. 1875, § 3.13(a)(i).

Nonetheless, neither the Debtor nor the Creditors' Committee responded to Mr. Dondero's offers. It was not until The Honorable Former Judge D. Michael Lynn, counsel for Mr. Dondero, reminded the Creditors' Committee counsel that its members had a fiduciary duty to respond that a response was forthcoming. We believe Mr. Dondero's proposed plan offered a materially greater recovery than what the Debtor had reported would be the expected Plan recovery. The Creditors' Committee's failure to timely respond to that offer suggests that Debtor management, the Creditors' Committee, or both were financially disincentivized from accepting a case resolution offer and that some members of the Creditors' Committee were contractually constrained from doing so.

What happened instead was that the Debtor, its management, and the Creditors' Committee brokered deals that allowed grossly inflated claims and sales of those claims to a small group of investors with significant ties to Debtor management. In a transparent bankruptcy proceeding, we question whether any of this could have happened. What we do know is that the Debtor's non-transparent bankruptcy has ensured there will be nothing left for residual stakeholders, while enriching a handful of intimately connected individuals and investors.

The Debtor's Management and Advisors Are Almost Totally Insulated From Liability

Despite the mismanagement of bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court has issued a series of orders ensuring that the Debtor and its management cannot not be held liable for their actions in bankruptcy.

In particular, the Court issued a series of orders protecting Mr. Seery from potential liability for any act undertaken in the management of the Debtor or the disposition of its assets:

- In its order approving the settlement between the Creditors' Committee and Mr. Dondero, the Court barred any Debtor entity "from commenc[ing] or pursu[ing] a claim or cause of action of any kind against any Independent Director, any Independent Director's agents, or any Independent Director's advisors relating in any way to the Independent Director's role as an independent director" unless the Court first (1) determined the claim was a "colorable" claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence, and (2) authorized an entity to bring the claim. The Court also retained "sole jurisdiction" over any such claim.²⁸
- In its order approving the Debtor's retention of Mr. Seery as its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Restructuring Officer, the Court issued an identical injunction barring any claims against Mr. Seery in his capacity as CEO/CRO without prior court approval.²⁹ The same order authorized the Debtor to indemnify Mr. Seery for any claims or losses arising out of his engagement as CEO/CRO.³⁰

Worse still, the Plan approved by the Bankruptcy Court contains sweeping release and exculpation provisions that make it virtually impossible for third parties, including investors in the Debtor's managed funds, to file claims against the Debtor, its related entities, or their management. The Plan's exculpation provisions contain also contain a requirement that any potential claims be vetted and approved by the Bankruptcy Court. As Mr. Draper already explained, these provisions violate the holding

²⁸ Dkt. 339, ¶ 10.

²⁹ Order Approving Debtor's Motion Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 105(a) and 363(b) Authorizing Retention of James P. Seery, Jr. as Chief Executive Office, Chief Restructuring Officer, and Foreign Representative Nunc Pro Tunc to March 15, 2020, Dkt. 854, ¶ 5.

³⁰ Dkt. 854, ¶ 4 & Exh. 1.

of *In re Pacific Lumber Co.*, in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected similarly broad exculpation clauses.³¹

The fundamental problem with the Plan's broad exculpation and release provisions has been brought into sharp focus in recent days, with the filing of a lawsuit by the Litigation Trustee against Mr. Dondero, other individuals formerly affiliated with Highland, and several trusts and entities affiliated with Mr. Dondero.³² Among other false accusations, that lawsuit alleges that the aggregate amount of allowed claims in bankruptcy was high because the Debtor and its management were forced to settle with various purported judgment creditors who had engaged in pre-petition litigation with Mr. Dondero and Highland. But it was Mr. Seery and Debtor's management, not Mr. Dondero and the other defendants, who negotiated those settlements with creditors in bankruptcy and who decided what value to assign to their claims. Ordinarily, Mr. Dondero and the other defendants could and would file compulsory counterclaims against the Debtor and its management for their role in brokering and settling claims in bankruptcy. But the Bankruptcy Court has effectively precluded such counterclaims (absent the defendants obtaining the Court's advance permission to assert them) by releasing the Debtor and its management from virtually all liability in relation to their roles in the bankruptcy case. That is a violation of due process.

Notably, the U.S. Trustee's Office recently has argued in the context of the bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma that release and exculpations clauses akin to those contained in Highland's Plan violate both the Bankruptcy Code and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.³³ In addition, the U.S. Trustee explained that the bankruptcy courts lack constitutional authority to release state-law causes of action against debtor management and non-debtor entities.³⁴ Indeed, it has been the U.S. Trustee's position that where, as here, third parties whose claims are being released did not receive notice of the releases and had no way of knowing, based on the applicable plan's language, what claims were extinguished, third-party releases are contrary to law.³⁵ This position comports with Fifth Circuit case law, which makes clear that releases must be consensual, and that the released party must make a substantial contribution in exchange for any release.

As a result of the release and exculpation provisions of the Plan, employees and third-party investors in entities managed by the Debtor who are harmed by actions taken by the Debtor and its management in bankruptcy are barred from asserting their claims without prior Bankruptcy Court approval. Those third parties' claims are barred notwithstanding that they were not notified of the releases and have never been given any information with which to evaluate their potential claims (as mentioned, the Debtor has not disclosed several major assets sales, nor does the Plan require the Debtor to disclose post-confirmation asset sales). Conversely, the releases insulate claims purchasers from the risk of potential actions by investors in funds managed by the Debtor (for breach of fiduciary duty, diminution in value, or otherwise). These releases are directly at odds with investors' expectations and the written documents delivered to and approved by investors when they invest in managed funds—i.e., that fund managers will act in a fiduciary capacity to maximize investors' returns and that investors will have recourse for any failure to do so.

³¹ 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).

³² The Plan created a Litigation Sub-Trust to be managed by a Litigation Trustee, whose sole mandate is to file lawsuits in an effort to realize additional value for the estate.

³³ See Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee's Expedited Motion for Stay of Confirmation Order, *In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.*, Case No. 19-23649 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Doc. 3778 at 17-25.

³⁴ *Id.* at 26-28.

³⁵ See *id.* at 22.

Ms. Nan R. Eitel

November 3, 2021

Page 17

As an example, the Court approved the settlement of UBS's claim against the Debtor and two funds managed by the Debtor (collectively referred to as "MultiStrat"). Pursuant to that settlement, MultiStrat agreed to pay UBS \$18.5 million. But the settlement made no sense for several reasons. First, Highland owns approximately 48% of MultiStrat, so causing MultiStrat to make such a substantial payment to settle a claim in Highland's bankruptcy necessarily negatively impacted its other non-Debtor investors. Second, in its lawsuit, UBS alleged that MultiStrat wrongfully received a \$6 million payment, but MultiStrat paid more than three times this amount to settle allegations against it—a deal that made little economic sense. Finally, as part of the settlement, MultiStrat represented that it was advised by "independent legal counsel" in the negotiation of the settlement, a representation that was patently untrue.³⁶ In reality, the only legal counsel advising MultiStrat was the Debtor's counsel, who had economic incentives to broker the deal in a manner that benefited the Debtor rather than MultiStrat and its investors.³⁷ If (as it seems) that representation and/or the terms of the UBS/MultiStrat settlement unfairly impacted MultiStrat's investors, they now have no recourse against the Debtor. The release and exculpation provisions in Highland's Plan do not afford third parties any meaningful recourse, even when they are negatively impacted by misrepresentations of the type contained in the UBS/MultiStrat settlement or when their interests are impaired by fund managers' failure to obtain fairness opinions to resolve conflicts of interest.

Bankruptcy Proceedings Are Used As an End-Run Around Applicable Legal Duties

The UBS deal is but one example of how Highland's bankruptcy proceedings, including the settlement of claims and claims trading that occurred, seemingly provided a safe harbor for violations of multiple state and federal laws. For example, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires registered investment advisors like the Debtor to act as fiduciaries of the funds that they manage. Indeed, the Act imposes an "affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith' and full and fair disclosure of material facts" as part of advisors' duties of loyalty and care to investors. See 17 C.F.R. Part 275. Adherence to these duties means that investment advisors cannot buy securities for their account prior to buying them for a client, cannot make trades that may result in higher commissions for the advisor or their investment firm, and cannot trade using material, non-public information. In addition, investment advisors must ensure that they provide investors with full and accurate information regarding the assets managed.

State blue sky laws similarly prohibit firms holding themselves out as investment advisors from breaching these core fiduciary duties to investors. For example, the Texas Securities Act prohibits any registered investment advisor from trading on material, non-public information. The Act also conveys a private right of action to investors harmed by breaches of an investment advisor's fiduciary duties.

As explained above, Highland executed numerous transactions during its bankruptcy that may have violated the Investment Advisors Act and state blue sky laws. Among other things:

- Highland facilitated the purchase of HarbourVest's interest in HCLOF (placing that interest in an SPE designated by the Debtor) without disclosing the true value of the interest and without first offering it to other investors in the fund;

³⁶ See Doc. 2389 (Order Approving Debtor's Settlement With UBS Securities LLC and UBS AG London Branch) at Ex. 1, §§ 1(b), 11; see Appendix, p. A-57.

³⁷ The Court's order approving the UBS settlement is under appeal in part based on MultiStrat's lack of independent legal counsel.

- Highland concealed the estate's true value from investors in its managed funds, making it impossible for those investors to fairly evaluate the estate or its assets during bankruptcy;
- Highland facilitated the settlement of UBS's claim by causing MultiStrat, a non-Debtor managed entity, to pay \$18.5 million to the Debtor, to the detriment of MultiStrat's investors; and
- Highland and its CEO/CRO, Mr. Seery, brokered deals between three of four Creditors' Committee members and Farallon and Stonehill—deals that made no sense unless Farallon and Stonehill were supplied material, non-public information regarding the true value of the estate.

In short, Mr. Seery effectuated trades that seemingly lined his own pockets, in transactions that we believe detrimentally impacted investors in the Debtor's managed funds.

CONCLUSION

The Highland bankruptcy is an example of the abuses that can occur if the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules are not enforced and are allowed to be manipulated, and if federal law enforcement and federal lawmakers abdicate their responsibilities. Bankruptcy should not be a safe haven for perjury, breaches of fiduciary duty, and insider trading, with a plan containing third-party releases and sweeping exculpation sweeping everything under the rug. Nor should it be an avenue for opportunistic venturers to prey upon companies, their investors, and their creditors to the detriment of third-party stakeholders and the bankruptcy estate. My clients and I join Mr. Draper in encouraging your office to investigate, fight, and ultimately eliminate this type of abuse, now and in the future.

Best regards,

MUNSCH HARDT KOPF & HARR, P.C.

By:


Davor Rukavina, Esq.


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Appendix

Table of Contents

Relationships Among Debtor’s CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers.....	2
Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]	3
Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony.....	15
Sale of Assets of Affiliates or Controlled Entities.....	24
20 Largest Unsecured Creditors.....	25
Timeline of Relevant Events	26
Debtor’s October 15, 2020 Liquidation Analysis [Doc. 1173-1].....	27
Updated Liquidation Analysis (Feb. 1, 2021).....	28
Summary of Debtor’s January 31, 2021 Monthly Operating Report.....	29
Value of HarbourVest Claim.....	30
Estate Value as of August 1, 2021 (in millions)	31
HarbourVest Motion to Approve Settlement [Doc. 1625].....	32
UBS Settlement [Doc. 2200-1]	45
Hellman & Friedman Seeded Farallon Capital Management	62
Hellman & Friedman Owned a Portion of Grosvenor until 2020	63
Farallon was a Significant Borrower for Lehman	65
Mr. Seery Represented Stonehill While at Sidley	66
Stonehill Founder (Motulsky) and Grosvenor’s G.C. (Nesler) Were Law School Classmates.....	67
Investor Communication to Highland Crusader Funds Stakeholders.....	70

Relationships Among Debtor's CEO/CRO, the UCC, and Claims Purchasers



*Is there an affiliate relationship between Stonehill, Grosvenor, and Farallon? Has it been adequately disclosed to the Court and investors?

009194

Debtor Protocols [Doc. 466-1]

I. Definitions

- A. “Court” means the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas.
- B. “NAV” means (A) with respect to an entity that is not a CLO, the value of such entity’s assets less the value of its liabilities calculated as of the month end prior to any Transaction; and (B) with respect to a CLO, the CLO’s gross assets less expenses calculated as of the quarter end prior to any Transaction.
- C. “Non-Discretionary Account” means an account that is managed by the Debtor pursuant to the terms of an agreement providing, among other things, that the ultimate investment discretion does not rest with the Debtor but with the entity whose assets are being managed through the account.
- D. “Related Entity” means collectively (A)(i) any non-publicly traded third party in which Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, or Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor) has any direct or indirect economic or ownership interest, including as a beneficiary of a trust; (ii) any entity controlled directly or indirectly by Mr. Dondero, Mr. Okada, Mr. Grant Scott, or Mr. John Honis (with respect to Messrs. Okada, Scott and Honis, only to the extent known by the Debtor); (iii) MGM Holdings, Inc.; (iv) any publicly traded company with respect to which the Debtor or any Related Entity has filed a Form 13D or Form 13G; (v) any relative (as defined in Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code) of Mr. Dondero or Mr. Okada each solely to the extent reasonably knowable by the Debtor; (vi) the Hunter Mountain Investment Trust and Dugaboy Investment Trust; (vii) any entity or person that is an insider of the Debtor under Section 101(31) the Bankruptcy Code, including any “non-statutory” insider; and (viii) to the extent not included in (A)(i)-(vii), any entity included in the listing of related entities in **Schedule B** hereto (the “Related Entities Listing”); and (B) the following Transactions, (x) any intercompany Transactions with certain affiliates referred to in paragraphs 16.a through 16.e of the Debtor’s cash management motion [Del. Docket No. 7]; and (y) any Transactions with Charitable DAF Fund, L.P. (provided, however, that additional parties may be added to this subclause (y) with the mutual consent of the Debtor and the Committee, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld).
- E. “Stage 1” means the time period from the date of execution of a term sheet incorporating the protocols contained below the (“Term Sheet”) by all applicable parties until approval of the Term Sheet by the Court.
- F. “Stage 2” means the date from the appointment of a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc. until 45 days after such appointment, such appointment being effective upon Court approval.
- G. “Stage 3” means any date after Stage 2 while there is a Board of Independent Directors at Strand Advisors, Inc.
- H. “Transaction” means (i) any purchase, sale, or exchange of assets, (ii) any lending or borrowing of money, including the direct payment of any obligations of another entity, (iii) the satisfaction of any capital call or other contractual

requirement to pay money, including the satisfaction of any redemption requests, (iv) funding of affiliates and (v) the creation of any lien or encumbrance.

- I. "Ordinary Course Transaction" means any transaction with any third party which is not a Related Entity and that would otherwise constitute an "ordinary course transaction" under section 363(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
- J. "Notice" means notification or communication in a written format and shall include supporting documents necessary to evaluate the propriety of the proposed transaction.
- K. "Specified Entity" means any of the following entities: ACIS CLO 2017-7 Ltd., Brentwood CLO, Ltd., Gleneagles CLO, Ltd., Greenbriar CLO, Ltd., Highland CLO 2018-1, Ltd., Highland Legacy Limited, Highland Loan Funding V Ltd., Highland Park CDO I, Ltd., Pam Capital Funding LP, PamCo Cayman Ltd., Rockwall CDO II Ltd., Rockwall CDO Ltd., Southfork CLO Ltd., Stratford CLO Ltd., Westchester CLO, Ltd., Aberdeen Loan Funding, Ltd., Bristol Bay Funding Ltd. Eastland CLO, Ltd., Grayson CLO, Ltd., Highland Credit Opportunities CDO Ltd., Jasper CLO, Ltd., Liberty Cayman Holdings, Ltd., Liberty CLO, Ltd., Red River CLO, Ltd., Valhalla CLO, Ltd.

II. Transactions involving the (i) assets held directly on the Debtor's balance sheet or the balance sheet of the Debtor's wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Jefferies Prime Account, and (ii) the Highland Select Equity Fund, L.P., Highland Multi Strategy Credit Fund, L.P., and Highland Restoration Capital Partners

A. **Covered Entities:** N/A (See entities above).

B. Operating Requirements

- 1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
- 2. Related Entity Transactions
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages)

- a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.
- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

III. Transactions involving entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above)

- A. **Covered Entities:** See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest (other than the entities discussed in Section I above).¹
- B. **Operating Requirements**
 - 1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
 - 2. Related Entity Transactions

¹ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

- a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
3. **Third Party Transactions (All Stages)**
- a) Except as set forth in (b) and (c) below, Transactions in excess of \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require three business days advance notice to Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - c) The Debtor may satisfy margin calls and short covers without providing the Committee advance notice if the exigencies do not allow advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable.
- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category.

IV. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

A. **Covered Entities:** See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.²

B. **Operating Requirements**

1. Ordinary Course Transactions do not require Court approval (All Stages).
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: ordinary course determined by the CRO.
 - b) Stage 3: ordinary course determined by the Debtor.
2. Related Entity Transactions
 - a) Stage 1 and Stage 2: Transactions with Related Entities require prior approval of CRO and five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - b) Stage 3:
 - (1) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$1,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require five business days advance notice to the Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
 - (2) Transactions with Related Entities greater than \$2,000,000 (either individually or in the aggregate basis on a rolling 30 day period) require Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
3. Third Party Transactions (All Stages):
 - a) Except (x) as set forth in (b) and (c) below and (y) for any Transaction involving a Specified Entity and the sale or purchase by such Specified Entity of an asset that is not an obligation or security issued or guaranteed by any of the Debtor, a Related Entity or a fund, account, portfolio company owned, controlled or managed by the Debtor or a Related Entity, where such Transaction is effected in compliance with the collateral management agreement to which such Specified Entity is party, any Transaction that decreases the NAV of an entity managed by the Debtor in excess of the greater of (i) 10% of NAV or (ii) \$3,000,000 requires five business days advance notice to

² The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

Committee and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- b) The Debtor may satisfy any redemption requests from entities that are not Related Entities without advance notice so long as the Debtor provides notice of such Transactions to the Committee as soon as reasonably practicable. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any redemption requests made by and payable to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.
- c) The Debtor may take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to winddown any managed entity and make distributions as may be required in connection with such winddown to any required parties. The Debtor will provide the Committee with five business days advance notice of any distributions to be made to a Related Entity, and if the Committee objects, the burden is on the Debtor to seek Court approval, which the Committee agrees may be sought on an expedited basis.

- C. **Weekly Reporting:** The Debtor will provide the Committee with weekly reports showing all Transactions under this category. Such reports will include Transactions involving a Specified Entity unless the Debtor is prohibited from doing so under applicable law or regulation or any agreement governing the Debtor's relationship with such Specified Entity.

V. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest.³
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

³ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

VI. Transactions involving entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest.⁴
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VII. Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

- A. Covered Entities: See Schedule A hereto. Schedule A includes or will include all non-discretionary accounts.⁵
- B. Ordinary Course Transactions (All Stages): N/A
- C. Operating Requirements: N/A
- D. Weekly Reporting: Debtor will provide weekly reports of all cross-held asset Transactions, i.e. Transactions in which the Debtor or a Related Entity also holds a direct or indirect interest.

VIII. Additional Reporting Requirements – All Stages (to the extent applicable)

- A. DSI will provide detailed lists and descriptions of internal financial and operational controls being applied on a daily basis for a full understanding by the Committee and its professional advisors three (3) business days in advance of the hearing on the approval of the Term Sheet and details of proposed amendments to said financial and operational controls no later than seven (7) days prior to their implementation.
- B. The Debtor will continue to provide weekly budget to actuals reports referencing their 13-week cash flow budget, such reports to be inclusive of all Transactions with Related Entities.

IX. Shared Services

- A. The Debtor shall not modify any shared services agreement without approval of the CRO and Independent Directors and seven business days' advance notice to counsel for the Committee.
- B. The Debtor may otherwise continue satisfying its obligations under the shared services agreements.

⁴ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

⁵ The Debtor is continuing to review the Related Entities List and to determine whether any additional parties or entities should be included on Schedule A. The Debtor will update Schedule A as soon as reasonably practicable to the extent necessary.

X. Representations and Warranties

- A. The Debtor represents that the Related Entities Listing included as **Schedule B** attached hereto lists all known persons and entities other than natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.
- B. The Debtor represents that the list included as **Schedule C** attached hereto lists all known natural persons included in the definitions of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(i)-(vii) above at the time of the execution of the Term Sheet.
- C. The Debtor represents that, if at any time the Debtor becomes aware of any person or entity, including natural persons, meeting the definition of Related Entities covered by Section I.D parts A(1)-(vii) above that is not included in the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, the Debtor shall update the Related Entities Listing or Schedule C, as appropriate, to include such entity or person and shall give notice to the Committee thereof.

Schedule A⁶

Entities the Debtor manages and in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland CLO Funding, Ltd. (0.63% Ownership Interest)
2. Dynamic Income Fund (0.26% Ownership Interest)

Entities that the Debtor manages but in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Prometheus Master Fund L.P.
2. NexAnnuity Life Insurance Company
3. PensionDanmark
4. Highland Argentina Regional Opportunity Fund
5. Longhorn A
6. Longhorn B
7. Collateralized Loan Obligations
 - a) Rockwall II CDO Ltd.
 - b) Grayson CLO Ltd.
 - c) Eastland CLO Ltd.
 - d) Westchester CLO, Ltd.
 - e) Brentwood CLO Ltd.
 - f) Greenbriar CLO Ltd.
 - g) Highland Park CDO Ltd.
 - h) Liberty CLO Ltd.
 - i) Gleneagles CLO Ltd.
 - j) Stratford CLO Ltd.
 - k) Jasper CLO Ltd.
 - l) Rockwall DCO Ltd.
 - m) Red River CLO Ltd.
 - n) Hi V CLO Ltd.
 - o) Valhalla CLO Ltd.
 - p) Aberdeen CLO Ltd.
 - q) South Fork CLO Ltd.
 - r) Legacy CLO Ltd.
 - s) Pam Capital
 - t) Pamco Cayman

Entities that the Debtor does not manage but in which the Debtor holds a direct or indirect interest

1. Highland Opportunistic Credit Fund
2. Highland Healthcare Opportunities Fund f/k/a Highland Long/Short Healthcare Fund
3. NexPoint Real Estate Strategies Fund
4. Highland Merger Arbitrage Fund
5. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund
6. Highland Small Cap Equity Fund
7. Highland Global Allocation Fund

⁶ NTD: Schedule A is work in process and may be supplemented or amended.

8. Highland Socially Responsible Equity Fund
9. Highland Income Fund
10. Stonebridge-Highland Healthcare Private Equity Fund (“Korean Fund”)
11. SE Multifamily, LLC

Entities that the Debtor does not manage and in which the Debtor does not hold a direct or indirect interest

1. The Dugaboy Investment Trust
2. NexPoint Capital LLC
3. NexPoint Capital, Inc.
4. Highland IBoxx Senior Loan ETF
5. Highland Long/Short Equity Fund
6. Highland Energy MLP Fund
7. Highland Fixed Income Fund
8. Highland Total Return Fund
9. NexPoint Advisors, L.P.
10. Highland Capital Management Services, Inc.
11. Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors L.P.
12. ACIS CLO Management LLC
13. Governance RE Ltd
14. PCMG Trading Partners XXIII LP
15. NexPoint Real Estate Partners, LLC f/k/a HCRE Partners LLC
16. NexPoint Real Estate Advisors II LP
17. NexPoint Healthcare Opportunities Fund
18. NexPoint Securities
19. Highland Diversified Credit Fund
20. BB Votorantim Highland Infrastructure LLC
21. ACIS CLO 2017 Ltd.

Transactions involving Non-Discretionary Accounts

1. NexBank SSB Account
2. Charitable DAF Fund LP

Schedule B

Related Entities Listing (other than natural persons)

Schedule C

1. James Dondero
2. Mark Okada
3. Grant Scott
4. John Honis
5. Nancy Dondero
6. Pamela Okada
7. Thomas Surgent
8. Scott Ellington
9. Frank Waterhouse
10. Lee (Trey) Parker

Seery Jan. 29, 2021 Testimony

Page 1

1 IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
3 DALLAS DIVISION

4 -----)

5 In Re: Chapter 11
6 HIGHLAND CAPITAL Case No.
7 MANAGEMENT, LP, 19-34054-SGJ 11

8

9 Debtor

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13 REMOTE DEPOSITION OF JAMES P. SEERY, JR.

14 January 29, 2021

15 10:11 a.m. EST

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24 Reported by:
Debra Stevens, RPR-CRR
JOB NO. 189212

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